Busy Primary Day, With An Emphasis On D.C. Mayor's Race

Let's get a little more current.  Today wraps up the primary season leading into November's midterms, gubernatorial, and various state and local races.  Seven states are up and there are a number of interesting races.  The one that is getting the most ink is the Republican Senate primary in Delaware.  A month ago this race was on nobody's radar.  The presumptive nominee is longtime Republican vote getter Mike Castle.  Castle is one of the politicians I profiled last year in my post on small state politics.  A fixture in state political circles since the mid '60's Castle has served as both governor (two terms) and as the state's lone House member since 1993.  Castle has fashioned himself as a prgamatic moderate, perfectly suited to a state which typically votes Democratic statewide.  The state GOP establishment has been firmly behind Castle and everything pointed to an easy pick-up for Republicans of the seat vacated by now VP Joe Biden. 

That, of course, was before the year of the Tea Party.  Over the past several weeks, Castle has seen his sure thing become much more precarious as Christine O'Donnell, fueled by a Sarah Palin endorsement and a slew of out of state funding and manpower, has tightened the race.  Like earlier contests in Utah and Alaska, which saw incumbent GOP Senators defeated, tonight's contest in the First State could provide fireworks.  The winner faces Chris Coons, New Castle County Executive.

Closer to home, the big tilt today is the DC Democratic mayoral primary (Washington Post blog coverage here).  Given the underlying political affiliation of DC voters, this is the whole shebang.  The winner will be the mayor.  Watching this race up close over the past months, this race has become fascinating.  The incumbent, Adrian Fenty shot to prominence four years ago through a retail politics performance par excellance.  He won every precinct in the city, casting himself as a results oriented reformer.  As is so often the case with reformers, patience and prudence take a back seat to action.  The flashpoint in all of this has been Fenty's efforts to reform the long moribund DC education system.  Under Chancellor Michelle Rhee, Fenty has overseen a mayoral takeover of the school system and a process of school consolidation and widespread teacher firings--with test scores both improving and ebbing as a result.  In a nutshell, Fenty has been highly polarizing, especially among DC's older establishment.  His opponent, City Council Chair Vince Gray has campaigned on the notion of "One City."  To supporters, he will bind back together what Fenty has blown up.  To detractors, he will be a throwback to the dysfunction of latter day Marion Berry/Control Board DC government.  The prevailing view of the underlying dynamics of this race suggests that race and age are the faultlines upon which the election will be decided.  Fenty has tended to draw his support from white, more educated, and younger voters whereas Grey is seen as strongest among African American and, especially, older voters.

John has been doing yeoman's work looking at this race from the ground level--see here, here, and here.  We're both going to try and get out today to capture some of what's going on at various polling places.  I'm also going to post as results start coming in later tonight. 

Also of note today is the GOP gubernatorial primary in Wisconsin.  Milwaukee County Executive Scott Walker is taking on former 1st District Congressman and one time Senate candidate Mark Neumann.  The winner will take on Milwaukee Mayor and former 5th District Congressman Tom Barrett in the general.

UPDATE: As the results start coming in tonight, we're going to get very focused on the micro level for the DC mayor's race.  Here's a DC ward and precinct map so you can play along at home.  If the race shakes out as predicted, expect to see Gray do extremely well in Wards 5, 7 (his home), and 8.  Fenty can be expected to do well in Wards 2 and 3.  His home Ward 4 could be the real bellwether.  Wards 1 and 6 should be relatively competitive too I would think. 

John and I are going to hit some of the precincts in Ward 5 to get some local flavor.  Hopefully we'll have some pictures to go along with the numbers.  This should be Gray territory big time.

The 1864 Wisconsin Vote: Where the Copperheads Were

Some more Civil War musings.  Over the last few weeks I've been trying to unearth some of the data behind the Civil War era elections.  Like the last post that looked at the secession vote in Virginia, county level data is the holy grail, yet oftentimes elusive.  As has been the case so often, my native state of Wisconsin has been exceptional in its record keeping.  Any Badger State political junkie is well familiar with the bi-annual Blue Book, which acts as a sort of mega almanac of Wisconsin government, economics, history, and the like.  It also provides detailed election returns.  Thus, I was ecstatic to find an on-line version of every Blue Book going back to when it was simply called the "Legislative Manual of the State of Wisconsin."

For the 1864 election, the report election returns down to, where relevant, the town, ward, and precinct level (!!!).   From this, we can explore the relative levels of support for Abraham Lincoln and the Democratic nominee, General George McClellan.  What I'm particularly interested in is how the war, and its progress by 1864, affected support for Lincoln.  One thing that those familiar with the war know is how the military success of the north and south ebbed and flowed throughout the conflict.  While by 1864 the north had achieved some notable successes (i.e. Gettysburg), the war was far from over and a sort of weariness had crept into northern circles.  Politically, Lincoln was seen as highly vulnerable.  For the duration of the war he had been trying to balance a coalition of Radical Republicans, pro-war Democrats, and border state fence-sitters.  The defection of any of these groups could not only lead to the collapse of his government, but perhaps the Union as well.  For any President trying to manage a coalition, any decision or action is likely to upset one camp while not fully pleasing the other--a no win situation in even the most peaceful times.  The 1864 election was thus a test of whether or not the country would be willing to see the war to its conclusion or whether increasingly vocal anti-war northerners would be able to change the direction of country.

Indeed, the fact that Lincoln's re-nomination took place under the banner of the "Union Republican" Party and not the still fledgling "Republican" label is an indication of how worried northern pro-war politicos were of the coalition's splintering.  The coupling of Lincoln with pro-war Tennessee Democrat Andrew Johnson as the VP nominee is further illustration of this delicate dance taking place among those trying to re-elect the President.  Ultimately, Republicans were aided by the fact that the Democrats seemed to have a difficult time fielding a candidate that was 1) anti-war, or at least skeptical of the Lincoln administration's efforts and 2) viable in an electorate that had thousands of its sons, brothers, and fathers currently engaged in the fight.  The fact that the Democrats ultimately settled on the popular, yet handily pro-war McClellan shows how hard it was going to be defeat Lincoln, despite public unease with the pace of the war. (We could devote a lot of time to McClellan as a General and how his dismissal by Lincoln may have played into the politics of his nomination and campaign, but we'll set that aside for now).

Those northern elements allied against the war are normally identified as "Copperheads."  While being largely pro-Union, Copperheads were oftentimes driven against the war by its increasingly abolitionist tenor.  With the issuing of the Emancipation Proclamation after the Union victory at Antietam, many northerners felt that the war's efforts were being directed for more ambitious purposes than those originally sold to them by Lincoln.  This question of "why" the war was being fought is one that I'm going to hopefully address in my next post.  Until then, its worth noting that northern feelings about abolition were decidedly mixed, especially in certain segments of the electorate.  When the manpower needs of the Union army were such that volunteer regiments would have to be supplemented by conscription, draft riots in such places as New York demonstrated how difficult it would be to lead men into battle under the banner of ending slavery.

In doing some background reading on the Copperhead movement, I've been spending some time with the writing of Frank Klement, a historian who used to teach at my alma mater.  In his writing on the subject, Klement talks a lot about how the Copperhead movement had a strong ethnic dimension to it.  Specifically, Copperheadism tended to take root in many parts of the midwest that had a strong German and Irish Catholic population.  Writing in "Catholics as Copperheads During the Civil War," he argues:

The Republican party, founded during the 1850's as Whiggery disintegrated, became the home of three isms: prohibitionism, abolitionism, and Know-Nothingism.  Irish-Americans and German-Americans detested each of the three, oftentimes reacting emotionally...The Irish and German-Americans detested abolitionism, for they feared that emancipation would release a flood of cheap labor that would threaten their very livelihood. (The Catholic Historical Review.  January 1994.  p. 36). 

Midwestern voters tended to also be drawn to Copperheadism for economic reasons.  Heavily agricultural, these regions relied on southern markets for their livelihood.  As the war dragged on, and especially as the Mississippi River blockade shut off southern markets, many sought an end to the war as soon as possible.

When we take all of this into account when looking at one particular state--Wisconsin--what do we see???  With the data I've created the following color coded map to show the support of Lincoln (red) and McClellan (blue) on a county by county basis.  Statewide, Lincoln won Wisconsin with 52.4% of the vote.  He won 35 counties to McClellan's 22.

McClellan's main area of strength was Milwaukee and its surrounding counties--the urban center of the state.  Winning 68% of Milwaukee county his 3700 margin there was the largest margin of victory for either candidate in any county.  Neighboring Washington and Ozaukee counties gave McClellan an additional 4058 vote margin. 

Aside from these areas being populous, what else does this part of the state have, that is relevant to this discussion???  German Americans.  Check out the following map that shows the prevalence of German Americans in Civil War era Wisconsin:

Not only were German-Americans present in great numbers in those counties that gave McClellan his greatest support, the German presence throughout the state was immense.  In fact, those who were either German born themselves, or had at least one German born parent, comprised over 1/3 of the entire state's population.  In the ethnic mosaic of Wisconsin, Germans were the dominant group.

While not nearly as large as the German bloc, Wisconsin did see considerable Irish immigration as well.  As Klement noted, this group was also likely to be sympathetic to Copperhead critiques of the war.  Looking at a map of Wisconsin's Irish population, the correlation isn't quite as stark as we saw with the Germans.

In my next post I want to explore another facet of the 1864 vote: that of the soldiers themselves.  Here, the question of how salient the issues of the war and emancipation will be at the forefront.  Were those actually doing the fighting more likely to support Lincoln or were they, perhaps, ready for the war to end?  Would they support their previous, and beloved commander, McClellan?  Might it depend upon which group of soldiers we're looking at?  Finally, we'll have something to say about the mechanics of how soldiers in the field actually voted--and whether this might have affected their choice.  Stay tuned.


**Above maps from Richard N. Current.  The History of Wisconsin.  Volume II.  The Civil War Era.

Secession Dissection in the Old Dominion. Or, Where West Virginia Came From

Continuing on with a look at Civil War era electioneering, lets take a look at how one particular state (soon to become two) moved toward secession.  As I mentioned in the previous post, the Confederacy was formed in waves; not every state left the Union at the same time.  In the second wave of secessions was Virginia.  Following the attack on Fort Sumter and President Lincoln's call upon the states to provide troops for the Union effort, the critical state of Virginia moved toward secession.  Given the size of the state, its geographical location, and its history in the forming of the country, the Confederacy would probably have ended much sooner than it did had it not had Virginia in its ranks.

As must be noted, Virginia was actually quite hesitant to secede.  A number of efforts were made to keep Virginia in the Union, with an early Secession Convention sending a delegation to Washington to try and ascertain the Lincoln administration's intentions.  When Sumter was met with Lincoln's determination to meet Southern hostilities with force, Virginia's march to leave the Union picked up pace.  On April 17, Virginia's Secession Convention voted to secede, with the final decision subject to a statewide referendum.  With the data for this vote available on a county-wide basis, I thought I'd map it to see if any patterns emerge.

In the last post I tried to show a linkage between secession support across the South with the prevalence of slavery.  For the purposes of this post, lets do the same thing.  Our hypothesis would be that those parts of Virginia that had a higher prevalence of slavery would have a higher level of support for the secession referendum.  Fortunately, I found a good map of Virginia that shows slavery by county that we can use:

As we can see from the map, slavery was more prevalent in some parts of the state than others.  The most north-western part of the state (more on that in a bit) had very little slave presence at all.  So, how did the vote correspond?  The vote to ratify secession was held on May 23, 1861.  I've taken the county data, color coded it based on the percentage of the vote for secession in each particular county, and then transposed the result onto the above map.  The color scheme is as follows.  Each percentage band is % of the vote in favor of secession: Dark Red 95% and above; Red 90-95%; Dark Pink 85-90%; Pink 80-85%; Orange 75-80%; Yellow 65-70%; Light Yellow 60-65%; Brown 55-60%; Light Green 50-55%; Green 35-40%; Dark Green 30-35%; Sage Green 25-30%; Light Blue 20-25%; Turquoise 15-20%; Pale Blue 10-15%; Blue 5-10%; Dark Blue 0-5%.   For those parts of the map that are un-colored, there was no data available.

What becomes clear immediately is how widespread and virtually unanimous support was for ratification across a wide swath of the state.  Essentially, all of modern day Virginia, even in those counties that had a comparatively small slave population, voted unanimously (95%+) to ratify secession.  Once the movement toward secession had built up momentum, the population followed. 

Where things are more interesting is in the north-western part of the state.  Here, as we can see, resistance to secession was strong.  In most of this part of the state ratification failed to not only get a majority, but received less than 20% of the vote.  This, in short, is the story of how modern day West Virginia came into existence.  Even prior to the May 23 vote, efforts were underway in this part of the state to not only vote against secession, but to create an alternative government and eventually break off from the Commonwealth.  During two conventions held in Wheeling, strongly pro-Union Virginians plotted to resist the movement of the state into the Confederacy.   Conventioneers moved to create a "Restored Government of Virginia" and utlimately break away from Virginia.  Ultimately, West Virginia was admitted to the Union on June 20, 1863.  If you've ever driven through this part of the country you know how mountainous this territory is.  This was not land where slavery ever took hold.  The land was simply not hospitable to the type of agriculture that one found in South Carolina, Mississippi, and other parts of the Confederacy including modern day Virginia.  Thus, Unionism was and remained strong even as the state was moving quickly into rebellion. 

Civil War Secession Maps

As the current electoral season has me a bit underwhelmed, I'm going to dig back into history a bit. Every once in a while I get a Civil War bug that sends me to the book store for a few weeks or months of exploration. In my mind it's without a doubt the most important period of our history. Most of the unresolved issues of our early history came to a head then; so much of our history since then can trace its legacy to this time. A lot of posts on this site have dealt with the legacy of the Civil War, especially as they relate to the role of race in our politics and elections.

I'm currently in the midst of Shelby Foote's magisterial three volume history of the Civil War. This is a project that will probably be completed in fits and starts over the months ahead, especially as other things capture my attention. Anyhow, an interesting electoral story is that of the secession votes held across the south in the wake of Lincoln's election and the subsequent firing on Ft. Sumter in early 1861. The first wave of states to secede were South Carolina, Alabama, Mississippi, Georgia, Louisiana, Florida, and Texas. The second wave (following Ft. Sumter) comprised the states of Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas. I found this interesting map to give a sense of secession sympathy in these states:

What the history of this period tells us is that support for secession was by no means universal. Many of these deep south states had pockets of people loyal to the union (or at least not enthusiastic about secession). A classic example of this is Tennessee, which to this day has strongly Republican leaning counties in the eastern part of the state that never became part of the Solid South for Democrats. Also of note is the part of Virginia that would ultimately break off to form the new state of West Virginia.

The most common explanation for this diversity of opinion regarding secession in these states relates to the presence or reliance upon slave labor. In Alabama, for example, the northern most counties tended to have very little slaveholding. With a geography and topography that wasn't conducive to cotton or other labor intensive crops, secessionist feelings were less intense than in places like South Carolina or the Mississippi Delta. Consider these maps of slavery's pervasiveness in the region with the above to get a sense of these very interesting dynamics.

If you're interested in the Civil War and have some time on your hands, I'd highly recommend Yale historian David Blight's course on the period. Its absolutely amazing and worth the time it takes to get through all of the lectures.

Sometimes You Can't Make This Stuff Up

I've done a few posts on South Carolina politics since this blog started but I'm thinking I'm going to have to retire the Palmetto State altogether. I just can't figure the place out. Aside from the total wackiness of the governor's race as well as the Democratic Senate nomination, tonight's runoff in the 1st congressional district on the Republican side adds another chapter to the state's recent run of bizarro politics. See if your head doesn't explode after reading through this.

The Difference Between Political Journalism and Political Science

A little bit of satire that warmed my heart. I know where I stand.

How Not to Navigate the Primary/General Two-Step. Or, Did Artur Davis Have Any Choice Than to Move Right???

Among yesterday's primary results, probably the most interesting was on the Democratic side in Alabama's governor's race. For a long time I've been puzzling over the candidacy of Artur Davis, currently (but not for long) the House member from the state's 7th District, centered around Birnmingham. For many national observers, Davis was seen as a shining light. The Harvard educated African American was envisioned as kind of a southern Obama--pragmatic, clear-eyed, and electable. First elected in 2002, Davis secured a coveted seat on the Ways and Means Committee and even got some talk as a potential Attorney General before Eric Holder got the nod.


This year, Davis mounted a campaign for Governor and in doing so had to figure out how to win both a primary (which necessarily entails catering to a more liberal audience) and the general in a state that has been pretty hostile to Democrats--at least state wide--in recent years. As an African American candidate, given the state's history, the job was all the more difficult. Davis' strategy seemed to be to tack to the right during the primary season in the belief that he could engender himself to the moderate voters he would need in the general. Davis was one of the few House Democrats to vote against the Health Care Reform Bill and during the campaign went to great lengths to distance himself from President Obama. Likewise, as much of the coverage of the race makes clear, Davis also decided not to court Alabama's black political brokers.


What happened?? Yesterday he got crushed by State Agriculture Commissioner Ron Sparks. Sparks won 62% of the vote and 62 of the state's 67 counties. Sparks filled the vacuum created by Davis' passivity toward the black community, winning a sizable percentage of the black vote. He was endorsed by several of the state's leading liberal organizations, including the powerful teacher's union, in a campaign that moved leftward while Davis moved right.


In the post mortems being written today, Davis' strategy is being decried. By focusing on moderates he was, the argument goes, putting the cart before the horse. Primaries and generals are very different animals. They bring out different electorates, emphasize different issues oftentimes, and thus require different strategies and coalitions. Candidates who try to win both elections with one strategy--given these differences--oftentimes fail. What is worth thinking about, however, is whether a candidate like Davis had any other choice than to move rightward as soon as he could. Given the state's history and political profile, can a left of center African American win statewide?


Alabama Primary Coverage:

Montgomery Advertiser
Birmingham News
Washington Post
Fivethirtyeight.com
Talkingpointsmemo.com


County by County results
County Results Map

Out of the Darkness

Sorry that the blog has been dark for so long. House buying and moving will do that. Now that things have somewhat returned to normal, I'll be doing much more posting in the coming days. Lots of stuff to report on--Bennett (UT) and Mollohan (WV) losses plus tomorrow's big tilts in Pennsylvania, Arkansas, and Kentucky.

Stay tuned.

A Counterfactual to the Conventional Wisdom

Now that the health care vote has taken place, we move into the post-mortem phase. For the past several months, as Democrats struggled to get this bill passed, the conventional wisdom has been that the 2010 midterms were going to be a bloodbath. Democrats will lose massive numbers of seats, the reasoning goes, possibly jeopardizing their majorities in both chambers. In the end, this may indeed be what happens, and I would bet that seats will be lost (although not necessarily because of health care).

However, what happens if the conventional wisdom (as is so often the case) turns out to be wrong? In the last day or so we've started to see evidence, both anecdotally and through polling, that health care reform may indeed prove to be quite popular and a net-plus for Democrats. President Obama is beginning a massive barnstorming push to sell the bill and we even have some Republicans taking credit for some of the bill's provisions.

In the run up to the vote, a lot of ink was spent talking about which Democrats might be the most vulnerable as a result of health care. The focus was on those Democrats who hail from districts also won by John McCain in 2008. In the end, of those 49 House Democrats, 31 voted against the bill. In a similar vein, Nate Silver at fivethirtyeight.com created this simple graphic that shows a pretty strong correlation between Obama's success in a district and how that member ultimately voted.

In this spirit, I decided to focus on the other side of the aisle. Rather than look at vulnerable Democrats, I wonder if there might be some Republicans who--should health care reform prove to be popular and a winner politically--might suffer as a result of their vote? The table at the top of this post shows those Republicans who represent House districts won by President Obama. I've included not only Obama's vote percentage but also the member's to provide a sense of relative popularity as well as the member's seniority. If we were to target which of these member's might have the most to fear, it would be those 1) whose own level of support is closest to Obama's--there are 10 members who received the same % of the vote or less than Obama; or 2) have less seniority in Congress. Usually members are most vulnerable earlier in their career, before they have the chance to build up a strong constituent base of support and familiarity. The final column of the table also might provide some indication of danger in that it highlights how salient the lack of health insurance might be to a district. Thanks to this Washington Post graphic, we can determine how much of a district lacks health insurance. If the number is sizable, and the member seems not to appreciate this, a "no" vote could prove problematic down the road.

Again, I'm not arguing definitively that this is how things will play out, but its always worth asking whether the dominant narrative is wrong.

Lone Star Rundown

As expected, Republican Governor Rick Perry cruised to renomination last night and avoided a run-off with either Kay Bailey Hutchison or Debra Medina. Bill White easily won the Democratic nod. Here's a quick rundown of the coverage:

Election results at the Office of the Texas Secretary of State

Houston Chronicle

Dallas Morning News

Austin Statesman

Burnt Orange Report

I'm trying to find a good county by county map so when I find one I'll put it up.

A Few Things For The Day

First up, its primary day in Texas (coverage here, here, and here). For the best coverage of the race (from the more liberal perspective), check out the Burnt Orange Report. While the Rick Perry / Kay Bailey Hutchison tilt started out as a real clash of the titans, the campaign since hasn't really lived up to the hype. It seems clear that Perry is going to win handily with the only real question whether he will top 50% and thus avoid a run-off with the runner up. The wild card in the race is Debra Medina. Medina, who is by far the candidate furthest to the right, has seen her numbers take a hit since voicing some support for "truther" claims about 9-11. Nonetheless, her polling suggests that she may be able to force a Perry/Hutchison run-off or even sneak into second place herself. Hutchison's campaign has been, from all accounts, a complete disappointment. Despite having high approval ratings throughout her career she has clearly been out-Texased by the incumbent Perry. He has artfully tied Hutchison to Washington despite her votes against the economic stimulus plan and other parts of the Obama agenda. Former Houston mayor Bill White is expected to easily clinch the Democratic nomination.

Once numbers start coming in we'll try to provide some quick analysis.

Second up today is a report from my home state, Wisconsin, that former four term governor, and Bush II era Secretary of Health and Human Services, Tommy Thompson is considering enterning this year's Senate race against incumbent Democrat Russ Feingold. Since leaving the governor's office in 2001, talk about Thompson's return has bubbled up regularly--often stoked by Thomspon himself. Despite his abysmal presidential run in 2008 (he dropped out even before the caucusing in Iowa) Thompson is often portrayed as a political juggernaut in Wisconsin. While he is clearly the most successful Republican in recent Wisconsin history, count me as skeptical about his chances against Feingold.

The first thing to keep in mind about a Thompson potential run is that while he has been extremely successful in the past, he hasn't been elected to anything in 10 years. Not only has he not campaigned in Wisconsin since 2000 he hasn't been on the scene in the state either. Almost all of his time has been spent in Washington and, since leaving HHS, on a number of corporate boards and government relations firm rosters (which will no doubt be used in any campaign against him). While long departed politicians oftentimes assume they can return home to past glories, things rarely work out that easily.

Second, while Feingold has never racked up huge numbers state wide in his three elections, he does have a constant base of support that never seems to wane. Despite receiving 51%, 53%, and 55% in '92, '98, and '04 respectively, Feingold is not an easy target to knock off. He is not easily pigeonholed and has enough votes and positions that make it hard for Republican opponents to portray him as out of touch with Wisconsin and its oftentimes quirky political culture. Also, despite having a reputation as a campaign finance zealot, Feingold has built up a considerable war chest, currently totaling about $3.5 million.

A third point to keep in mind--and this is something that probably won't receive a lot of coverage--is that Wisconsin voters tend not to vote out incumbents. Of the current House delegation (8 members), none of them were elected by beating an incumbent. Over the last twenty years only two Wisconsin House members have been defeated. The most recent was Peter Barca (1st District) in 1994 who was completing the term of Les Aspin who became President Clinton's Secretary of Defense. Before him, Scott Klug (2nd District) defeated long time incumbent Robert Kastenmeier in 1990. Otherwise, the House delegation, save for retirements, has been very stable. Likewise, Wisconsin Senate races have been largely uneventful in recent years. In fact its Feingold who was the last to win via an incumbent knock-off, downing two term incumbent Robert Kasten in 1992. Feingold and his couterpart Herb Kohl (first elected in 1988 via an open seat upon the retirement of five term incumbent William Proxmire) have kept the Senate delegation in Democratic hands ever since. Despite a political environment that seems rabidly anti-Washington and anti-incumbent, Feingold seems like the type of politician--aided by an electorate that tends to value stability--who could weather the storm.

Finally, and related to last week's post about Evan Bayh of Indiana, a piece about the top Democrat running to replace him, incumbent House member Brad Ellsworth (8th District). The takeaway is that despite progressives' grumblings about Bayh's record on liberal issues, Ellsworth is in fact considerably more conservative especially on social issues.

What Does Evan Bayh's Retirement Say About Centrism and the Modern Congress??? Or, Why Are Progressives So Glad He's Leaving???

The recent announcement of the retirement of Indiana Senator Evan Bayh has set off more of a conversation among commentators than that of any of the other recent congressional retirees. The debate, to be sure, has largely been taking place on the left. Much of this discussion, from the standpoint of more progressive liberals, stems from a long running frustration, if not exasperation, with Bayh. To those who have favored a robust health care reform bill, a progressive approach to energy policy, a fiscal and tax regime that rolled back many of the Bush era policies, and a less belligerent foreign policy, Bayh was someone who could never be counted upon. Though a Democrat, Bayh either sided with Republicans (an original supporter of the Bush tax cuts and the Iraq War) or required numerous concessions from Democrats before delivering his vote. Even worse, many have argued that Bayh’s approach to policy was rooted not so much in a centrist set of positions, but rather his own political agenda. In the past two presidential cycles, Bayh was on the short list for Vice Presidential consideration. He was a moderate from a historically red state, someone who would be attractive to independents and more centrist Republicans—seemingly gold for a party trying to cobble together 270 electoral votes after two narrow losses. But for those on the left, he had no core set of beliefs, but rather positions that seemed to shift with the prevailing political winds. This frustration with Bayh came to a head in the 60 vote Democratic Senate of the past year. In this environment, with no Republican support for any of the President’s major initiatives, each Democratic Senator has come to exercise maximum leverage. Thus, we’ve gotten to know Bayh, Ben Nelson, Blanch Lincoln, Joe Lieberman, and Mary Landrieu quite well over the past year. For many liberals, this has not been time well spent.

Bayh’s announcement, and his critique of Congress on the way out the door, got me thinking some more about some of the topics I’ve blogged about in the past as it relates to Congress, legislating, and elections: partisanship; centrism; and the relationship between members and their constituencies. I’d like to hit on these topics while putting them within the context of some of the political science literature. As I noted above, one of the criticisms of Bayh was that he was a political centrist, not a policy centrist. Over at Ta-Nehisi Coates’ blog at the Atlantic Monthly (one of my all time favorite blogs), a commentator brought this distinction to my attention. Its worth hashing out a bit, I think. A policy centrist would seem to be someone who both holds a consistent set of policy beliefs and locates those beliefs somewhere near the middle of the ideological spectrum. What might this look like? On fiscal matters—something that Bayh prided himself on—this might include a recognition that balanced budgets and fiscal responsibility require both spending cuts and revenue increases. How these are arranged may vary depending upon the circumstance but the point would be that someone is willing to accept both of them and that they do so from a reasoned set of arguments and assumptions and, hopefully, over time. Another example could be abortion. A centrist position could entail accepting abortion under certain circumstances (rape, incest, etc.) or under certain time constraints (during first trimester). Policy centrism doesn’t need to be the result of indecisiveness or uncertainty. Rather, in the best sense, it is the result of someone recognizing that the more ideologically extreme positions aren’t likely to prove workable or successful. Political centrism is a slightly different animal. Here, a politician could hold positions that are actually to one end of the ideological spectrum but could, because of how they fit into a broader political community (say a legislature), position themselves as someone who could provide concessions and as a result, be a dealmaker (or deal-killer). Also, this person’s centrism could result from policy positions that aren’t tethered to a core set of beliefs. These stances could be unpredictable and in fact could also be contradictory (pro-tax cut and pro-spending increases while emphasizing fiscal responsibility for example). During the health care debate, Joe Lieberman embodied this for many liberals. They noted, for example, that during his own presidential run Lieberman had campaigned on the idea of a public option and health care insurance exchanges. When he later disavowed support for these, critics charged that he was less interested in policy than in his own ability to shape the debate given that his vote was essential to the Senate moving forward.

Bayh’s announcement got me thinking again about some of the themes I’ve blogged about in regard to Congress: polarization and partisanship; centrism; and the electoral connection between members and their districts. I’d like to hit on each of these and try to put some of the furor around Bayh into a broader—largely political science based—context. The criticism that Bayh was more interested in positioning himself as a “political centrist” and that he deep down had no true policy convictions brought me back to an influential piece of work from the early 1950’s that acted as the theoretical underpinning for what has come to be known as the “responsible party” model of government. “Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System” was generated by the American Political Science Association, through the collaboration of many scholars, and presented in 1950 as a way to create a more accountable governing system. At the time, many scholars (known as pluralists) had been describing and even advocating a more group or civil society based organization of politics. Parties, to them, were a remnant of a past, more corrupt, and less responsive mode of governance. To those responsible for the new report, though, group-ism was even less democratic in that it dispersed accountability too much, especially among those not electable. Only parties could provide true accountability and an organized set of choices for voters. To quote a bit of the report:

“An effective party system requires, first, that parties are able to bring forth programs to which they commit themselves and, second, that the parties possess sufficient internal cohesion to carry out these programs. Such a degree of unity with the parties cannot be brought about without party procedures that give a large body of people an opportunity to share in the development of the party program…The fundamental requirement of accountability is a two-party system in which the opposition party acts as the critic of the party in power, developing, defining and presenting the policy alternatives which are necessary for a true choice in reaching public decisions. The opposition most conducive to responsible government is an organized party opposition.”

In other words, parties produce policy proposals that give voters a clear choice of how the government will move forward. A winning party will enact that set of policies and do so as a united bloc. This movement will be opposed by a unified opposition—with their own set of policies—that frame the choice in the next election. Voters will evaluate the performance of the majority party either positively or negatively, setting the course for the next move forward.

Let’s bring this into the current environment. For those on either end of the ideological spectrum “responsible party government” is extremely attractive and desirable. Their party is unified around a common set of objectives and pledges itself to work as a bloc. Any internal dissension works against this. This is why people like Bayh, Landrieu, Lincoln, Nelson, and Lieberman are so maddening to liberals. They refuse to be part of a unified Democratic Senate caucus. Rather than being able to enact a health care, cap and trade, or jobs bill—which can then be put to the voters for their consideration—these members produce (again in the eyes of their liberal critics) gridlock. While Senate Republicans are acting “responsibly” by presenting a unified opposition (although some would argue without their own set of policy prescriptions) the result works against the Democrats in two ways. Not only do they not have a set of results to point to, they also can be credibly blamed for not producing them. If only they acted like the Republicans and stuck together, they could get things done. Notice how few elegies to Bayh have been given by Senate liberals and other progressives over the past week.

A critique of the Responsible Party model that one could give is that it’s impossible for parties to 1) elect members from a diverse electorate and 2) stay unified afterwards. Or, in the case of Bayh, one can argue that he had no choice but to act the way that he did given where he came from. Indiana is not California, which is not New York, which is not Pennsylvania, etc. Constituencies and districts matter. They have different electorates with different interests and thus elect different types of politicians. This is the stuff on which we’ve dwelled so much on this site.


What I decided to do was come up with a way of seeing how close Senators are to their states based on the ideologies and partisanship of the two. The table above is the result of this attempt. To be clear up front, this is going to be very, very inexact. Methodology is crucial, yet tricky. What I decided to do was come up with a way to rank states based on their level of liberalism. The only way—or perhaps the only way that matters in the end—to do this is to look at voting. Because states change and because support for one party can vary based on who the candidates are and other variables, I decided to look at the past three elections. I took the Democratic percentage of the vote for each election and then added the three to give an overall score. Thus, a state that gave the Democrats 50%, 52%, and 55% would get 157. The result is a continuum of states running from the least liberal (Utah) to the most (Massachusetts). Running through the list I don’t see anything that’s too out of whack with what we would predict coming in.

From this, we want to try and predict how that state’s Senator should behave. If Senators work hard to represent their constituencies, there should be some correlation between the Senator’s behavior/ideology and that of their state. We should, in theory, see a continuum of Senator ideology that conforms with the state voting continuum. So what I did was create a column that suggests an “expected” order of Senators based on their ideology. Because each state has two Senators, each state is listed twice as you go down the column. Thus, Utah should have the country’s least liberal Senators, Massachusetts the most. While this is what we would expect, what we’re ultimately interested in is what we’ve actually seen—and whether it confirms our expectations.

To measure the ideology of individual Senators, I’ve relied on the most recently released set of Ideology Ratings by National Journal. Each year, the magazine selects a representative sample of Economic, Social, and Foreign Policy votes. Each member’s vote is recorded across all of these votes in each category. Members are then compared to each other. The result is a percentile score that places each member in relation to their colleagues in each of these policy categories. The higher the score, the higher the level of liberalism. National Journal then combines the Economic, Social, and Foreign Policy dimension to give each member a single score. Columns 7, 8, and 9 of the table list the actual order of the Senators along with their respective state and liberalism scores. Each Senator is color coded based on party as well.

I should note a couple of things right here. First, the most recent data available is for the year 2008 so we aren’t looking at the current Congress. We might expect behavior of Senators to change a bit given a new President, somewhat different agenda, and other factors. Overall, though, I doubt that individual behavior would change dramatically although I could be wrong in certain cases. Based on when this data came out last year, I would expect the 2009 numbers to be coming out shortly so I’ll try and update this ranking to include the cast of Senators elected in 2008 (and exclude those no longer in office). A second quick note relates to three Senators whose data was not available for 2008. First, Senator Ted Kennedy, due to his illness, did not cast enough votes to produce a meaningful score. Thus, as a proxy I used his 2007 score. Given that National Journal compiles a broadly representative sample of votes from year to year, I didn’t expect there to be much difference between his behavior in 2007 and what it would have been the following year. Similarly, Barack Obama did not cast enough votes in 2008 due to his presidential campaign. I also used his 2007 score. Like Obama, John McCain didn’t have a 2008 score. He also didn’t have enough recorded votes in 2007 (???!!!) so I had to use his 2006 score as a proxy.

Anyhow, you can see the continuum of Senators that we have as a result. The least liberal Senator is John Barrasso of Wyoming while the most liberal was Obama. One point we need to make clear is that although I have produced an ideological continuum of Senators, the ideological distance between each is not the same. Rather, as we have talked about a lot here, there is considerable polarization of the modern Congress. Thus, most Republican members are clustered on the right of the ideological spectrum whereas most Democrats are clustered together on the left. A better way to represent and visualize this would be to produce a bell-curve of this distribution of scores. Here is one that was generated based on the 2007 rankings. Going back to an earlier point, this clustering and polarization is what we might expect in a “Responsible Two Party System.” Also worth noting is that Senators from the same state are not necessarily located close to each other on the continuum but in many circumstances are quite distant.

What we’re interested in with people like Bayh is what’s going on in the middle of the continuum. How liberal/conservative are these Senators, where are they from, and how does this conform with their states? With National Journal’s rankings, we actually see a bit of overlap between Democratic and Republican moderates. Senator Bayh is actually more conservative than Maine Republicans Olympia Snowe and Susan Collins while Democrats Ben Nelson and Mary Landrieu score more conservative than Snowe. Its no surprise, then, that these members have been the ones getting the most attention over the last year—and driving their respective party ideologues crazy in the process.

How do they compare with their states??? What I did next (Column 10) is calculate the distance between where they are based on their Senate behavior and where they should be based on their state’s behavior (Column 6). Thus, is a Senator more liberal or conservative than their state and by how much? What we see is a range of distances as well as a small handful of Senators who are exactly where we would expect them to be (Enzi, Feinstein, Schumer, and Reed). The Senators who are far away are interesting to speculate about and also show us how elections and survival in Congress are oftentimes based on more than just a member’s voting. We should note, though, that because of the clustering around the ideological poles (that bell curve above) the distances I'm calculating here might look much further than they really are--i.e. moving 20 spots might mean traversing over 20 Senators who are only marginally different than you. Because we’ve had an election since these numbers were produced, I highlighted the Senators who lost re-election (Yellow) and the seats that changed party after a retirement (Green). While most of the flips took place in states where the incumbents had a bit of distance from their expected slot, two switches (Dole and Warner) did not. Overall, though, there is a tremendous amount of variance among the members. To further demonstrate how states and members can differ in their behavior, the final column is color coded to show the degree to which each state splits its vote among its Senate delegation. Red coincides with both Senators being Republican; Blue for both being Democratic; and Purple connotes a split delegation. Here, too, one sees some pretty good variation. As I noted above, we often see Senators from the same state behaving quite differently. National Journal has an interesting discussion of this phenomenon here.

To come back to those “centrist” members including Bayh, we see that there is a range of variance between their actual and expected behavior. Bayh, it turns out, is actually pretty closely aligned with Indiana (12 spots more liberal than expected) whereas Republicans Snowe and Collins are 25 and 28 spots respectively more conservative than we would expect for a Maine Senator. With Ben Nelson, his reluctance to sign on to the Democratic agenda seems understandable given his distance from Nebraska’s expected ideological location (he’s 38 spots more liberal).

So where does this leave us??? What this discussion, I think, shows is that (no surprise here) legislating is difficult, especially in the modern Congress. “Responsible Party Government” is attractive in that it is clean and efficient. For those who find themselves in wide agreement with a party’s ideological positions, there will be a demand that politicians act accordingly. Unfortunately for these people, we don’t seem to have a country—geographically, demographically, etc.—that is conducive to producing this type of politics. This wasn’t the case in 1950 and it is even less the case today. What you get instead is a politics that is much more messy and slow. When you have polarization coupled with this demographically and geographically produced diversity, things slow down even more and frustration mounts. In the past week, the frustration felt by those on the left has been aimed at Evan Bayh. Similarly, in past months Ben Nelson and Joe Lieberman have occupied the position of “Democrats’ Most Hated Democrat.” I’d expect this type of frustration to continue.

What's the Current State of Play???

Just a quick post. The New York Times has a nice set of interactive maps showing, in their estimation, the status of the various House and Senate races for this year. We'll be giving a lot of these races some attention and more in depth coverage as the weeks and months go on.

Two Passings of Note

I'm on the road this week and don't have my full arsenal of Almanacs of American Politics at my disposal, so I'm going pretty much on memory here, but I wanted to make a quick note of two members of Congress--one current and one former--who've died in the past few days. Both members were in many ways throwbacks. Not only were they pro-defense and pro-defense spending Democrats from rural areas, but they were proud (some critics might say shameless) of promoting government largesse on behalf of their districts and beliefs.

John Murtha, who represented southwestern Pennsylvania's 12th District passed away on Monday. An ex-Marine and Vietnam combat veteran, Murtha was first elected in 1974. As an advocate for his economically ravaged district, Murtha was known for his skill in steering millions of defense dollars to his corner of the Keystone State. As Chairman of the Defense Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, Murtha was perfectly positioned to use the levers of power on his district's behalf. Murtha received much attention when he came out against the Iraq War in 2005 as his unblemished military credentials and track record gave cover to more liberal members, including Nancy Pelosi (who pushed for his elevation to Majority Leader following the 2006 Democratic takeover), to become more outspoken in challenging the Bush administration. A special election is expected to take place in May and this contest, once the candidates emerge, should prove to be a real barnburner. An interesting bit of trivia that has been noted in some of the coverage of Murtha's death is that his district was the only one in the country that voted for John Kerry in 2004 but also John McCain in 2008. Back during the 2008 primary season I wrote up a short profile of the district that we might revisit given the news of Murtha's death.


Then today comes word of the passing of former Texas congressman Charlie Wilson. "Good Time Charlie" is perhaps best known as the subject of the book and film "Charlie Wilson's War" which chronicles not only his colorful personal exploits but also his support for the Afghan Mujihadeen during the 1980's. For a great profile of Wilson's exploits, see here. Wilson represented the 2nd district of east Texas from 1973 until 1996. Aside from Wilson's penchant for covert ops in support of the Afghan resistance, Wilson's domestic policy positions were actually quite liberal, especially given where he was from. He was a supporter of the Equal Rights Amendment, was pro-choice, and took a number of anti-corporate positions. While the 2nd District has been substantially redrawn since his tenure, one can get a flavor of it here.

While there is certainly a lot that one can find in both of these members' backgrounds that opens them to criticism (as well as ethics inquiries)--and their obituaries no doubt run through them--both Murtha and Wilson were refreshing in that they represent a type of politician that we seem to find fewer and fewer of. More "earthy" than today's breed of blow-dried, overly scripted, and rigidly ideological politicians, Murtha and Wilson's style of representation and legislating seem almost anachronistic, more suited to the LBJ and Sam Rayburn era Congresses. Both members were pure horse-traders, more interested in getting something done and possessing the political skills to do so--than staking out positions of purity. They also added a lot of color to an increasingly bland Congress. One can only imagine, for example, what type of fodder Good Time Charlie would have provided for the blogosphere.

Illinois Primary Rundown

Yesterday brought primaries in Illinois for two big prizes, the governorship vacated by the impeachment of Rod Blagojevich, and the U.S. Senate seat vacated by Barack Obama. The Chicago Tribune has a good rundown on the results (more coverage here, here, here, and here) . Of all the candidates moving on, the one likely to get the most coverage is GOP Senate nominee Mark Kirk. The moderate north shore Republican currently represents the 10th District in the state's House delegation. A pro-choice fiscal conservative, Kirk has managed to hold his seat despite decent challengers, Democratic gains nationally, the Obama wave, and his state's increasingly blue hue. Despite having to tack a bit to the right during the primary, he's clearly the best nominee the GOP could put forward in hopes of capturing the seat. On the Democratic side, Alexi Giannoulias, the 31 year old State Treasurer, won the nod in a closer race. Moving to the fall, this race should be among the most competitive in the nation, and probably among the most expensive as well.

Updates to come.

**Update: This is not the type of news you want your newly nominated Lieutenant Governor to be generating. Makes Thomas Eagleton look quaint.

Everybody Likes to Say They're an Independent--But Are They?

Back in grad school when I was taking a seminar on electoral behavior, one of the major concepts we discussed and read about at length was the notion of whether or not "independents" are actually as prevalent as the conventional wisdom suggests. Among mainstream media reporters, a common assertion is that America is increasingly becoming disconnected from the two major parties. They are dissatisfied with their choices, are less ideological, and will gravitate toward candidates who offer "real solutions" and are pragmatic. The success of candidates like Michael Bloomberg, Arnold Schwarzenegger, John McCain, and other self styled "mavericks" feeds the media obsession with this meme.

But is this really true? Are Americans really becoming more independent??? While voters might certainly identify themselves as independent, it is their behavior that really matters. In response to the latest talk about Barack Obama and his declining support, John Sides over at the Monkey Cage throws water (convincingly I believe) on the rise of the independent.

As a slew of political science research has demonstrated over the past decade or so, self identified independents actually behave quite similar to highly partisan voters. Although they claim no partisan allegiance, they tend to vote consistently with one party. In the research's parlance, they are "leaners." The number of pure independents, those whose votes are truly up for grabs, especially over time, is only in the neighborhood of about 10% of the electorate. Furthermore, their numbers seem to actually be decreasing.

So as you continue to hear more and more discussion about the vaunted "independent voter," dig a little bit deeper and ask whether appearance and reality match up.

Massachusetts Special Election

I like to wait a few days before I try to analyze why an election turned out the way it did. Too often, in the immediate aftermath of the voting, there's a rush of speculation and "analysis" that treats the election in question as if it, and it alone, will tell us everything we need to know about the current state of our politics. There tends to be very little context and a lot more heat than light.

So, just some links at this point regarding yesterday's tilt in Massachusetts, in which Republican State Senator Scott Brown, as was predicted in the days leading up to the voting, defeated Democratic Attorney General Martha Coakley for the right to fill the remainder of Ted Kennedy's term (town by town results here). The most comprehensive coverage of the race can be found at the Boston Globe and Boston Herald's site as well as a great blog that tracked the race, kennedyseat.com.

Our own John LaBeaume was on the ground in Massachusetts this week and filed some dispatches to give you a little bit of the local flavor (here and here).

Finally, via The Electoral Map, here's a good primer on the political geography of the Bay State to help put some of the returns in context.

Amidst the Tragedy, Some Fascinating Numbers

As we watch the horrific tragedy unfold in Haiti, I came across a staggering statistic that I thought was worth looking at in the context of this blog. During one of the news stories last night, it was reported that Brooklyn contains roughly 100,000 people of Haitian descent and that over 200,000 Haitian Americans live in the broader New York area. While we know how much of a melting pot New York is, this number really jumped out at me. This story from a few years back gives some specifics. A while back I did a post on the micropolitics of these ethnic communities throughout the city so its worth revisiting this topic.

The Haitian community in NYC is most prevalent in the Flatbush and Crown Heights neighborhoods In 2007 Mathieu Eugene became the first Haitian American elected to the New York City Council, representing the 40th District which is bisected by Flatbush Avenue. The New York Haitian community is served by the Haitian Times, the Bedford Haitian Community Center, and Radio Soleil, which has been broadcasting continuously in the midst of the earthquake crisis.

The number of elected officials of Haitian descent is relatively widespread across the United States although Florida and New York tend, unsurprisingly, to be best represented. Interestingly, President Obama's former Illinois State Senate seat is currenly held by Kwame Raoul, whose parents immigrated from Haiti. A further Obama--Haiti connection is provided by his Political Director, Patrick Gaspard, who is Haitian born.

For information about how to donate to the relief efforts in Haiti, click here.

Is It Freak Out Time for The Democrats???!!!

Sorry for the lack of posts over the past several weeks. With the end of the semester, holiday season, etc. its been a bit hectic. I'll try to get some new things up over the next few days.

The big news over the past forty eight hours or so has been the announced retirements of several Democratic big hitters: Senators Chris Dodd (CT) and Byron Dorgan (ND), plus Colorado Governor Bill Ritter. As we might expect, there's been tons of speculation within the mainstream press about what this says about the Democrats' chances in this year's midterms (see here, here, and here). Most of it, in my opinion, tries to create a "sky is falling" sense of hysteria.

We need to remember that so far, more Republicans have announced their retirement than Democrats. Despite the GOP's attempt to play up their chances of capturing Congress, most members realize that the math is too difficult (a point even conceded by RNC head Michael Steele). For House members, being a member of the minority is not much fun. The procedural advantages that the majority possesses gives minority members little role to play in the day to day crafting of policy. Thus, for a lot of members, this anemic position is enough to tip them toward getting out.

Back in September I did a post about congressional retirements, trying to add a little perspective to what's been transpiring. In short, I argued that in order for the Democrats to be in any real danger of losing control of Congress-- a la 1994--we'd need to see a much larger wave of defections than what we've seen to this point. Despite Dodd and Dorgan announcements, plus the recent announced retirments of Tennessee Blue Dogs John Tanner and Bart Gordon (see this earlier post about them), we're still a long ways from bed wetting time for Democrats.

The more interesting aspect of these announcements, for my money, is what their replacements will mean for the next Congress. I'm particularly interested in what will happen in the districts being vacated by House Blue Dogs like Tanner, Gordon, and KS Rep. Dennis Moore. Rather than conservative Democrats being replaced by moderate Republicans--which one might expect given the underlying ideologies of the districts--what may happen instead is that these Blue Dogs will be replaced by more conservative Republicans. Even though the districts aren't changing, we may see considerable change in who represents them. In short, many of these retirements may produce a more polarized 112th Congress.

Part of the reason for this may spring from some of the debates taking place within Republican circles these days--the "purity" vs. "big tent" conversation. To get a sense of the intra-GOP dynamic taking place across the country, check out some of these recent stories (here, here, here, and here) on the primary (or potential) races heating up on the Republican side. While the Florida contest between popular Governor (and more moderate) Charlie Crist and the more conservative Marco Rubio has been getting the most press coverage, there are other races that may complicate Republicans' efforts to have a bloodless attempt at capturing Capitol Hill. If the GOP goes through months of fractous primaries that not only produces nominees less palatable to moderate districts but also turns off voters from the losing side (and maybe even swing them to the Democratic nominee), the Democrats' fortunes may turn out much better than a lot of Washington reporters are now predicting.

Redistricting Louisiana--When Every Variable Collides

This study by the Rose Institute at Claremont McKenna brings together everything that gets me excited about elections and political demography (great maps too). When Louisiana begins its redistricting process after next year's census, its going to have its work cut out for it. As a result of Hurricane Katrina and the subsequent out-migration of thousands of Louisianans, the state's population has actually declined. That's a sure fire way to ensure that the state is going to lose one House seat. Thus, its delegation is poised to fall from 7 to 6 members. The process of reshuffling districts in order to remove one is almost always messy.

There are some other variables at play here as well. The state government is currently divided between a Republican Governor (Bobby Jindal) and House (with a narrow GOP majority) and a Democratic Senate. Thus, assuming this division remains, partisan wrangling will run through all of the mapping and deliberations. The current delegation is 6 Republicans to only 1 Democrat. Obviously both parties want to grow the size of their delegation. What either party is able to propose is somewhat limited by another consideration. As a result of the Voting Rights Act, the 2nd District which encompasses New Orleans will likely have to be kept majority-black. I profiled the interesting turn this district took in last year's election. Currently represented by Republican Joseph Cao, this district is likely to swing back to the Democrats next year. The requirement to maintain its racial balance limits the ability of the state to shift its black population into neighboring districts or to move outlying white constituents in.

The district that appears to be most in jeopardy is the 3rd, encompassing the southeastern part of the state. Currently held by Blue Dog Democrat Charlie Melancon, the willingness of state legislators to carve this district up and disperse its constituents to surrounding districts is buttressed by the fact that Melancon is vacating the seat next year to challenge GOP Senator David Vitter. As the study notes, it may be easier to force out Melancon's freshman successor than any of the more senior members of the delegation. If someone needs to lose out, better it be a freshman than someone with more political clout.

The part of the state that seems to be ground zero in both parties' attempts to maximize their electoral chances is the greater Baton Rouge area (also profiled last year). The 6th district has been the most competitive in recent cycles and contains the largest African American population outside of New Orleans. Thus, moving enough whites out into surrounding districts or adding enough African Americans (probably from the 2nd assuming one could do so and still abide by the Voting Rights Act) would seem to be on the Democrats' agenda. Moving more whites in, probably from the 3rd, would help the GOP's chances.

Overlaying all of this is a general statewide trend toward Republicans. John McCain carried the state by 19 points in 2008, an improvement on Bush's 53% and 57% totals in 2000 and 2004 respectively. However, Democrats are able to be competitive in statewide offices. Senator Mary Landrieu is currently in her third Senate term. With an African American population of roughly 33% (with that population being very well dispersed as well), Democrats have a sizable base of support from which to build upon.

Thus, we've got the intersection of dramatic population shifts, partisanship, race, and the interests of individual politicians and their careers--all within a process that must produce a final outcome. Louisiana has always had one of the most colorful politics in the country. 2011 should live up to the state's reputation.

Voting for Mayor in the "City Too Busy To Hate"

Some interesting results from yesterday's mayoral runoff in Atlanta. The race pitted Kasim Reed, the Democratic candidate and a former state senator against independent City Councilwoman Mary Norwood. The result--a tentative 620 vote win by Reed--has triggered calls for a recount, something Norwood is entitled to by law and which Reed has pledged to adhere to. What's interesting about this election is not so much the results, but what they might say about the role race plays in voting. I've spent a lot of time on this site talking about the racial dimension of American voting behavior, much too much to recount ad nauseum here. Suffice it to say, its an issue, especially in many southern states. The results in Atlanta, however, go against the conventional wisdom that whites won't vote for blacks and blacks won't vote for whites (especially when running against a black opponent). Reed is black; Norwood is white.

Lets look at some numbers. The Atlanta Journal Constitution reports the results by city council district (and also precinct) here and also provides an excellent interactive map of the city. Their data also includes each district's white and black population %. From this I created the following chart:

What we see is that the voting does not show a consistent correlation between the racial makeup of the electorate and its vote. If we were to hypothesize an electorate perfectly polarized by race, we'd expect each candidate's performance to essentially match the racial composition of each district. That is far from what happened. In the three whitest districts (6, 7, and 8) Reed did better than we might expect. Likewise, in the four blackest districts (4, 10, 11, and 12) Norwood also outperformed expectations based solely on race. These numbers are even more interesting when we throw the variable of party into the mix. We would assume that those whitest parts of Atlanta, located in the northern part of the city, would be the most Republican. That he still reasonably well here is quite fascinating. Likewise, although Norwood campaigned as an Independent, she has more often than not voted as a Republican in past elections. That she could perform so well in heavily black areas further suggests that there were some interesting dynamics at play.

When the Civil Rights Movement threw much of the south into turmoil, there was a saying that Atlanta--which didn't produce the violence seen in places like Birmingham, Selma, and Oxford--was a "City Too Busy To Hate." Maybe yesterday's vote was an indication that many people in Dixie have moved on.

West Tennessee Open Seat Creates More Ground For the Democrats to Defend

Well, it looks as if we might have been on to something in the last post. Yesterday brought word that one of the members I highlighted, Tennessee Democrat John Tanner (8th District), was announcing his retirement from Congress. While fear of electoral defeat does not appear to be the overriding factor in his decision making (he contemplated stepping down after his previous term despite the fact that he would ultimately run unopposed), his 2010 campaign was shaping up to be pretty daunting with his top challenger already having banked over $300,000 in campaign contributions.


Tanner has long been a leader of the House Blue Dogs and represents a rural chunk of western Tennessee. While west Tennessee has historically been the more Democratic part of the state, it has been trending Republican in recent cycles. John McCain garnered 56% last year while Bush received 53% in 2004. Native son Al Gore narrowly won the 8th with 51% in 2000. To expand a bit on the interesting geographic/partisan divisions of the Volunteer State, here's a bit from "The Transformation of Southern Politics":


The politics of contemporary Tennessee have their roots in the Civil War. The state rejected the Confederacy until after the fall of Fort Sumter and after President Lincoln asked for 75,000 troops. For almost a century after the Civil War, Tennessee politics remained frozen by the state's division in that conflict...Much of Middle Tennessee and most of west Tennessee was plantation country, but the mountainous East was dominated by small farmers who found slavery unprofitable and who rejected the notion that it was a divinely ordained institution.


The modern day 8th district is from that part of the state that supported secession and clung to its Democratic loyalties for generations. Thus, there is little history of GOP success in the region and it will be interesting to see whether the Democrats (who may push forward a credible candidate in State Senator and current gubenatorial candidate Roy Herron) are able to draw upon these longstanding loyalties and maintain control of the seat. Republican hopes lie in the fact that the district includes wealthier suburban areas of both Memphis and Nashville. Should the currently hypothesized "enthusiasm gap" between Democratic and GOP voters continue into next year, this could be where the race is won. Democrats, in addition to relying on history and tradition, have been able to draw upon the large African American population of the district--currently 22%. Their turnout will be crucial to preventing this district from flipping to the GOP for the first time since Reconstruction.


While I won't predict the outcome of next year's race, here's one thing that wouldn't surprise me. Congressman Tanner currently chairs the Ways and Means Subcommittee on Social Security. If President Obama, as has been reported, pivots from the current focus on health care to a focus on long term deficits and entitlement reform, expect Tanner to be tapped as a member of an entitlement reform commission charged with creating recommendations for Congress.


**An interesting bit of trivia: the city of Jackson in the southern part of the district is the home of the only Pringles production facility in the U.S. due to the local abundance of cotton seed oil. Who knew?