Do Contentious Nominations Put Parties in Trouble or Do Parties in Trouble Have Contentious Nominations???

As the debate continues about the state of the Obama/Clinton contest and how it will affect the Democratic nominee’s chances in November, I thought it might be helpful to take a bit of a historical look at this issue. With all sorts of pundits, journalists, and Democratic activists in a tizzy over this question, taking a step back is clearly in order.

As I mentioned in my post on realignment, Walter Dean Burnham identified a process, rapidly unfolding by the 1960’s, of party “decomposition.” What he meant by this was that the party, as organization, was able to exert less and less control over the process by which party nominees were chosen. With the advent of the primary system the nomination process, while “democratized,” was also more subject to unpredictable and uncontrollable twists and turns. Candidates themselves became increasingly in control of the process and decisions about when to enter and when to exit the race were largely theirs to make. We see the manifestation of this today in the Democratic race.

This got me thinking about those nomination fights, for both parties, that have been the most contentious in the years since Burnham identified this process. Did these contentious nomination processes doom the nominee in the fall? Might there be other explanations for that party’s failure to capture the presidency?

While all nomination fights have some degree of conflict—indeed that’s what a nomination process is premised on—some have been more contentious and drawn out than others. I’ve identified four that seem to be the most cited as damaging to their party:

1968 Democrats. Here we have the classic example of a party in chaos and disarray. After President Johnson is embarrassed in the New Hampshire primary by Senator Eugene McCarthy, LBJ decides not to seek re-election. We see McCarthy continue, soon joined by Bobby Kennedy and the incumbent Vice President Hubert Humphrey. After the assassination of RFK, the party limps to the disastrous Chicago convention and awards the nomination to Humphrey.

1976 Republicans. President Ford, never elected Vice President or President due to the resignations of both Spiro Agnew and Richard Nixon, is seeking election in his own right. In the process he is challenged from the right by former California Governor Ronald Reagan. Reagan wins some primaries but drops out at the party convention in Kansas City.

1980 Democrats. President Jimmy Carter, in the midst of the Iranian hostage crisis, is challenged by Senator Edward Kennedy. Carter, despite capturing the White House for the Democrats in the wake of Watergate, is unpopular nationwide and within the Democratic Congress. Sensing the last chance at restoring Camelot, Kennedy jumps in the race and manages to win some contests but doesn’t come close to winning the nomination. Nonetheless, he doesn’t formally drop out until the convention in New York.

1992 Republicans. This case was probably the least contentious but still produced some surprises. Coming out of the Gulf War, George Bush’s popularity skyrockets, forcing many prominent Democrats to opt out of challenging him. As the economy begins to sour, commentator and former Nixon speechwriter Pat Buchanan mounts a populist challenge to Bush for the Republican nomination. While the outcome of the nomination was never really in doubt, Buchanan’s challenge did signal difficulties ahead, both at the disastrous convention in New Orleans, and afterwards.

So what can we say about these cases? The first thing that we would note is that in all four cases the nominee eventually lost the general election in November. The 1968 and 1976 general elections were extremely close, 1980 and 1992 less so. Thus, a fractious nominating process would seem to bring bad tidings on a party.

But wait. Might we have the arrow of causality backwards? Rather than a party being weakened by a tough nomination fight, might that fight be the consequence of an already weakened party? Here, there seems to be compelling evidence.

One thing we would note about these contentious fights is that in all four cases it was the party in power that went through the wrenching nomination. As presidents’ terms progress, we tend to see a decline in their popularity, the fracturing of their original electoral coalition, and their tendency to be captured by events. With Humphrey in ’68, his inability to disassociate himself with LBJ’s Vietnam policy was an albatross he couldn’t shake. Ford in ’76 found himself bearing the brunt of voters’ Watergate rage, surely compounded by his pardon of Nixon. Carter in 1980, as mentioned, had the Iran hostage crisis, plus the general “malaise” of inflation to grapple with. Finally, Bush in ’92 had declining economic fortunes on his watch. Thus, while we normally think of incumbents as having tremendous advantages, a faltering presidency can be deadly, whether the incumbent is on the ticket in November or not.

A second thing to note about these election years is that in three of them—’68, ’80, and ’92 you had a credible third party candidate enter the race and perform well in November. George Wallace captured 13% of the vote, and five states, in 1968. Republican House member, turned independent candidate, John Anderson received 7% of the vote in 1980. Ross Perot in 1992 got 19%. Furthermore, in looking at the origins of these candidacies and the source of their support, we can see them essentially as spin-offs or breakaways from one of the major parties. Wallace had been elected as a Democrat, had sought the Democratic nomination before and would seek it again in the future. Anderson, as mentioned, was a Republican House member and seemed to tap into the liberal wing of the Republican electorate scared off by Reagan’s conservatism. Some of these voters may have flocked to Carter (although they wouldn't have been enough to save Carter's presidency). Finally, while never a Republican office holder, an examination of the Perot vote suggests he took more from the normal Republican electorate than from the Democratic side.

So, rather than dooming a party to failure, might a contentious nomination fight be a symptom of a much larger problem?

Looking at this year, then, what can we say? The first thing I would say is that it’s not at all clear that the Obama/Clinton contest has reached to level of rancor that these other races did. We’ll have to see how the next few months play out. Second, one thing working in the Democratic nominee’s favor, whoever it is, is that they are the party out of power right now. It is John McCain who will be occupying the role of Hubert Humphrey, to use the Vietnam/Iraq parallel as an example. Neither Obama nor Clinton has to defend the current administration. There will inevitably be a rallying behind the Democratic nominee—it’s easier, perhaps, to storm the castle than defend it. Finally, we don’t have a credible third party candidate this year to siphon off votes from the left. That will work to the Democratic nominee’s advantage. If we look at the fundamentals—Bush’s approval rating, perception of the economy, opinion of the war in Iraq, Democrats’ performance in the ’06 midterms, etc.—things seem to look good for the Dems.

So for those worrying about whether Clinton voters will support Obama or whether Obama voters will support Clinton, you need to settle down.

A Long Rumination on Turnout, the South, and Harold Washington

Over the last couple of weeks I’ve been thinking a lot about turnout. As several stories in the past few days have discussed, and as we know from the primaries to this point, turnout has been soaring on the Democratic side. Obviously this bodes well for them in the general election in November.

For Obama supporters, increased turnout among African Americans and younger voters has been responsible for the magnitude of many of their victories. As the campaign between Obama and Clinton has intensified and turned nasty, the question that has been asked is whether these voters will still show up in November should Obama be denied the nomination. Likewise, Clinton supporters have argued that her core constituency—i.e. older women, white working class voters—can’t be taken for granted either. Polling released in the past few days about the hesitancy of each side to vote for the other (polling that I would take with a large grain of salt, by the way, given how moods can change over seven months) has re-enforced these fears.

My thinking about turnout was also peaked by the running debate about how an Obama nomination could “change the electoral map” in November. With increased turnout, especially among African Americans, might states that have voted Republican in the past—but with large black populations—potentially vote Democratic in the fall? Here, many people have looked to the south, a region I’ve been writing a lot about recently. A Census Bureau report on the black population in America confirms what we’ve known for a while (see my earlier map from Kevin Phillips circa 1968). Namely, the black population continues to be concentrated in southern states.

For example, ten states—Texas, Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, Maryland, Louisiana, Virginia, South Carolina, Alabama, and Mississippi—account for just under half of the nation’s black population. In six of these states, blacks make up more than 25% of the total population (Mississippi—37%; Louisiana—33%; South Carolina—30%; Georgia—29%; Maryland—29%; Alabama—26%). These numbers make many Democratic operatives salivate, especially with an Obama candidacy driving up turnout and drawing virtually all black voters to his side.

So what’s the problem?? The problem, according to Thomas Schaller, is that black voting doesn’t occur in a vacuum, but tends to produce a reaction among white voters. We would note, for example, that of the states listed above only Maryland is reliably in the Democratic camp election after election. Others have gone Democratic sporadically—Georgia (’92), Louisiana (’92, ’96)—but on the whole these states have been among the reddest of the red over the last few decades. The reason, according to Schaller, is that race is so entwined in southern politics that whites have fled the Democratic party (a process begun by Goldwater and continued through Wallace, Nixon, and Reagan) over the past generation and have become the most solid part of the Republican coalition. While the size of the black population gives Democrats a head start toward carrying these states, the strong Republican tilt of the white vote is able to overwhelm Democratic candidates. Using Mississippi as a specific example, Schaller writes:

“If African-Americans, who are 37 percent of voters, cast 90 percent of their vote for the Democratic nominee, that means Mississippi Democrats begin any statewide campaign with about 33 percent of the vote—or two thirds of the way to a majority. Yet the Republicans control the state’s governorship, both U.S. Senate seats, and have carried Mississippi in the last seven presidential elections.”

We would also note that such a scenario has happened with white Democratic candidates on the ballot. White flight to the Republican camp might intensify with a Democrat like Obama at the top of the ticket.

Schaller’s analysis seems to dovetail nicely with the southern portraits that V.O. Key gave us over fifty years ago. As I’ve noted in several earlier posts, Key wrote that southern politics prior to the recent Republican realignment tended to produce pathologies heavily influenced by the race question. Without a viable opposition party to attract black votes (assuming they had access to the ballot) white politicians were able to demagogue the issue without fear of reprisals. In fact, it was usually electorally advantageous.

Where does that leave us? Is someone like Obama unable to “change the electoral map” in the south? Schaller is highly skeptical of any Democratic future in the south in the short term (even with white candidates). He counsels Democrats to look westward for greener (bluer?) pastures. This is no doubt a wise strategy given what we're seeing in places like Colorado, New Mexico, and Nevada. While Schaller’s evidence is quite convincing, I’d like to throw out for consideration three southern states that could potentially go Democratic with Obama as the nominee (and perhaps with Clinton too should black voters turn out for her). These states are southern, but not of the deep south, and have four things going for them that might help put them in the Democratic camp. First, they have a sizable black population. Second, while race has been a prevalent issue in their politics, it hasn’t been as crippling and venomous as in some other southern states. Third, they have a large number of highly educated white voters, many born outside of the south. These voters tend to live in what Judis and Texeira call “ideopolises.” These areas tend to have voters who have high education, high income, and socially liberal positions on issues such as abortion, gay marriage, prayer in school, etc. As we know from the exit polling so far this year, Obama has done extremely well in these areas. Finally, these states have elected Democrats statewide recently and, in fact, all have Democratic governors now. I’ll list these states in order of what I would predict to be their likelihood of going Democratic.

First is Virginia. The black population of Virginia, as of 2000, is 20.4% compared to 12.9% nationwide. The black population of the state is largely concentrated in the city of Richmond in the center of the state and in the Hampton Roads/Newport News/Portsmouth/Norfolk area in the southeast corner. Virginia has elected an African American governor—Douglas Wilder in 1989 and has elected two consecutive Democratic governors—Mark Warner (2001) and Tim Kaine (2005) in addition to Democrat Jim Webb to the Senate in 2006. This “purpling” of the state, which hasn’t voted for a Democrat for President since LBJ in 1964, has been fueled by the growth of northern Virginia. The corridor of suburbs stretching westward from Washington, DC from Arlington through Fairfax, Falls Church, and out into Loudon County is a classic example of an ideopolis. The tech boom of the 90’s had its counterpart to Silicon Valley in this area and has been trending more and more Democratic, witnessed most recently by last year’s contest for the state legislature that saw a number of seats go Democratic.

Second is North Carolina. Here, the black population is 22.1% and is much more geographically dispersed than in Virginia. Concentrations of black voters can be found in and around Charlotte as well as the Raleigh/Durham area and in the more rural northeastern part of the state. The state’s governor since 2000 is Democrat Michael Easley and the state’s House delegation in Congress is now majority Democrat. North Carolina last voted Democratic in the presidential race, however, in 1976. As for the “ideopolis” variable, we have the research triangle area of Chapel Hill/Raleigh/Durham with three world class universities and a large tech sector. Orange and Durham counties went overwhelmingly for Kerry in 2004 and Wake county gave Bush only a slight win.

Finally, and least likely to go Democratic, is Tennessee. African Americans make up 16.8% of the state population. It is often argued that Tennessee is in fact three distinct regions (with three distinct brands of politics) and we see a similar pattern in terms of the black population. The largest concentration of black voters is in the south west part of the state, mainly in and around Memphis. Central Tennessee, centered around Nashville, sees a somewhat smaller, but nonetheless significant population of black voters (around 23%). Finally, heavily Republican eastern Tennessee is the whitest part of the state. The state currently has a Democratic governor in Phil Bredesen and voted Democratic in the ’92 and ’96 presidential races (Al Gore). In 2006, African American congressman Harold Ford, Jr. narrowly lost the race for the open Senate seat vacated by Bill Frist. The Nashville area has developed into a region to be known for more than the Grand Ole Opry. Like the Research Triangle and Northern Virginia, it has a thriving tech sector. Davidson county gave Kerry 55% in 2004.

Having said all of this, I don’t want to predict definitively how these states might go this fall. I simply raise them as possibilities which, I believe, are well rooted in the demography, history, and voting trends of each state.

What might tip these states in Obama’s favor? I return to the issue of turnout. According to Schaller, black turnout in the south is in fact higher than in other parts of the country. Thus, he is skeptical of efforts to turn these states blue through greater mobilization. In thinking about this, however, I was reminded of a book I read a year or so ago about another black candidate from Chicago—Harold Washington. When Washington became the first black mayor of Chicago in 1983, he was successful because of an amazing mobilization of the city’s black electorate. On the tail end of the first Daley era, Washington’s campaign was a classic insurgency style effort. Running in a heavily contested Democratic primary, Washington was able to benefit from a 25% increase in black turnout to garner a narrow victory. In the general election, black turnout in Chicago was a staggering 85%, with 99% of the black vote going to Washington. In a campaign, both primary and general, that saw some of the worst race baiting possible, Harold Washington was able to rely on turnout to win. If Obama could produce registration and turnout that mirrors what Washington did, but on a much larger scale, might we see some previously red states go blue?

When Washington ran for and won re-election in 1987, who was one of his main consultants???? David Axelrod, now chief strategist for Obama. Who had just moved to Chicago at the time of Washington's campaign and was working in the community being mobilized??? That's right. See any parallels between these two campaigns???