A couple of stories caught my eye today that might be of interest:
First, the Washington Post has a long piece on the difficulties of increasing black turnout, especially in the south. The story nicely fleshes out some numbers to add to the running debate we, and others, have been having about the feasibility of Obama picking up states like Georgia, North Carolina, and Virginia.
Second, The Electoral Map has a short blurb on the Obama camp's efforts in North Dakota and highlights some factors that don't make this outreach so far fetched.
Lastly, today's Milwaukee Journal Sentinel has a short piece on Obama's fundraising success in some traditionally conservative Milwaukee suburbs. In fact, he's outraised McCain in both Waukesha and Ozaukee Counties, two of the most Republican in the state, and is only slightly behind in Washington County.
Monday, July 28, 2008
Friday, July 18, 2008
Will Demographics + High Turnout Endanger Any House Republicans???
This week’s primaries in Georgia that pitted several House Democrats against upstart African American candidates got me wondering if a similar dynamic could work against any Republican incumbents this fall. Namely, are there any House Republicans with sizable enough minority populations in their districts that, with high turnout, could be in danger of defeat?
Now, it should be noted that demographics are rarely, if ever enough, to endanger or defeat an incumbent. A number of factors must usually be at work. Incumbent House members are extremely difficult to defeat. The norm for both parties over the past decade or so has been for roughly 95% of House incumbents to be re-elected, most with large margins. Among the factors required for defeating an incumbent are 1) a high quality challenger; 2) a well funded challenger; 3) a political “mood” hostile to incumbents or the incumbent’s party; and 4) scandal and/or deficient job performance by the incumbent. In other words, challengers must hope that a number of things go right, both in and out of their control, to have a chance at victory.
A second thing I would note is that those districts with the highest minority populations are not necessarily those that the Democrats have the best chance of winning. If we look at 2006, for example, the Democrats defeated several Republican incumbents in very, very white constituencies (i.e. IA-2, IN-8, IN-9, MN-1, NY-20, NH-1, NH-2). So, looking toward the Democrats’ chances this fall, I wouldn’t make a direct correlation between the likelihood of a party switch and the minority population in a given district. Nonetheless, in a year which saw higher turnout and registration among African-Americans during the primary season and with Barack Obama on the top of the ticket (likely to increase black turnout even higher during the general), we might look at the demographic profile Republican districts for potential upsets.
Using my handy "CQ’s Politics in America 2008", I’ve tabulated the minority percentage (African-American and Hispanic) for each Republican held district. I’ve also recorded the vote total the incumbent received in 2006 to use as a baseline of expectations for 2008. Because 2006 was as bad a year as 2008 is shaping up to be for Republican congressional candidates, we would expect these Republicans’ support to be in the same neighborhood as two years ago. Using this data, we can crunch the numbers in a variety of ways in seeking to identify potentially vulnerable Republicans. So, what do we see???
Looking first at African American constituencies, we find that the Republican incumbent with the largest black constituency is Rep. Rodney Alexander of Louisiana's 5th with a district that is 34% black. In total, 5 members have districts that are roughly 1/3 black (Alexander, McCrery—LA-4, Forbes—VA-4, Pickering—MS-3, Rogers—AL-3). Of these, all are running for re-election this year with the exception of Pickering. In the next tier, 14 members have constituencies that are between 20% and 30% African American.
For these members with sizable black constituencies, is there any correlation with how easily they won in 2006? Here, there seems to be some evidence of what I’d call the “Schaller Effect,” for lack of a better term. As I’ve written about several times in the last month, Thomas Schaller argues that in those states with sizable African American electorates, namely those in the deep South, Republicans have actually increased their support over time because white voters have been drawn to the GOP in reaction to the Democratic support given by black voters and the perception that the Democrats are the “party of minorities.” Thus, states like Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina are among the most consistently Republican despite having the biggest black populations in the country. So, of the 19 House Republicans with at least 20% of their district being African American, only 3 received less than 55% of the vote in 2006. These were Steve Chabot of Ohio (District 27% black; 52% of the vote), Robin Hayes of North Carolina (District 27% black; 50% of the vote) and Thelma Drake of Virginia (District 21% black; 51% of the vote).
Overall, if we look at those Republicans that have sizable black constituencies, they are almost all southern. This shouldn’t surprise us given the distribution of the black population across the country. Of those 19 members with the “blackest” districts, only 2 are from outside the south (Steve Chabot and Pat Tiberi of Ohio). This discussion of the geographic spread of the black electorate—not to get too far off course—brings into play the whole debate about gerrymandering. In northern states, where black voters are much more concentrated in urban areas, we’ve seen the creation over the past few decades of “majority minority” districts in which overwhelmingly black seats are surrounded by overwhelmingly white seats, all thanks to the high degree of segregation in northern metropolitan areas (for a definitive study on segregation in America, see here). In the south, where the African American population is much more dispersed, and more heavily rural, one sees more “integrated” districts. Thus, a state like Alabama has 3 Republican incumbents (Rogers, Everett, and Bonner) that have large black constituencies (32%, 29%, 28% respectively). I'd note that in Alabama's 2nd, Terry Everett is retiring this year and Democrats are targeting the district as a potential pick up.
Turning to heavily Hispanic districts, 24 House Republicans have districts that are over 20% Hispanic. One caveat here is the Florida Republican membership with a large Cuban (and traditionally Republican) base. The districts of the Diaz Balart brothers (FL-21 and 25) and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (FL-18) are over 60% Hispanic but have been strongly Republican (although they are, interestingly, competitive this year). Below them, these mostly Hispanic districts are all in either California, Texas, or New Mexico with the exception of Rep. Doc Hasting’s central Washington district that is 26% Hispanic. In these heavily Hispanic districts, we see that Republican performance in 2006 was better than it was in the more heavily African American districts. Of these top 24 seats, only 1 incumbent received less than 55%. This was Rep. Heather Wilson (NM-1), who is this year running for the open Senate seat in the state. Not surprisingly, Democrats are heavily targeting this seat in hopes of a pick-up.
Next, I combined the African-American and Hispanic numbers for an overall “minority population” for each Republican district. Are their districts that contain large numbers of both minority groups? For the most part, the answer is no. The black and Hispanic population is largely segregated by the redistricting process. Of the 199 Republican held House seats, only 11 are more than 10% black and 10% Hispanic. Of these, 7 are in the state of Texas. What’s so special about Texas?? While it is certainly a very diverse state, it is also the home of the infamous re-districting scheme of 2003 in which Texas Republicans redrew House districts out of cycle in attempt to maximize party gains. As I was entering these districts into the data set, the sophistication of the project really jumped out at me. What the state legislature was able to do, it seems, was find the perfect ratio of white to minority voters to ensure Republican victories—across a large number of districts. The Texas Republican in this group with the slimmest re-election victory in ’06, John Carter (TX-31) still managed to get 58% of the vote. All of the others surpassed 60%.
Of the four remaining Republicans with 10% of their constituencies being black and Hispanic, only Chris Shays (CT-4) had a close race in ’06, garnering 51%. As the northeast continues to trend Democratic, the always in jeopardy Shays will have to watch out for the possibility that increased black turnout this year will finally provide the tipping point for his district. The other three members in this category had greater success in ’06. Rep. Mario Diaz Balart (FL-25) received 59% (10% black, 62% Hispanic, largely Cuban), Frank LoBiondo (NJ-2) received 62% (14% black, 10% Hispanic), and Rep. Adam Putnam (FL-12) received 69% (12% black, 13% Hispanic).
Finally, I decided to use re-election margins as my starting point—i.e. of those members who had close races last time, do any of them have large minority populations? For all the Republican members, there are 8 who have at least 20% minority composition in their district and received less than 55% of the vote in ’06. Several of these members have already appeared in this analysis, but a few are new. These members are John Porter (NV-3) who received 49% (5% black, 16% Hispanic), Heather Wilson (NM-1) who received 50% (2% black, 43% Hispanic), Robin Hayes (NC-8) who received 50% (27% black, 7% Hispanic), Thelma Drake (VA-2) who received 51% (21% black, 4% Hispanic), Chris Shays (CT-4) who received 51% (11% black, 13% Hispanic), Steve Chabot (OH-1) who received 52% (27% black, 1% Hispanic), Ric Keller (FL-8) who received 53% (7% black, 18% Hispanic), and finally Brian Bilbray (CA-50) who also received 53% (2% black, 19% Hispanic).
So, when we look at the numbers closely, what seems to emerge are some, but not many, opportunities for Democrats to make gains by relying solely on the demographic characteristics of Republican constituencies. Also, Republican districts that have large minority populations tend to be concentrated in certain parts of the county. For African Americans, these districts are overwhelmingly in the deep South, an area where the Republican party has been in ascendance for the past generation. While recent Democratic successes in Mississippi and Louisiana—districts that were 26% and 33% African American respectively—are certainly positive signs, I wouldn’t expect realignment scale change in the region. The strength of these incumbents should allow them to hold their seats, even if black turnout spikes this year. Those districts with large Hispanic populations also tend to be geographically concentrated. Here, we see incumbents also relatively insulated from Democratic challenges by having large numbers of reliably Republican whites concentrated in their constituencies. This is especially true in Texas.
What I haven’t done in this analysis, and what I’ll start turning to next, is look at how these races are shaping up this year in terms of the Democratic candidates being run in these districts. As I mentioned at the outset, one can’t expect demographics to be enough to turn a district, even with higher than normal turnout. You still need quality, skilled, and well funded challengers. Nonetheless, in a year in which demography has been one of the strongest predictors of voting—especially for the Democrats in their presidential primary—its useful to look at some of these characteristics to gauge the likelihood of certain outcomes in November.
Now, it should be noted that demographics are rarely, if ever enough, to endanger or defeat an incumbent. A number of factors must usually be at work. Incumbent House members are extremely difficult to defeat. The norm for both parties over the past decade or so has been for roughly 95% of House incumbents to be re-elected, most with large margins. Among the factors required for defeating an incumbent are 1) a high quality challenger; 2) a well funded challenger; 3) a political “mood” hostile to incumbents or the incumbent’s party; and 4) scandal and/or deficient job performance by the incumbent. In other words, challengers must hope that a number of things go right, both in and out of their control, to have a chance at victory.
A second thing I would note is that those districts with the highest minority populations are not necessarily those that the Democrats have the best chance of winning. If we look at 2006, for example, the Democrats defeated several Republican incumbents in very, very white constituencies (i.e. IA-2, IN-8, IN-9, MN-1, NY-20, NH-1, NH-2). So, looking toward the Democrats’ chances this fall, I wouldn’t make a direct correlation between the likelihood of a party switch and the minority population in a given district. Nonetheless, in a year which saw higher turnout and registration among African-Americans during the primary season and with Barack Obama on the top of the ticket (likely to increase black turnout even higher during the general), we might look at the demographic profile Republican districts for potential upsets.
Using my handy "CQ’s Politics in America 2008", I’ve tabulated the minority percentage (African-American and Hispanic) for each Republican held district. I’ve also recorded the vote total the incumbent received in 2006 to use as a baseline of expectations for 2008. Because 2006 was as bad a year as 2008 is shaping up to be for Republican congressional candidates, we would expect these Republicans’ support to be in the same neighborhood as two years ago. Using this data, we can crunch the numbers in a variety of ways in seeking to identify potentially vulnerable Republicans. So, what do we see???
Looking first at African American constituencies, we find that the Republican incumbent with the largest black constituency is Rep. Rodney Alexander of Louisiana's 5th with a district that is 34% black. In total, 5 members have districts that are roughly 1/3 black (Alexander, McCrery—LA-4, Forbes—VA-4, Pickering—MS-3, Rogers—AL-3). Of these, all are running for re-election this year with the exception of Pickering. In the next tier, 14 members have constituencies that are between 20% and 30% African American.
For these members with sizable black constituencies, is there any correlation with how easily they won in 2006? Here, there seems to be some evidence of what I’d call the “Schaller Effect,” for lack of a better term. As I’ve written about several times in the last month, Thomas Schaller argues that in those states with sizable African American electorates, namely those in the deep South, Republicans have actually increased their support over time because white voters have been drawn to the GOP in reaction to the Democratic support given by black voters and the perception that the Democrats are the “party of minorities.” Thus, states like Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina are among the most consistently Republican despite having the biggest black populations in the country. So, of the 19 House Republicans with at least 20% of their district being African American, only 3 received less than 55% of the vote in 2006. These were Steve Chabot of Ohio (District 27% black; 52% of the vote), Robin Hayes of North Carolina (District 27% black; 50% of the vote) and Thelma Drake of Virginia (District 21% black; 51% of the vote).
Overall, if we look at those Republicans that have sizable black constituencies, they are almost all southern. This shouldn’t surprise us given the distribution of the black population across the country. Of those 19 members with the “blackest” districts, only 2 are from outside the south (Steve Chabot and Pat Tiberi of Ohio). This discussion of the geographic spread of the black electorate—not to get too far off course—brings into play the whole debate about gerrymandering. In northern states, where black voters are much more concentrated in urban areas, we’ve seen the creation over the past few decades of “majority minority” districts in which overwhelmingly black seats are surrounded by overwhelmingly white seats, all thanks to the high degree of segregation in northern metropolitan areas (for a definitive study on segregation in America, see here). In the south, where the African American population is much more dispersed, and more heavily rural, one sees more “integrated” districts. Thus, a state like Alabama has 3 Republican incumbents (Rogers, Everett, and Bonner) that have large black constituencies (32%, 29%, 28% respectively). I'd note that in Alabama's 2nd, Terry Everett is retiring this year and Democrats are targeting the district as a potential pick up.
Turning to heavily Hispanic districts, 24 House Republicans have districts that are over 20% Hispanic. One caveat here is the Florida Republican membership with a large Cuban (and traditionally Republican) base. The districts of the Diaz Balart brothers (FL-21 and 25) and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (FL-18) are over 60% Hispanic but have been strongly Republican (although they are, interestingly, competitive this year). Below them, these mostly Hispanic districts are all in either California, Texas, or New Mexico with the exception of Rep. Doc Hasting’s central Washington district that is 26% Hispanic. In these heavily Hispanic districts, we see that Republican performance in 2006 was better than it was in the more heavily African American districts. Of these top 24 seats, only 1 incumbent received less than 55%. This was Rep. Heather Wilson (NM-1), who is this year running for the open Senate seat in the state. Not surprisingly, Democrats are heavily targeting this seat in hopes of a pick-up.Next, I combined the African-American and Hispanic numbers for an overall “minority population” for each Republican district. Are their districts that contain large numbers of both minority groups? For the most part, the answer is no. The black and Hispanic population is largely segregated by the redistricting process. Of the 199 Republican held House seats, only 11 are more than 10% black and 10% Hispanic. Of these, 7 are in the state of Texas. What’s so special about Texas?? While it is certainly a very diverse state, it is also the home of the infamous re-districting scheme of 2003 in which Texas Republicans redrew House districts out of cycle in attempt to maximize party gains. As I was entering these districts into the data set, the sophistication of the project really jumped out at me. What the state legislature was able to do, it seems, was find the perfect ratio of white to minority voters to ensure Republican victories—across a large number of districts. The Texas Republican in this group with the slimmest re-election victory in ’06, John Carter (TX-31) still managed to get 58% of the vote. All of the others surpassed 60%.
Of the four remaining Republicans with 10% of their constituencies being black and Hispanic, only Chris Shays (CT-4) had a close race in ’06, garnering 51%. As the northeast continues to trend Democratic, the always in jeopardy Shays will have to watch out for the possibility that increased black turnout this year will finally provide the tipping point for his district. The other three members in this category had greater success in ’06. Rep. Mario Diaz Balart (FL-25) received 59% (10% black, 62% Hispanic, largely Cuban), Frank LoBiondo (NJ-2) received 62% (14% black, 10% Hispanic), and Rep. Adam Putnam (FL-12) received 69% (12% black, 13% Hispanic).
Finally, I decided to use re-election margins as my starting point—i.e. of those members who had close races last time, do any of them have large minority populations? For all the Republican members, there are 8 who have at least 20% minority composition in their district and received less than 55% of the vote in ’06. Several of these members have already appeared in this analysis, but a few are new. These members are John Porter (NV-3) who received 49% (5% black, 16% Hispanic), Heather Wilson (NM-1) who received 50% (2% black, 43% Hispanic), Robin Hayes (NC-8) who received 50% (27% black, 7% Hispanic), Thelma Drake (VA-2) who received 51% (21% black, 4% Hispanic), Chris Shays (CT-4) who received 51% (11% black, 13% Hispanic), Steve Chabot (OH-1) who received 52% (27% black, 1% Hispanic), Ric Keller (FL-8) who received 53% (7% black, 18% Hispanic), and finally Brian Bilbray (CA-50) who also received 53% (2% black, 19% Hispanic).
So, when we look at the numbers closely, what seems to emerge are some, but not many, opportunities for Democrats to make gains by relying solely on the demographic characteristics of Republican constituencies. Also, Republican districts that have large minority populations tend to be concentrated in certain parts of the county. For African Americans, these districts are overwhelmingly in the deep South, an area where the Republican party has been in ascendance for the past generation. While recent Democratic successes in Mississippi and Louisiana—districts that were 26% and 33% African American respectively—are certainly positive signs, I wouldn’t expect realignment scale change in the region. The strength of these incumbents should allow them to hold their seats, even if black turnout spikes this year. Those districts with large Hispanic populations also tend to be geographically concentrated. Here, we see incumbents also relatively insulated from Democratic challenges by having large numbers of reliably Republican whites concentrated in their constituencies. This is especially true in Texas.
What I haven’t done in this analysis, and what I’ll start turning to next, is look at how these races are shaping up this year in terms of the Democratic candidates being run in these districts. As I mentioned at the outset, one can’t expect demographics to be enough to turn a district, even with higher than normal turnout. You still need quality, skilled, and well funded challengers. Nonetheless, in a year in which demography has been one of the strongest predictors of voting—especially for the Democrats in their presidential primary—its useful to look at some of these characteristics to gauge the likelihood of certain outcomes in November.
Wednesday, July 16, 2008
Georgia Primary Results
The results from yesterday's House primaries in Georgia confirmed what I had speculated yesterday, namely the advantage the incumbents would have in fending off their pesky challengers. Reps. Lewis (5th district), Barrow (12th), and Scott (13th) were all easily renominated with 69%, 76%, and 64% respectively. See results here.
Tuesday, July 15, 2008
The Obama Primaries Continue.... Down Ballot
If you thought the primary season was over, guess again. There are a number of interesting congressional primaries in the offing and, as a number of recent stories suggest (see here and here), a fascinating subtext in them is how these candidates' support for Obama (and when that support came) will affect their chances. The most compelling of these races pit established African American House members (who initially supported Hillary Clinton) against younger, upstart, black politicians who were early Obama boosters. In many ways this is a generational battle between those who fought on the front lines of the civil rights movement and those who have grown up as the beneficiaries of the movement. As this earlier generation of black politicians entered the political arena, accommodating themselves to the party establishment was a crucial step in developing a base of power. Coming from safe districts they were able to climb the seniority ladder in Congress to the point that now, many of the most influential House Democrats are members of the Congressional Black Caucus (see James Clyburn, Charlie Rangel, John Conyers, and Bennie Thompson for examples) These members were long time and devoted supporters of Bill Clinton going back to the '90's and, when Hillary Clinton seemed the all but assured nominee in late '07, many transferred their support from Bill to her. When the Obama candidacy took off, however, many of members found themselves scrambling to jump on board. Having not had to run in a close campaign in many cycles, they are now trying to ramp up long dormant organizations. So, not only do these campaigns provide us with a fascinating generational drama in which one's degree of Obamamania is the yardstick by which a candidate is measured, but they offer a constant reminder of how important it is for members of Congress to be attuned to the ebbs and flows of constituent opinion. With higher than normal turnout and an energinzed electorate, these entrenched members are facing an unfamiliar level of unpredictability and volatility.In Georgia today the iconic John Lewis finds himself running to retain his seat against two younger candidates. Both have used Lewis' early bolstering of Clinton against him in a district that gave Obama a three to one margin of victory. Lewis switched his support to Obama in the aftermath of the Georgia primary but still drew heavy fire from many of his constituents.
In several of these races, it appears as if the incumbents will slip through, mainly due to the fact that they are facing not one but several primary opponents. Not only is it extremely difficult to beat incumbents in primary battles, but it is almost impossible to do so when the anti-incumbent vote is being split among numerous challengers.
In an even more interesting twist, Georgia Congressman John Barrow (who is white and was an early Obama supporter) is being challenged for re-nomination by an African American state senator, in the 12th district. With African Americans making up 45% of the electorate in the district which includes Savannah and Augusta, Barrow has received the help and endorsement of Obama in trying to hold on to his seat. Already a swing district, this race could be the most interesting of today's slate to watch.
Monday, July 07, 2008
Could Small Immigrant Groups Make a Difference in 2008???
Yesterday's Washington Post had this story on the African diaspora (especially Somali and Ethiopian) in the DC area and its activism in the current presidential race. As one would expect, this group is extremely enthusiastic about the Obama candidacy. The question of interest is whether their numbers are large enough to make a difference in any state.
To get a sense of the size of various immigrant groups in the U.S., this study by the Center for Immigration Studies is a good resource. In glancing at some statistics, we note that immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa make up only about 3% of the total U.S. immigrant population--they are dwarfed by immigrants from Latin America. Hence the obvious focus on the Latino vote. However, the Post story notes the possibility of there being 10,000 Ethiopian voters in Virginia that Obama could pick up. While that doesn't seem like much, consider the margin that Democratic Senator Jim Webb won by in his defeat of George Allen in 2006--9,000 votes.
Monday, June 30, 2008
More Discussion of the South's Competitiveness
Today's New York Times has a long piece on the continuing debate about whether the south is potentially fertile ground for the Obama candidacy. As I wrote a while back, certain states may come into play by virtue of 1) the size of the African American electorate; 2) expected higher turnout among these black voters; and 3) a sizable "ideopolis" population of highly educated whites. The current sexy pick for a state that could tilt blue in November--and one discussed in the Times article--is Georgia. With some arguing that there are 500,000 unregistered African American voters in Georgia, a concentrated effort to turn these folks out, along with a respectable showing by Libertarian candidate and former Georgia Rep. Bob Barr, could be enough to give Obama Georgia's 15 electoral votes.
As I've discussed, Thomas Schaller (among others) is skeptical of this possibility because of the inability of Obama--or any other Dem.--to get enough of the white vote. I'm not sure which side I fall on yet, but the potential of unprecedented turnout increases among African Americans and young voters is certainly possbile. Also worth noting is the Times' contention that turnout among white conservatives is unlikely to exceed what we saw in 2004. Bush fatigue, economic woes, and McCain's uneasy relationship with the evangelical base would suggest to many that Bush's re-election marked the high water mark for Republican support in Dixie. The recent House special election losses in Louisiana and Mississippi can be viewed as further evidence of the decline of the Republican brand since '04.
Perhaps the most important variable mentioned in the story--and one that has gotten increased attention with Obama's decision to decline public financing--is that Obama will be able to spend money wherever he wants. Whereas previous candidates (see Kerry in '04) have had to make strategic choices about resources--and have therefore tended to concentrate money in a few truly tossup states (Ohio, Florida)--Obama will be able to do this while also putting money into more long shot states in hopes of getting lucky. The other benefit of this strategy is that it forces McCain to spend a portion of his more limited resources in states that should easily be his. If McCain has to defend Georgia, he'll be less able to compete in states like Iowa, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Colorado, and elsewhere.
It appears, then, that the groundwork is being laid for a replay of Obama's primary strategy against Clinton, writ large...Dollars + Demographics = Victory
**Update: On a similar note, but focused more on the upper South and Obama's perceived problems among whites there is this long profile of Dave "Mudcat" Sanders, consultant to such Dems as Mark Warner and John Edwards. Hailing from southwest Virginia, Sanders has gained fame for his ability to tap into this region's political culture on behalf of liberal candidates. The idea to have Mark Warner sponsor a race truck (discussed in this post) was his idea. Well worth a read, especially his emphasis on "twofers."
**Update--July 1: Thomas Schaller responds to this debate in today's New York Times.
**Update--July 1: A story in yesterday's Wall Street Journal about the Obama campaign's voter registration efforts in the south.
Tuesday, June 24, 2008
ElectionDissection.com Book Club
Next up on CBMurray's Book Club will be James N. Gregory's "The Southern Diaspora." I've been on a Great Migration kick over the last few weeks, having just finished Nicholas Lemann's "The Promised Land." In doing all this reading on the massive internal migration within the U.S., especially during and after WWII, one can't help but be struck by how much our recent political history has been shaped by the demographic changes that rapidly altered so many cities and states. New political alignments were able to emerge with the arrival of millions of new voters. As these groups brought with them their histories, cultures, and worldviews, the Democratic and Republican blocs were reconfigured. What is unique about Gregory's book--and I've only just started it--is that he looks at both the black and white migration (both massive in scope) that transpired during the 20th century.
I've never really read much about the white migration but, browsing toward the later chapters, its apparent that Gregory will use it to explain much of the rise of modern conservatism (a la "Nixonland") that arose in the mid-60's. Also, when we revisit Wallace's northern successes, we'll note that his votes came not just from white ethnics whose families had been established in the north for generations but also from whites who were just recently removed from the deep south. The heritage of many of these voters helps explain how someone like Wallace was able to establish support in places like Baltimore, Cleveland, and other northern industrial cities. As I start to pull data from the book, I'll make sure to post it.
Wednesday, June 18, 2008
Does Obama Have a Polish Problem???
With the primaries over and the nomination decided, we have some time to go back and look at some data that got lost in the bustle of the unfolding contests. I’ve done a lot of reading over the last few years on Chicago politics and history, including some recent study of the Great Migration. I thought I’d go back to the Illinois primary and see if anything jumped out about the voting in the Windy City. Given that this is Obama’s backyard, any strong Clinton showing could highlight potential problems for the Illinois senator.
Indeed, when we start looking at smaller units of analysis, we see that the Chicagoland voting was not uniformly for Obama. Statewide, Obama received 64.7% to Clinton’s 32.8%. In Cook County, he received 68.9% to Clinton’s 29.2% and in Chicago proper Obama got 72.8% to Clinton’s 25.6%. Within both Cook County and the city, we see some areas of Clinton strength.
Cook County, for tax assessment purposes mainly, organizes itself into a number of townships. The County also uses these townships to report election returns (get the full primary election returns, by township, here). Of the 30 townships outside the city of Chicago, Clinton actually won 9 (Berwyn, Cicero, Lemont, Leyden, Maine, Norwood Park, Orland, Palos, and Stickney). Mapping these (Clinton in red; Obama in blue), one sees a clustering effect. Wondering if there was any correlation between the demographics of these inner suburbs and the vote (as we saw in virtually every primary nationwide), I got some census data and found that Clinton's wins tended to be in townships with either 1) a very large white electorate or 2) a very large Hispanic electorate. The correlation is not perfect but there is a general trend. Of the four townships that are over 90% white, Clinton won three (Lemont, Norwood Park, and Orland). The Obama win in this category, New Trier, comes in a township of very high income and education levels and conforms with trends we found earlier in the primary season. New Trier Township includes such villages as Wilmette, Winnetka, Kenilworth, and Glencoe. To use a pop culture reference, this was the area where Ferris Bueller’s Day Off and a number of other John Hughes movies were filmed and set.
For the Hispanic dimension, Cicero stands out. With a Hispanic population of 77%, it gave 65%--her largest total in any township. Also Berwyn (38% Hispanic) and Leyden (23% Hispanic) went Clinton although Hanover (23% Hispanic) and Calumet (23% Hispanic) went for Obama. In the case of Calumet, though, it is also the township with the largest African American percentage, explaining the tilt to Obama. I’ve produced a rudimentary graphic to show the relationship between each township’s white population and Obama vote (as I get more skilled in chart making the visuals should improve here).
When we look at the vote in Chicago proper (see results here), we see a similar ethnic dimension to the voting. Chicago is divided into 50 wards. Of these, Clinton won 14. Like with the township vote, there is a definite clustering of her support. I’ve highlighted the Clinton wins in the below map.
To get a sense of the correlation between ethnicity and the vote, compare the map on the right with this amazing map produced by the Newberry Library and the Chicago Historical Society, entitled “Chicago’s Ethnic Mosaic in 2000.” Two things jump out. As with the township voting, the heavily Hispanic areas of the city went for Clinton. Of perhaps more interest, one sees a rough correlation between the Polish vote and Clinton. Most notably, the areas around Midway Airport in the southwestern part of the city and O’Hare Airport in the northwestern part are heavily Polish (shaded purple). They also were areas of strong support for Clinton. I'd also note that these were areas where Harold Washington fared very poorly in his historic 1983 mayoral victory. In the southwestern part, one sees how the Polish population extends outside of the city limits into the neighboring townships that also went for Clinton.
Come November, all of this may not mean much. Obama is expected to win Illinois easily. Nonetheless, even in his home state, his support was not universal and may signal broader, more national, areas of weakness. While recent polling on the Hispanic vote seems to show Obama making tremendous gains, his white ethnic support isn't yet where he'd like it to be.
Indeed, when we start looking at smaller units of analysis, we see that the Chicagoland voting was not uniformly for Obama. Statewide, Obama received 64.7% to Clinton’s 32.8%. In Cook County, he received 68.9% to Clinton’s 29.2% and in Chicago proper Obama got 72.8% to Clinton’s 25.6%. Within both Cook County and the city, we see some areas of Clinton strength.
Cook County, for tax assessment purposes mainly, organizes itself into a number of townships. The County also uses these townships to report election returns (get the full primary election returns, by township, here). Of the 30 townships outside the city of Chicago, Clinton actually won 9 (Berwyn, Cicero, Lemont, Leyden, Maine, Norwood Park, Orland, Palos, and Stickney). Mapping these (Clinton in red; Obama in blue), one sees a clustering effect. Wondering if there was any correlation between the demographics of these inner suburbs and the vote (as we saw in virtually every primary nationwide), I got some census data and found that Clinton's wins tended to be in townships with either 1) a very large white electorate or 2) a very large Hispanic electorate. The correlation is not perfect but there is a general trend. Of the four townships that are over 90% white, Clinton won three (Lemont, Norwood Park, and Orland). The Obama win in this category, New Trier, comes in a township of very high income and education levels and conforms with trends we found earlier in the primary season. New Trier Township includes such villages as Wilmette, Winnetka, Kenilworth, and Glencoe. To use a pop culture reference, this was the area where Ferris Bueller’s Day Off and a number of other John Hughes movies were filmed and set.
For the Hispanic dimension, Cicero stands out. With a Hispanic population of 77%, it gave 65%--her largest total in any township. Also Berwyn (38% Hispanic) and Leyden (23% Hispanic) went Clinton although Hanover (23% Hispanic) and Calumet (23% Hispanic) went for Obama. In the case of Calumet, though, it is also the township with the largest African American percentage, explaining the tilt to Obama. I’ve produced a rudimentary graphic to show the relationship between each township’s white population and Obama vote (as I get more skilled in chart making the visuals should improve here).
When we look at the vote in Chicago proper (see results here), we see a similar ethnic dimension to the voting. Chicago is divided into 50 wards. Of these, Clinton won 14. Like with the township vote, there is a definite clustering of her support. I’ve highlighted the Clinton wins in the below map.
To get a sense of the correlation between ethnicity and the vote, compare the map on the right with this amazing map produced by the Newberry Library and the Chicago Historical Society, entitled “Chicago’s Ethnic Mosaic in 2000.” Two things jump out. As with the township voting, the heavily Hispanic areas of the city went for Clinton. Of perhaps more interest, one sees a rough correlation between the Polish vote and Clinton. Most notably, the areas around Midway Airport in the southwestern part of the city and O’Hare Airport in the northwestern part are heavily Polish (shaded purple). They also were areas of strong support for Clinton. I'd also note that these were areas where Harold Washington fared very poorly in his historic 1983 mayoral victory. In the southwestern part, one sees how the Polish population extends outside of the city limits into the neighboring townships that also went for Clinton.Come November, all of this may not mean much. Obama is expected to win Illinois easily. Nonetheless, even in his home state, his support was not universal and may signal broader, more national, areas of weakness. While recent polling on the Hispanic vote seems to show Obama making tremendous gains, his white ethnic support isn't yet where he'd like it to be.
The Clinton Aftermath--And Future???
With the end of Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaign, much time will be spent over the coming months on post mortems that will try to explain her failure to achieve the Democratic Party’s nomination. One question that will surely be asked in these analyses is why Senator Clinton continued to run well after it became clear that the mathematical possibility of winning a majority of elected delegates was gone. As her campaign continued though the latter contests, Obama supporters, and no doubt a number of realists within the Clinton campaign, worried that her tactics would irreparably damage Obama’s chances in the fall.
Much of this handwringing has sought to get inside Senator Clinton’s psyche and decipher her true motivations. Was her pyrrhic campaign indeed designed to bring down Obama so that she could rescue the Democratic Party in 2012? Knowing that she wouldn’t be the nominee, did she persevere in order to assure an offer of the Vice Presidential spot? Did she feel that the Democrats’ chances of winning the White House were so good that she could capture the nomination, despite taking the party through a divisive and protracted fight, and still become President?
The answers to these questions, rather than being gleaned from armchair psychoanalysis, might rather be found in exploring the recent history of the Democratic Party’s nomination process. In looking over the last several decades, one notices that a clear pattern emerges when the Democrats choose their standard bearer. In short, in only rare instances has a candidate who at one time sought the nomination, and lost, been able to win the nomination at a later time. The Democrats reward newcomers. Since the modern primary process has been in place, only one Democratic nominee has at an earlier time been a failed candidate. That one nominee is Al Gore, who first ran for president in 1988. Even here though, Gore received the nomination through what we might call an “heir apparent” candidacy, having served as Bill Clinton’s Vice President. Facing only Bill Bradley in 2000, Gore was essentially handed the Democrats’ nomination without a fight.
All of the other recent Democratic nominees, however, received the nomination during their first run for President. Rather than being the anomaly that many view him to be, Senator Obama in fact is the norm for modern Democratic nominees. John Kerry, Bill Clinton, Michael Dukakis, Walter Mondale, and Jimmy Carter were all nominated for President during their first run for the White House. Each was relatively unknown on the national scale, with the exception of Mondale who had been Carter’s Vice President. A look at the Democratic fields over this recent history reveals several candidacies that having failed once, failed again—John Edwards, Joe Biden, Dennis Kucinich, Richard Gephardt, Jesse Jackson, and Gary Hart come immediately to mind. In fact, being an unsuccessful Vice Presidential nominee doesn’t seem to give one a later advantage either, as John Edwards and Joe Lieberman can attest to.
To understand why the Democratic nomination process tends to benefit newcomers, we might look at another part of this year’s drama for the answer—namely the rules for awarding elected delegates. The proportional allocation of elected delegates ensures that should the primaries and caucuses be highly competitive, no candidate is able to run away with the nomination. Candidates who have run, but failed, for the nomination before presumably have a degree of name recognition, party service, and fundraising prowess that should help them in their second run for President. Senator Clinton, though a first time candidate, had these qualities in spades going into 2008. These advantages, however, haven’t translated into the nomination. Once Senator Obama pulled his upset in Iowa, and then followed it up with a victory in South Carolina and several key Super Tuesday states, it became clear that the dynamic had changed. Having proven the validity of his candidacy, Obama was in the race for the long haul and there was little Clinton could do to stop him. While Senator Clinton won a number of late contests, Obama’s delegate lead held.
Therefore, when one looks at the recent history of Democratic nomination fights, the motivation of Senator Clinton for staying in the race until the end becomes somewhat clearer. Recent history suggests that if she didn’t win this year, she would probably never win. The Democratic Party has a history of moving on to someone new. Having now ended her campaign, Clinton’s White House aspirations seem to rest not only with Obama’s willingness to pick her as his running mate, but on his victory in November as well. While the selection of Clinton to the number two spot seems increasingly slim as the days go by, these fading hopes may be her only chance of reaching the White House.
Much of this handwringing has sought to get inside Senator Clinton’s psyche and decipher her true motivations. Was her pyrrhic campaign indeed designed to bring down Obama so that she could rescue the Democratic Party in 2012? Knowing that she wouldn’t be the nominee, did she persevere in order to assure an offer of the Vice Presidential spot? Did she feel that the Democrats’ chances of winning the White House were so good that she could capture the nomination, despite taking the party through a divisive and protracted fight, and still become President?
The answers to these questions, rather than being gleaned from armchair psychoanalysis, might rather be found in exploring the recent history of the Democratic Party’s nomination process. In looking over the last several decades, one notices that a clear pattern emerges when the Democrats choose their standard bearer. In short, in only rare instances has a candidate who at one time sought the nomination, and lost, been able to win the nomination at a later time. The Democrats reward newcomers. Since the modern primary process has been in place, only one Democratic nominee has at an earlier time been a failed candidate. That one nominee is Al Gore, who first ran for president in 1988. Even here though, Gore received the nomination through what we might call an “heir apparent” candidacy, having served as Bill Clinton’s Vice President. Facing only Bill Bradley in 2000, Gore was essentially handed the Democrats’ nomination without a fight.
All of the other recent Democratic nominees, however, received the nomination during their first run for President. Rather than being the anomaly that many view him to be, Senator Obama in fact is the norm for modern Democratic nominees. John Kerry, Bill Clinton, Michael Dukakis, Walter Mondale, and Jimmy Carter were all nominated for President during their first run for the White House. Each was relatively unknown on the national scale, with the exception of Mondale who had been Carter’s Vice President. A look at the Democratic fields over this recent history reveals several candidacies that having failed once, failed again—John Edwards, Joe Biden, Dennis Kucinich, Richard Gephardt, Jesse Jackson, and Gary Hart come immediately to mind. In fact, being an unsuccessful Vice Presidential nominee doesn’t seem to give one a later advantage either, as John Edwards and Joe Lieberman can attest to.
To understand why the Democratic nomination process tends to benefit newcomers, we might look at another part of this year’s drama for the answer—namely the rules for awarding elected delegates. The proportional allocation of elected delegates ensures that should the primaries and caucuses be highly competitive, no candidate is able to run away with the nomination. Candidates who have run, but failed, for the nomination before presumably have a degree of name recognition, party service, and fundraising prowess that should help them in their second run for President. Senator Clinton, though a first time candidate, had these qualities in spades going into 2008. These advantages, however, haven’t translated into the nomination. Once Senator Obama pulled his upset in Iowa, and then followed it up with a victory in South Carolina and several key Super Tuesday states, it became clear that the dynamic had changed. Having proven the validity of his candidacy, Obama was in the race for the long haul and there was little Clinton could do to stop him. While Senator Clinton won a number of late contests, Obama’s delegate lead held.
Therefore, when one looks at the recent history of Democratic nomination fights, the motivation of Senator Clinton for staying in the race until the end becomes somewhat clearer. Recent history suggests that if she didn’t win this year, she would probably never win. The Democratic Party has a history of moving on to someone new. Having now ended her campaign, Clinton’s White House aspirations seem to rest not only with Obama’s willingness to pick her as his running mate, but on his victory in November as well. While the selection of Clinton to the number two spot seems increasingly slim as the days go by, these fading hopes may be her only chance of reaching the White House.
Thursday, June 12, 2008
Obama Back in Wisconsin
Continuing our coverage of where the candidates are--and why--Barack Obama is in Kaukauna, Wisconsin today. See coverage via the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel here. Kaukauna is about 30 miles north of my hometown so I know a bit about the area.Kaukauna is in Outagamie County, which has historically been reliably Republican. Bush had a 10 point victory in '04. Outagamie gave Clinton a 2% win in '96 but hadn't voted Democratic since LBJ in '64, and before that FDR in '36. In the '06 governor's race, Democratic incumbent Jim Doyle narrowly won the county, somewhat surprising because the county was part of his challenger's (Mark Green) congressional district. To give you a sense of the historical flavor of this area's Republicanism, the neighboring city of Appleton is the headquarters of the John Birch Society and the birthplace of notorious Wisconsin Senator Joseph McCarthy is next door in Grand Chute.
The city of Kaukauna, though, has more of a Democratic lean to it, recently giving majorities to both Kerry and Gore. It gave Governor Doyle a big margin-61%-in '06. Demographically, it is almost totally white with minority populations--African American & Hispanic--each less than 1%. There is a manufacturing presence which contributes to the slight leftward leaning of the electorate--papermaking is the main industry. The string of cities that runs through Kaukauna, Appleton, Neenah, and Menasha is home to a number of paper mills and companies such as Kimberly-Clark.
In the first Wisconsin poll (directed by my former stats professor & Pollster.com co-editor Charles Franklin) released since the nomination fight became settled, Obama has a 13 point lead. See details here.
**Update June 16--Here is the complete UW Polisci Department poll, with answers to all questions. A quick read shows good news for Obama beyond the 13 point lead, especially questions dealing with Iraq war.
Monday, June 09, 2008
"And the Migrants Kept Coming"
On Saturday I went to an amazing exhibit at the Phillips Collection. Over the course of the next few months, the museum will be showing Jacob Lawrence's "The Migration Series." Rarely shown in its entirety, the series is a dramatic depiction of the great migration of African Americans from the rural south to the urban north in the years during and after World War I. The work was commissioned in 1940 and contains 60 individual panels showing the social, economic, cultural, and demographic dimensions of the Great Migration. While this site is not meant as a venue for art appreciation, I will say that the work is absolutely stunning and incredibly moving.
As I was viewing the work, though, I couldn't help but think of the political consequences of the Great Migration. While I've written about this from time to time, it was interesting to have a different frame of reference through which to view this event. One cannot overstate, I don't think, the ways in which our political system was affected by this unprecedented movement of people. As northern industrial cities like Detroit, Chicago, Cleveland, Pittsburgh, and Philadelphia saw their black populations explode, their politics were altered as well. For a sense of this urban demographic change, check out this table from the "Historical Statistics of Black America":
A city like Detroit went from having a black population of just under 6,000 in 1910 to 120,000 in 1930!! Chicago saw its African-American population grow six fold during the same time period. As we explore the contours of political change, the affect that the Great Migration had on our politics is staggering.
Whereas Lawrence subtitled Panel 60 of his work "And the Migrants Kept Coming," he could have just as easily said "And the Voters Kept Coming."
***Above--Panel 1 of the Migration Series
Wednesday, June 04, 2008
Lets Go Racin'!!!! Barack Obama Goes to Bristol
Now that the Democratic nomination has been settled, we’llstart to transition into general election mode a bit. As the candidates criss-cross the country, we’ll try to add a little background to the places they visit and speculate about why they’re there and what they hope to accomplish.
A good way to kick this off is to look at Senator Obama’s events over the next few days. Tomorrow, he’s heading deep into the part of the country that vexed him throughout the primary season, Appalachia. He’ll be hosting a town hall meeting in Bristol, Virginia, located right on the state's border with Tennessee. Just across the state line is Bristol Motor Speedway, a stop on the annual NASCAR circuit. When running for governor of Virginia in 2001, Democrat Mark Warner capitalized on the area's passion for racing, sponsoring a race truck at the nearby Martinsville Speedway, using the sponsorship to both advertise his candidacy as well as show kinship with the local folks. When driving to New Orleans a few years ago, the fact that there was a Bristol, Virginia and a Bristol, Tennessee confused me to no end.
We know from the primary season (Clinton counties red; Obama counties blue) that Obama fared poorly in the region. I noted last week that the area, however, has been receptive to recent Democratic candidates in statewide elections. Bristol is actually an independent city, not part of a county. Bristol borders Washington County and gave Hillary Clinton a 35 point victory. Looking at its voting in presidential races, Bristol was last won by a Democrat in 1976. LBJ, Truman, and FDR won the city in each of their elections as well. Washington County has largely mirrored Bristol's voting. It hasn't given a Democratic nominee more than 40% since Jimmy Carter in both ’76 and ’80. It did give LBJ a ten point margin in 1964 and voted for FDR in each of his four victories.Despite its strong support for Republicans at the presidential level, however, the region has had Democratic representation in Congress. Interestingly, Rick Boucher, endorsed Obama early on in the primary season and has managed to represent the ninth district since 1982. Despite Clinton’s 30 point win in the district, Boucher has remained a strong supporter. He has consistently been re-elected by large margins, only getting less than 60% in 1994 and during his first two victories in ’82 and ’84.
One might also note that about 120 miles up the road is Blacksburg, home to Virginia Tech. During this year’s primary, Obama won Montgomery County, home to the school, a bright spot for him in area.
Obviously, Obama is showing a willingness to campaign in areas where he needs to build familiarity and trust. This move, in fact, seems to build upon his primary season strategy. In mapping out a plan for capturing delegates, Obama focused on states that one would have thought would have been unreceptive--Idaho, Nebraska, North Dakota, etc. but that offered, collectively, a bounty of elected delegates. As we know now, this strategy allowed him to tap into areas untouched by a Clinton campaign focused almost entirely on big states. Now that he is the presumptive nominee, he seems equally willing to reach into unfamiliar areas in search of votes. Hoping to turn Virginia blue in November, this seems like a wise strategy from a campaign that has, tactically and strategically, performed brilliantly to this point.
Tuesday, June 03, 2008
"Minnewisowa"
An article yesterday by Minnesota political commentator Barry Casselman got me thinking about the politics of the Midwest again. As I wrote a few weeks back, the upper Midwest, especially the parts that border the Mississippi River, has a history of progressive politics that makes it fertile ground for Democratic candidates. Casselman has coined the term “Minnewisowa” to describe the Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Iowa region. Noting that these states have similar demographics and economies, they have been hotly contested in past elections and are set up this year for attention by both parties. Collectively, the states award 27 electoral votes.
I thought I’d look at this region a little more closely to see how it stacks up for the coming campaign. While the three states are indeed characterized by close margins of victory every four years, the recent trends have all been in the Democratic direction. Furthermore, these states tend to vote as a block. In 2004, Iowa went to Bush by just one half percentage point while Kerry won Wisconsin and Minnesota. In each of the five previous elections (’04—’88), however, all three states went Democratic. A Republican nominee hasn’t won Wisconsin since Reagan’s landslide in 1984 and Nixon in 1972 was the last Republican to win Minnesota. In 1988, “Minnewisowa” gave Dukakis 3 of the 9 states he won nation wide.
If we look further down the ballot in recent years, we also see good Democratic trends. In the 2006 congressional elections, Democrats gained 2 House seats in Iowa (Bruce Braley and Dave Loebsack) and 1 each in Wisconsin (Steve Kagen) and Minnesota (Tim Walz). Likewise in 2006, Iowa Democrats captured both houses of the state legislature while Minnesota and Wisconsin Democrats captured one state house each from Republican control. Iowa Democrats kept their governor’s mansion in Democratic hands while Wisconsin re-elected its Democratic governor. The one bright spot for Minnesota Republicans was that they managed to re-elect governor Tim Pawlenty (currently being bandied about as a possible VP pick), although with just 47% of the vote.
In speculating on how the region might go this fall, one might look at the recent primary season. Barack Obama won all three states’ contests, with Iowa especially propelling his candidacy. McCain, on the other hand, largely ignored Iowa to focus on New Hampshire. He came in fourth place and didn’t win a single Iowa county. Furthermore, he did virtually no campaigning in Wisconsin or Minnesota due to how rapidly he sewed up the nomination (He did visit Milwaukee last week). To get a sense of how often Obama and McCain have been to these states, visit Slate’s “Map the Candidates” page and one will see how the build up to the Iowa caucuses, especially, has allowed Obama to build a massive organization in the state that will surely be maintained and fine tuned with eyes toward November. I would also suggest that Obama’s recent campaign activities point to how seriously he is targeting the region. When he chose to hold a rally in Iowa on the night of the voting in Oregon and Kentucky, a fall strategy was clearly at play. Furthermore, note where he will be speaking tonight—St. Paul, Minnesota, site of this summer’s Republican convention.
I thought I’d look at this region a little more closely to see how it stacks up for the coming campaign. While the three states are indeed characterized by close margins of victory every four years, the recent trends have all been in the Democratic direction. Furthermore, these states tend to vote as a block. In 2004, Iowa went to Bush by just one half percentage point while Kerry won Wisconsin and Minnesota. In each of the five previous elections (’04—’88), however, all three states went Democratic. A Republican nominee hasn’t won Wisconsin since Reagan’s landslide in 1984 and Nixon in 1972 was the last Republican to win Minnesota. In 1988, “Minnewisowa” gave Dukakis 3 of the 9 states he won nation wide.
If we look further down the ballot in recent years, we also see good Democratic trends. In the 2006 congressional elections, Democrats gained 2 House seats in Iowa (Bruce Braley and Dave Loebsack) and 1 each in Wisconsin (Steve Kagen) and Minnesota (Tim Walz). Likewise in 2006, Iowa Democrats captured both houses of the state legislature while Minnesota and Wisconsin Democrats captured one state house each from Republican control. Iowa Democrats kept their governor’s mansion in Democratic hands while Wisconsin re-elected its Democratic governor. The one bright spot for Minnesota Republicans was that they managed to re-elect governor Tim Pawlenty (currently being bandied about as a possible VP pick), although with just 47% of the vote.
In speculating on how the region might go this fall, one might look at the recent primary season. Barack Obama won all three states’ contests, with Iowa especially propelling his candidacy. McCain, on the other hand, largely ignored Iowa to focus on New Hampshire. He came in fourth place and didn’t win a single Iowa county. Furthermore, he did virtually no campaigning in Wisconsin or Minnesota due to how rapidly he sewed up the nomination (He did visit Milwaukee last week). To get a sense of how often Obama and McCain have been to these states, visit Slate’s “Map the Candidates” page and one will see how the build up to the Iowa caucuses, especially, has allowed Obama to build a massive organization in the state that will surely be maintained and fine tuned with eyes toward November. I would also suggest that Obama’s recent campaign activities point to how seriously he is targeting the region. When he chose to hold a rally in Iowa on the night of the voting in Oregon and Kentucky, a fall strategy was clearly at play. Furthermore, note where he will be speaking tonight—St. Paul, Minnesota, site of this summer’s Republican convention.
Friday, May 30, 2008
Is Webb the Wrong Virginian to Help Obama??
Over at the Democratic Strategist, Ed Kilgore has an interesting post on all the speculation regarding Virginia Senator Jim Webb's VP credentials. In the context of Barack Obama's alleged "Appalachian" problem, many have looked to Webb as the VP nominee who could immediately give the Democrats a chance in this region. Should Obama be able to win Virginia--and with Webb's help Ohio and Pennsylvania--he would be well on the way to the White House, the argument runs.
Kilgore, however, is skeptical of the idea that the Scots-Irish ancestry of so many in this region has much salience. Rather, he argues that economic messages play best and those candidates who best speak to material needs will succeed, regardless of whether they share some ethnic identity with the mountain folk. As evidence, he looks at the last three statewide races in Virginia--2001 Governor, 2005 Governor, 2006 Senator. In all three races the Democrat won--Mark Warner, Tim Kaine, Jim Webb respectively. If we look at the voting ni SW Virginia, we see that, in fact, it was the WASPy Mark Warner who did best (Dem. counties in Red; Rep. in Blue):
2001 Warner:
2005 Kaine:
2006 Webb:
With Warner running for Senate this year, his tremendous popularity in the state could potentially create reverse coattails, leaving Obama able to go elsewhere for his VP pick and still be in position to win Virginia's 13 electoral votes.
Kilgore, however, is skeptical of the idea that the Scots-Irish ancestry of so many in this region has much salience. Rather, he argues that economic messages play best and those candidates who best speak to material needs will succeed, regardless of whether they share some ethnic identity with the mountain folk. As evidence, he looks at the last three statewide races in Virginia--2001 Governor, 2005 Governor, 2006 Senator. In all three races the Democrat won--Mark Warner, Tim Kaine, Jim Webb respectively. If we look at the voting ni SW Virginia, we see that, in fact, it was the WASPy Mark Warner who did best (Dem. counties in Red; Rep. in Blue):
2001 Warner:
2005 Kaine:
2006 Webb:
With Warner running for Senate this year, his tremendous popularity in the state could potentially create reverse coattails, leaving Obama able to go elsewhere for his VP pick and still be in position to win Virginia's 13 electoral votes.
Wednesday, May 28, 2008
ElectionDissection.com Book Review--Nixonland
Having finally finished “Nixonland” by Rick Perlstein, I wanted to take some time to lay out my reaction to it. As I mentioned in my short blurb last week, “Nixonland” is the second part of a large project by Perlstein to describe the rise of modern conservatism. This project is extremely important, especially for those on the left, in that it presents a counter narrative to the accepted history of the era. For many liberals, the 1960’s were a time of ascendancy. The Civil Rights movement, the anti-war movement, the rise of feminism, etc. have tended be portrayed in a triumphal light by many commentators. It was, for many, an era of progress. What Perlstein reminds us, however, is that this “progress” was not universally accepted or agreed upon. This was also an era of resentment and reaction. It is this backlash, and the politics it created, that is the focus of this work.
To get a sense of the political trajectory that is traveled, Perlstein bookends his study with two of the most lopsided elections in American history—1964 and 1972—and asks a simple question: How could a country that had first given Lyndon Johnson such a massive victory turn around and give Richard Nixon an even larger win eight years later? How could the country have swung so dramatically in such a short period of time?
The answer to this question, it seems, is that both of these victories were largely delivered by the same group of people. It is this group of people that are at the heart of Perlstein's work. In short, this turbulent period is defined not by who we would normally think of—the protesters, the rioters, the hippies, the baby boomer youth, the New Left—but rather by what Nixon identified as the “Silent Majority.” These were the millions of Americans who were, for the most part, most of the time, apolitical. They were working and middle class, and as such had an interest in stability, predictability, and order. They were the great center of the American electorate. As the 1960’s unfolds we see this group move perceptibly rightward in much of their voting.
For this to happen, however, something had to change in the American political system. While the Vietnam War, the civil rights movement, the sexual revolution, and other events certainly propelled this shift, I think that all of these were in many ways the product of a much larger systemic change beginning during this period. As I was finishing “Nixonland” and trying to put it into perspective, I came to conclude that the book is not just a story of the rise of conservatism, but perhaps more so it is the story of the collapse of New Deal Liberalism. One book that I came across several times in graduate school is Stephen Skowronek’s “The Politics Presidents Make.” In it, Skowronek argues that American history is characterized by periods of “political time.” By this, he means that politics at any given time is defined by a particular “regime”—namely a dominant coalition of interests, ideas, actors, and ideology. Over time, these regimes rise or decline in acceptance as they are more or less successful in solving problems and managing the emerging conflicts in society. Presidents are situated differently to these regimes and are sometimes, though rarely, able to replace one regime with another, or re-order the nature of politics. FDR is the classic example here. With the Depression, the old regime was in disarray and FDR was able to assume power and institute a new governing philosophy with the support of a newly organized coalition of supporters and ideas. It is this regime—New Deal Liberalism—that LBJ inherits some thirty years later. However, by the 1960’s, the ability of this Liberalism to manage the issues of the day is in doubt. As Skowronek explains, presidents like LBJ who seek to expand upon a regime and put their own stamp upon it are oftentimes unsuccessful. They try to do too much, they overreach, and the regime is subject to collapse. This is what we see in “Nixonland.” What the Great Society, the war in Vietnam, and the other policies pushed by Johnson do, in short, is create an unrealistic set of expectations among the public. When these expectations are inevitably not met, backlash is not far away. When this backlash is ripe, members of the dominant regime begin to turn on one another, setting the stage for the realignment of political and voting coalitions.
So, whereas the 1964 landslide is brought about through the votes of the older parts of the New Deal coalition (unions, farmers, urban whites) and newer groups (African Americans, the youth), by the late ‘60’s and early ‘70’s these groups are splintering and turning on one another. While the newer members of the coalition are in the process of becoming more radicalized—the rise of Black Power, the balkanization of the anti-war movement, the emerging gay rights movement—those older members of the coalition feel abandoned and thus begin to gravitate rightward. This backlash is fueled by the inability of the old regime to solve the problems of the day. As crime and urban disorder become the top issue of concern to American voters, Liberalism provided no answer or solution. Another great discussion of this, parenthetically, focusing on New York, is provided by Vincent Cannato in “The Ungovernable City,” a biography of John Lindsay.
As this process unfolds, Richard Nixon rises to pick up the pieces. Throughout the book, Perlstein uses Nixon as a lens through which to view the period. Nixon, he argues, is just like those groups who feel abandoned or left behind. Throughout his life, he felt constantly slighted, underestimated, and condescended to. Thus, his political genius was his ability to read the mood of that great mass of Americans who simply wanted to return to a politics and a way of life they felt was under siege: “This was something Richard Nixon, with his gift for looking below social surfaces to see and exploit the subterranean truths that roiled underneath, understood: the future belonged to the politician who could tap the ambivalence—the nameless dread, the urge to make it all go away; to make the world placid again, not a cacophonous mess” (p. 213). He uses the New Left as a foil, mocking their “pseudo-intellectualism” as opposed to his, and the Silent Majority’s solid values and patriotism.
While the story of “Nixonland,” as I argued above, seems to be more about the collapse of Liberalism, it is not necessarily the story of the final triumph of Conservatism. Rather, this is a period where things fall apart without necessarily being rebuilt. It would take Reagan (and this would seem to be where Perlstein will go next) to accomplish this. The Nixon we get in this history is one that is not terribly ideological and without a fixed governing philosophy. In fact, in domestic affairs he accepts many of the liberal assumptions and policies. Furthermore, if we look at other elections during the period, we see a Liberalism that still has some life in it. While Nixon is elected in 1968 and re-elected in 1972, he has no noticeable coattails in congressional elections. The Democrats maintain large majorities in both chambers of Congress and gain seats in the 1970 midterm. So while the Silent Majority was beginning a process of moving rightward, they hadn’t moved wholesale yet. What John and I have spent a lot of time looking at on this site is where these voters ended up.
To get a sense of the political trajectory that is traveled, Perlstein bookends his study with two of the most lopsided elections in American history—1964 and 1972—and asks a simple question: How could a country that had first given Lyndon Johnson such a massive victory turn around and give Richard Nixon an even larger win eight years later? How could the country have swung so dramatically in such a short period of time?
The answer to this question, it seems, is that both of these victories were largely delivered by the same group of people. It is this group of people that are at the heart of Perlstein's work. In short, this turbulent period is defined not by who we would normally think of—the protesters, the rioters, the hippies, the baby boomer youth, the New Left—but rather by what Nixon identified as the “Silent Majority.” These were the millions of Americans who were, for the most part, most of the time, apolitical. They were working and middle class, and as such had an interest in stability, predictability, and order. They were the great center of the American electorate. As the 1960’s unfolds we see this group move perceptibly rightward in much of their voting.
For this to happen, however, something had to change in the American political system. While the Vietnam War, the civil rights movement, the sexual revolution, and other events certainly propelled this shift, I think that all of these were in many ways the product of a much larger systemic change beginning during this period. As I was finishing “Nixonland” and trying to put it into perspective, I came to conclude that the book is not just a story of the rise of conservatism, but perhaps more so it is the story of the collapse of New Deal Liberalism. One book that I came across several times in graduate school is Stephen Skowronek’s “The Politics Presidents Make.” In it, Skowronek argues that American history is characterized by periods of “political time.” By this, he means that politics at any given time is defined by a particular “regime”—namely a dominant coalition of interests, ideas, actors, and ideology. Over time, these regimes rise or decline in acceptance as they are more or less successful in solving problems and managing the emerging conflicts in society. Presidents are situated differently to these regimes and are sometimes, though rarely, able to replace one regime with another, or re-order the nature of politics. FDR is the classic example here. With the Depression, the old regime was in disarray and FDR was able to assume power and institute a new governing philosophy with the support of a newly organized coalition of supporters and ideas. It is this regime—New Deal Liberalism—that LBJ inherits some thirty years later. However, by the 1960’s, the ability of this Liberalism to manage the issues of the day is in doubt. As Skowronek explains, presidents like LBJ who seek to expand upon a regime and put their own stamp upon it are oftentimes unsuccessful. They try to do too much, they overreach, and the regime is subject to collapse. This is what we see in “Nixonland.” What the Great Society, the war in Vietnam, and the other policies pushed by Johnson do, in short, is create an unrealistic set of expectations among the public. When these expectations are inevitably not met, backlash is not far away. When this backlash is ripe, members of the dominant regime begin to turn on one another, setting the stage for the realignment of political and voting coalitions.
So, whereas the 1964 landslide is brought about through the votes of the older parts of the New Deal coalition (unions, farmers, urban whites) and newer groups (African Americans, the youth), by the late ‘60’s and early ‘70’s these groups are splintering and turning on one another. While the newer members of the coalition are in the process of becoming more radicalized—the rise of Black Power, the balkanization of the anti-war movement, the emerging gay rights movement—those older members of the coalition feel abandoned and thus begin to gravitate rightward. This backlash is fueled by the inability of the old regime to solve the problems of the day. As crime and urban disorder become the top issue of concern to American voters, Liberalism provided no answer or solution. Another great discussion of this, parenthetically, focusing on New York, is provided by Vincent Cannato in “The Ungovernable City,” a biography of John Lindsay.
As this process unfolds, Richard Nixon rises to pick up the pieces. Throughout the book, Perlstein uses Nixon as a lens through which to view the period. Nixon, he argues, is just like those groups who feel abandoned or left behind. Throughout his life, he felt constantly slighted, underestimated, and condescended to. Thus, his political genius was his ability to read the mood of that great mass of Americans who simply wanted to return to a politics and a way of life they felt was under siege: “This was something Richard Nixon, with his gift for looking below social surfaces to see and exploit the subterranean truths that roiled underneath, understood: the future belonged to the politician who could tap the ambivalence—the nameless dread, the urge to make it all go away; to make the world placid again, not a cacophonous mess” (p. 213). He uses the New Left as a foil, mocking their “pseudo-intellectualism” as opposed to his, and the Silent Majority’s solid values and patriotism.
While the story of “Nixonland,” as I argued above, seems to be more about the collapse of Liberalism, it is not necessarily the story of the final triumph of Conservatism. Rather, this is a period where things fall apart without necessarily being rebuilt. It would take Reagan (and this would seem to be where Perlstein will go next) to accomplish this. The Nixon we get in this history is one that is not terribly ideological and without a fixed governing philosophy. In fact, in domestic affairs he accepts many of the liberal assumptions and policies. Furthermore, if we look at other elections during the period, we see a Liberalism that still has some life in it. While Nixon is elected in 1968 and re-elected in 1972, he has no noticeable coattails in congressional elections. The Democrats maintain large majorities in both chambers of Congress and gain seats in the 1970 midterm. So while the Silent Majority was beginning a process of moving rightward, they hadn’t moved wholesale yet. What John and I have spent a lot of time looking at on this site is where these voters ended up.
There seem to be several lessons that can be drawn from Perlstein’s work, especially for those on the left. The first of these is the danger of overreach. What we saw under Johnson, it seems, was an overestimation of the country’s appetite for massive change. Here, I’m reminded of my great professor at UW-Madison, Charles O. Jones. In his writings on policy making and the presidency, he always warned against what many call “the myth of the mandate.” Essentially, big electoral victories tend to be interpreted as a sign that voters are in agreement upon a wholesale policy agenda. The reality, Jones always taught, was that voters vote for candidates for a variety of reasons, many not connected to policy at all. When presidents act as if they have a clear mandate, they set themselves up for failure. Thus, we might look at this turbulent period and ask whether, in the future, a more “humble” or “incremental” approach to governing is warranted, lest we risk the fracturing and backlash that Perlstein describes.
A second lesson I would draw from this story is the need to avoid the temptation of ideological self-righteousness and self-absorption. The great value of Perlstein’s project is that he, as a progressive, is willing to look critically at the left. This period gives him plenty of fertile ground to explore. The fact of the matter is that many of the people he describes (and who have been lionized in many histories of the 60’s) would seem to have been pretty insufferable to deal with. The ultimate failure of people like Jerry Rubin, Mark Rudd, Bobby Seale, and others was not so much that their positions were wrong, but that their tactics made them easy targets for the forces mobilizing on the right. What was lacking among those on the left—and this may have been a function of a Liberalism in decline—was anyone of stature who could put the brakes on the process that was unfolding. The irony of this is that as the war dragged on, and as Perlstein describes, more and more members of the “Silent Majority” were being drawn to the anti-war movement. Had the leadership of this movement been less dogmatic and less confrontational early on, they perhaps might have had more success.
Aside from the main themes just described, there were some sections and topics that I found particularly interesting. First was his discussion of how Nixon was able to implement the “southern strategy.” Here, the role of Strom Thurmond was instrumental. While I had originally read about this before, I think in “The Making of the President 1968,” Perlstein describes the relationship between Thurmond and Nixon in much greater detail. We see how these two were able to court each other and ensure that each's interests were being served. With the Wallace vote threatening to keep the White House in the Democrats’ hands, Nixon was able to convince Thurmond (on issues like busing, school desegregation, etc.) that he would embrace state’s rights and strict constructionism. With Thurmond’s blessing (and signals to other southern leaders and voters), Nixon was able to win enough of the south, including Thurmond’s South Carolina, to capture the presidency.
A second section I particularly enjoyed was his narrative on how Watergate came about. When thinking about this scandal, the conclusion that many draw is that Nixon’s dirty tricks campaign was unnecessary. The fault of this analysis, it seems, is that we tend to view Watergate with the hindsight of knowing how the 1972 election turned out. In other words, why would a president who won 49 states need to break into the Democratic headquarters as part of a systematic process of infiltrating his opposition? What Perlstein gives us is, I think, is more of the answer than we've gotten before. What we see is that going into the 1972 election, Nixon’s victory was anything but assured. His level of popularity fluctuated. Opposition to the war was growing. So after the 1970 midterms, Nixon’s fear of holding the White House intensified and reached a level of paranoia. It was out of this context that Watergate was spawned.
Finally, as should be no surprise to anyone who has read my postings, I was interested in Perlstein’s discussion of race. I’ve long felt that the period of the civil rights movement that has been understudied is the time when the movement came north. As Martin Luther King concluded that issues of race and poverty couldn’t be disentangled, not only did answers and solutions become much more elusive, but the collision of the movement with the entrenched segregation of blacks in northern cities became inevitable and tragic. Thus, we have large scale riots in dozens of northern cities (Newark, Detroit, Milwaukee, Cleveland) and we are able to see how the reaction and backlash among many whites played out. So, in places like Cicero, Illinois, we see the large story that runs throughout “Nixonland” played out on a small scale. It was here that I found myself less certain about the culpability of those on the left for the backlash that emerged on the right. While its easier to question the tactics of those opposing the war, I find myself unable to say that confronting the poverty, segregation, and discrimination that existed in these cities head on was ill adivsed. It is perhaps because of the intractability of these issues that race continues to be the one cleavage described in "Nixonland" that endures stronger than the others to this day.
Updates to follow…
Tuesday, May 20, 2008
Kentucky & Oregan Primary Night Updates
KENTUCKY
It's not all bad news for Obama in Kentucky. Suburban Louisville's Oldham County, Kentucky's wealthiest and fastest growing in a state where many of its 120 counties are atrophying, gave Obama a respectable 41%.
Kentucky Coal Country went for Hillary Clinton in numbers as lopsided as those in neighboring West Virginia. The Coal Miner's Daughter herself, proud Republican Loretta Lynn's fabled birthplace, Butcher "Holler" went for HRC by a similarly landslide margin, 87% to 9%.
Johnson County is a historically Mountain Republican county whose partisan sentiments have roots in its Unionism during the Civil War. However, results there didn't differ by much from nearby Knott County, still a Democratic stronghold, where Obama only managed 6.5% to HRC's 83%. (A search for Knott's political ancestry came up fruitless, except for the nugget that the county is named for a Democratic governor who was nonetheless a "staunch Unionist." The county's fealty to the Democracy seems to predate the New Deal, whose programs challenged ancestral Mountain Republicanism in deprived Appalachia. No evidence can be found of Democratic landslides here due to United Mine Workers influence, either.)
OREGON
Retiring U.S. Rep. Darlene Hooley's (D-05) endorsement of Hillary Rodham Clinton seems to have made her competitive in the CD's counties. HRC didn't drop below 45% in any county in OR05 - outperforming her statewide total - and actually narrowly taking Tillamook. Detailed returns may indicate HRC strength in its rural dairy redoubts, and Obama winning the precincts that are displacing that agricultural heritage.
Sitting Gov. Ted Kulongoski saved some face today, despite endorsing Hillary Clinton. His endorsed candidate for the Democratic nomination to challenge vulnerable Sen. Gordon Smith (R), State House Speaker Jeff Merkley staved off an unexpectedly strong challenge by liberal activist Steve Novick, popular among Oregon's Obama acolytes, by a slim margin: 45%-41%.
It's not all bad news for Obama in Kentucky. Suburban Louisville's Oldham County, Kentucky's wealthiest and fastest growing in a state where many of its 120 counties are atrophying, gave Obama a respectable 41%.
Kentucky Coal Country went for Hillary Clinton in numbers as lopsided as those in neighboring West Virginia. The Coal Miner's Daughter herself, proud Republican Loretta Lynn's fabled birthplace, Butcher "Holler" went for HRC by a similarly landslide margin, 87% to 9%.
Johnson County is a historically Mountain Republican county whose partisan sentiments have roots in its Unionism during the Civil War. However, results there didn't differ by much from nearby Knott County, still a Democratic stronghold, where Obama only managed 6.5% to HRC's 83%. (A search for Knott's political ancestry came up fruitless, except for the nugget that the county is named for a Democratic governor who was nonetheless a "staunch Unionist." The county's fealty to the Democracy seems to predate the New Deal, whose programs challenged ancestral Mountain Republicanism in deprived Appalachia. No evidence can be found of Democratic landslides here due to United Mine Workers influence, either.)
OREGON
Retiring U.S. Rep. Darlene Hooley's (D-05) endorsement of Hillary Rodham Clinton seems to have made her competitive in the CD's counties. HRC didn't drop below 45% in any county in OR05 - outperforming her statewide total - and actually narrowly taking Tillamook. Detailed returns may indicate HRC strength in its rural dairy redoubts, and Obama winning the precincts that are displacing that agricultural heritage.
Sitting Gov. Ted Kulongoski saved some face today, despite endorsing Hillary Clinton. His endorsed candidate for the Democratic nomination to challenge vulnerable Sen. Gordon Smith (R), State House Speaker Jeff Merkley staved off an unexpectedly strong challenge by liberal activist Steve Novick, popular among Oregon's Obama acolytes, by a slim margin: 45%-41%.
Bluegrass Preview--And Down The Stretch They Come!!!
Senator Clinton is expected to win Kentucky easily today, although she probably won't receive the margin she did in neighboring West Virginia. One area where Obama is expected to compete (and perhaps win), and which today's Politico points us to, is the Louisville area. As the story notes, the city has certain sections that are expected to benefit each of the candidates. John and I will try and find returns for parts of the city as soon as possible--and we'll be doing some live blogging tonight--to see if anything appears unusual or if either candidate under or over performs.
Three parts of the city to note are: 1) West End. This is the part of the city that traditionally has the largest concentration of African American voters. Blacks make up about 19% of the population in Louisville and 7% statewide. Obviously, this is Obama territory; 2) South End. This should be Clinton country. The South End is historically blue collar and the home to a GM and Ford plant where a large number of residents work. Also, there is speculation that a large General Electric plant in this part of town might soon be closing so economic insecurities may play into Clinton's hand; 3) Highlands. The Highlands is a more gentrified section of town, home to young professionals, the creative class, and University of Louisville faculty. This should be an area where Obama does well. The east side of the city is typically more upper class.
The city and surrounding area comprise the state's 3rd congressional district, now represented by John Yarmuth, an Obama supporter. The 3rd has long been one of the most competitive districts in the country and is always being targeted by both parties. Yarmuth captured the seat from Anne Northrup in 2006. The 3rd is also the only district in the state won by John Kerry in 2006, giving him 51%.
Monday, May 19, 2008
ElectionDissection.com Book Club
I'm going to be doing a series of posts over the next little while, now that the primaries are winding down, on the fantastic new book by Rick Perlstein, "Nixonland." The second in his series on the rise of conservatism in America (following up on "Before the Storm"), the book is essentially a portrait of the period from 1964-1972. What makes his work so interesting is that it challenges, and presents a counter to, the traditional narrative of the 1960's that many have given us. While he discusses at length the anti-war movement, the rise of black power, and other developments on the left, what Perlstein is more interested in explaining is what was going on in reaction to these movements. Using Nixon as the central actor, "Nixonland" is, in short, the history of the Silent Majority.If you've read this blog, especially many of my earlier posts, you know that this is an era and a movement that I'm fascinated in, and one which I believe can still be felt today. Because I'm not quite finished with the book yet, I'm going to hold off on a long analysis. Also, I'm going to an event at the National Press Club tomorrow at which Perlstein will be discussing his work so I want to hear what he has to say. Nonetheless, pick "Nixonland" up and dive in.
Wednesday, May 14, 2008
West Virginia Primary Results
With Senator Clinton’s massive win in West Virginia yesterday, it’s easy to gloss over the numbers. In going through the county by county results this morning, one part of the state really jumped out at me. Deep in the heart of coal country, in the southwestern part of the state and nestled on the border with Kentucky and close to southeastern Ohio, a cluster of counties gave Clinton numbers well beyond what she achieved statewide. In Wayne, Boone, Lincoln, Logan, Wyoming, and Mingo counties, Obama received 14%, 13%, 13%, 11%, 11%, and 8%(!) respectively. The last county really jumped out at me. Not knowing a whole lot of details about this area, I thought I’d explore. Here’s how we might describe it.
Like the rest of the state, this region is overwhelmingly white. The African American percentages in each county are: Wayne--.13%; Boone--.65%; Lincoln--.17%; Logan—2.6%; Wyoming--.12%; and Mingo—2.3%. Economically, each county’s median family income is below the state average, with the exception of Boone County, which has a median family income of about $32,000. Remember, also, that West Virginia's median income is third lowest in the country, so this area is extremely poor. Given this demographic profile, I guess we might be surprised that Obama did as well as he did, all things considered. If we were to identify an area that seems to define Appalachia, especially as its political behavior is being discussed, this would be it. These are counties that are heavily rural, geographically isolated, and economically depressed.
Looking at their political behavior over time, we see a bit more diversity, although this is a pretty solidly Democratic region, especially at the local level. Mingo County has been consistently Democratic, only voting Republican in the landslides of 1972 and 1928. Boone has also been strongly Democratic, only going for the Republicans in ’72, ’20, and ’16. Wayne has gone Republican the last two elections, plus ’84, ’72, ’56, and ’28. Wyoming County voted Republican in ’04 and ’72. It was solidly Republican prior to the New Deal realignment upon which it consistently began to vote Democratic. Lincoln also went Republican in ’04 and ’72, but did as well in ’20, ’28, and ’44. Finally, Logan County has been the most Democratic, only voting Republican in 1928.
Boone County is the largest coal producing county in the state (see rankings here), producing more than double any other county. It, and its neighbors, as such has played an instrumental part in the labor movement throughout U.S. history. Boone, for example, gave Socialist candidate Eugene Debs 13% of the vote in 1912, double his national average. Neighboring Logan County was the site of the 1921 Battle of Blair Mountain, the largest armed uprising in American labor history.
We should note that Obama essentially ceded this contest to Clinton and never really campaigned in West Virginia. Given the demographics, one wonders how much he could have caused his numbers to improve had he spent time or resources in the state. Probably not much. Interestingly, these counties fall within the third congressional district, represented since 1976 by Nick Rahall. Congressman Rahall endorsed Senator Obama well before the primary.
Also from West Virginia yesterday, reminiscent of an earlier post of mine about electing judges statewide, the state's top Supreme Court judge got tossed in the Democratic primary. It's generally not a good idea to be photographed with the head of one of the state's biggest energy companies--who has business before the court--on the French Riviera.
Tuesday, May 13, 2008
West Virginia Primary LIVE Blogging
John and I will be live blogging the results of the West Virginia Primary as they come in tonight. Check in for updates and analysis.
8:10 PM
AP has already called West Virginia. No big surprise. What John and I are most interested in tonight is not so much the WV numbers but the special election in Mississippi's first district. Democrats are hoping to pick up their third consecutive special election in a heavily Republican district. CBMurray
8:58 PM
In MS-1, Travis Childers (D) leads Greg Davis (R) 60-40% with 8% in. If these numbers hold, you might want to stay away from the bottom of bridges if you're anywhere near a Republican party headquarters. Watch out for falling objects. CBMurray
9:20 PM
Tightening in MS. Down to 6 point lead for Childers. 33% in. CBMurray
10:07 PM
Its tied in MS. CBMurray
10:23 PM
AP has called the race for Childers. The Republicans have now lost three straight special elections in heavily Republican districts--Hastert (IL), Baker (LA), Wicker (MS). CBMurray
Victorious in tonight’s Nebraska Dem U.S. Senate primary is Scott Kleeb, the “rancher-professor” who ran an unexpectedly tough race in NE 03 in ’06, racking up 45% in a CD that Pres. Bush carried by a 74-24% landslide. Kleeb easily beat back self-financed Tony Raimondo, who switched parties to seek the seat. Kleeb may make a once safe R seat competitive. JVLaB
8:10 PM
AP has already called West Virginia. No big surprise. What John and I are most interested in tonight is not so much the WV numbers but the special election in Mississippi's first district. Democrats are hoping to pick up their third consecutive special election in a heavily Republican district. CBMurray
8:58 PM
In MS-1, Travis Childers (D) leads Greg Davis (R) 60-40% with 8% in. If these numbers hold, you might want to stay away from the bottom of bridges if you're anywhere near a Republican party headquarters. Watch out for falling objects. CBMurray
9:20 PM
Tightening in MS. Down to 6 point lead for Childers. 33% in. CBMurray
10:07 PM
Its tied in MS. CBMurray
10:23 PM
AP has called the race for Childers. The Republicans have now lost three straight special elections in heavily Republican districts--Hastert (IL), Baker (LA), Wicker (MS). CBMurray
Looks like Obama’s strongest county is
The New York Times' website has a nice graphic up now that shows that Jefferson County has the highest median income in the state. More evidence that Obama tends to do better as income goes up. CBMurray
Surprise:
Victorious in tonight’s Nebraska Dem U.S. Senate primary is Scott Kleeb, the “rancher-professor” who ran an unexpectedly tough race in NE 03 in ’06, racking up 45% in a CD that Pres. Bush carried by a 74-24% landslide. Kleeb easily beat back self-financed Tony Raimondo, who switched parties to seek the seat. Kleeb may make a once safe R seat competitive. JVLaB
Voting on the Mississippi--Does Geography Affect Politics???
Today should see Senator Clinton run up a big victory in West Virginia. Demographically, the state seems perfectly suited to her and not well suited at all for Obama, given the patterns we've seen to this point. Much has been written in the past weeks about Obama’s difficulty in winning white working class voters. The results in Ohio and Pennsylvania not only demonstrated these voters’ support of Senator Clinton, but many have put these results within a broader geographic discussion. As I mentioned in an earlier post, the “Pennsyltucky” or “Appalachian” voting patterns not only have had an effect on the nomination contest, but will perhaps have ramifications in the general election should Obama head the Democratic ticket (an excellent discussion of this here). Today’s contest will fill in a big chunk of the Appalachian map.
I have long been interested in how geography might affect political behavior. As I wrote in one of my posts on the Mississippi primary, one thing that characterizes that state’s political history is a linkage between the land, the economy it fostered, the populations that worked it, and the political behavior of those groups to this day.In fact, arguments of this type infused Kevin Phillips’ “The Emerging Republican Majority.” His discussion of settlement patterns, cultural heritage, etc. showed us that the political behavior we see today has its roots in distant history. Different regions, with different histories, populations, and economies, produce different types of politics.
In thinking about all of this, I thought I’d look at a geographic area that has always interested me. As a student of Wisconsin politics and voting behavior, I’ve come to believe that to understand the success of Democratic candidates in the Badger state, one shouldn’t focus on the usual or obvious suspects---the population centers of Milwaukee and Madison. While these two cities provide the lion’s share of the Democratic votes in the state, to be sure, they are rarely enough to guarantee victory. Winning Democrats need to find votes outstate as well. Where they tend to find these voters is in the string of counties that border the Mississippi River in the southwestern part of the state (see this old post).Thinking about Wisconsin and Mississippi—two states as different as can be imagined—we see a common characteristic—river counties, namely Mississippi River counties, that are heavily Democratic. Note that on the maps above, Democratic counties are colored red; Republican counties blue. How do we explain this???
In pondering this for a few days, I began to wonder whether it was something about the river itself that explained its politics. Does geography explain politics?? As I contemplated this, I remembered an argument I’ve heard in recent years about why Democrats tend to do better on the “coasts.” Looking at electoral returns over the last several cycles, one sees, with the exception of the southeast coast, how the coastal areas of the U.S. are the most strongly Democratic parts of the country. The argument that I’ve heard to explain this suggests that these areas are, by virtue of their exposure to international trade, immigration, and cultural exchange, the most diverse in the country. This cosmopolitanism is also seen in high concentrations of universities, corporate headquarters, and media centers. As a result, voters in these areas are more likely to espouse liberal positions and therefore vote Democratic.
If this is true, might we see a similar dynamic in another major coastal area in the U.S., namely along the Mississippi River? We tend not to think about how an “inner coast” like this might be similar to the ocean fronting coasts, but in many ways—especially if we look at this historically—there are some commonalities. During the mid to late nineteenth centuries, the Mississippi River was the central artery of American commerce, linking the interior of the country with foreign export markets via the ports in and around New Orleans. Even today, the Port of South Louisiana is the largest in the United States. Also during this earlier period, Mississippi river hubs were linked to the eastern states via the growing railroad network crisscrossing the country. Thus, in connecting disparate parts of the country the river brought different people, cultures, and economies together, creating a greater degree of cosmopolitanism and diversity than in the more inland areas.
So, have there been any political manifestations of this over the course of our history? Looking at the stretch of the River from Minnesota to Louisiana, we don’t see one party dominate the entire route by winning every state in a given election. Rather, there appears to be, especially in the elections after the Civil War, a regional dynamic—also highlighted by Kevin Phillips—in which Union/Confederate loyalties played out across these states. The northern states along the span of the river (Minnesota, Wisconsin, Illinois, Iowa) were consistently Republican, while the southern states (Louisiana, Mississippi, Arkansas, Tennessee, Kentucky) were consistently Democratic. Missouri, finding itself at the midpoint of the river was more schizophrenic in its behavior. It was Democratic until 1904, after which it became extremely competitive, to the point where it is now considered perhaps the quintessential bellwether state.
In recent electoral cycles, the entire Mississippi River area has tended to be heavily competitive, and from the Democrats’ perspective, extremely important in their attempts to win the White House. To demonstrate this, I thought it would be helpful to look a little more closely than at state maps. Instead, we can look county by county.
What we see is that, even in the years when Democrats lost the general election the counties along the river tended to vote Democratic. Below are maps for the 1988, 2000, and 2004 elections respectively (Democratic counties in Red, Republican counties in Blue). Thus, there seems to be something to the connection between the geography and its voting behavior.
I wondered next if we’ve seen any pattern to the voting this year in the Democratic primary. Indeed, we have. There are 110 counties that border the Mississippi River that have voted to this point: 17 MN; 8 WI; 18 IL; 10 IA; 17 MO; 5 TN; 6 AR; 11 MS; 18 LA. 4 Kentucky counties bordering the river will vote next week. What have we seen this year in the Obama/Clinton contest?Of these 110 counties, Obama has won 82—75%. If we discount the homefield advantage of Obama in Illinois and Clinton in Arkansas, Obama still has a huge advantage, winning 66 counties to Clinton’s 25. Going out a level, looking at the states, Obama has won 7 of the 9 Mississippi River states. He lost Clinton's home state of Arkansas along with Tennessee, which has a short border with the river.
Beyond the overall numbers, we see a very clear pattern to the distribution of these counties. This distribution is reminiscent of the pattern I described above. Below is a map I’ve produced that shows the voting in each of these 110 counties. Obama counties are in green, Clinton counties in red. What we see, essentially, is a geographic area—the Mississippi River—that is in reality three distinct sub-regions. In the northern stretch—Minnesota to southern Illinois—Obama wins the vast majority of counties. In the southern stretch—Louisiana though Mississippi—Obama is also dominant. Clinton does best in the middle stretch—Missouri, Tennessee, Arkansas—although Obama wins a number of counties here too.
What explains this regional pattern? When I started thinking about this region a few weeks ago, I wondered if there was a racial dynamic. In examining these 110 counties, I coded the African American percentage of each. In the northern stretch, the counties are almost totally white. While Hennepin and Ramsey counties in Minnesota (Minneapolis and St. Paul) have a black population of 10% and 9% respectively, only one other county in Minnesota, Wisconsin, or Iowa has a black population above 4%. In Illinois, you have a few counties with a sizable black population (St. Clair, Jackson, Alexander) but for the most part these counties are almost exclusively white.On the southern stretch, you see the inverse. Here, the counties have extremely large black populations. The Mississippi counties are on average 62% African American and the Louisiana counties are over 40% black (with 3 above 60%).
In the middle, and most divided stretch, you have a more moderate black population. The Missouri counties, for example, are roughly 11% black and the county with the highest black population, St. Louis city, went heavily for Obama. Clinton did win the counties in the boot heel that have relatively large black populations although she also won the northern counties of “Little Dixie” that have small black numbers. Likewise, in Tennessee, the one county Obama won (Shelby--Memphis) has the largest black population. In Arkansas, the two counties with the largest black population, Phillips and Lee, were also for Obama while the whiter counties went to Clinton.
To expand the analysis a bit I decided to map beyond only the counties that border the river to take into account some more of the surrounding land. Below we see the map, with the general pattern described above. A fuller shading in of the states shows Clinton’s strength in Missouri and Arkansas more than when I highlighted the river counties. Also note the Edwards counties in blue, won during the Iowa caucuses.
So race seems to be a factor. However it isn’t simply that Obama’s support increases as the black population increases. Rather, the dynamic seems to be more nuanced. Over the last month or so, there has been much debate about a U shaped distribution representing the vote for Obama and the size of a state’s black population. This debate gets most interesting when we think about why the whitest states have been so heavily for Obama.
So there seems to be something going on here. I've been tossing this around in my mind for the past few weeks and have been struggling for an explanation beyond one focusing solely on race. For the northern stretch of the river, I would throw one possibility. From the outset, Obama has based his campaign on a message of “change.” More specifically, he has pledged to change the way politics is conducted and has railed against special interests, lobbyists, and the like. In many ways, this message echoes a political culture, Progressivism, that was founded in and is well ingrained in the upper Midwest. Whether it be the LaFollette led Progressive movement in Wisconsin or the Democratic Farmer Labor movement in Minnesota, Obama’s message seems to resonate among populations that, while demographically are very different, have a shared political heritage that jibes with his message. Looking at current polling, Obama is performing better against McCain than Hillary Clinton in these states (see here to compare Clinton and Obama versus McCain). This, perhaps suggests that this part of the country is not just important to Democrats, but might be more prone to go Democratic with Obama heading the ticket.
So, while we might not say that Clinton's "Mississippi River Problem" isn't as severe as Obama's "Appalachian Problem," there do seem to be some worrisome signs for her, especially on the northern stretch. We can be sure that come November these states along the Mississippi River will be highly competitive. As the Democratic nomination begins to wind down, it seems as if Senator Obama is perhaps better positioned to take advantage of the politics that this stretch of land creates.
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