Why is John Cornyn Being So Nice to Sonia Sotomayor???

To continue our look into the political, geographic, and demographic ramifications of the nomination of Judge Sonia Sotomayor to the Supreme Court, I thought I'd speculate a bit on how various Senate Republicans might approach the confirmation process. Over the past week the lines seem to have been drawn around the question of whether biography should affect one's view of the law. As we approach the confirmation hearings and vote, we'll move (thankfully) from the stage that we're currently in--all sorts of "legal analysts," interest group representatives, and other flaks pontificating their positions and advancing their agendas--to one in which those actually voting on her nomination (i.e. Senators) are at the forefront. Unlike the current crop of voices, Senators are actually accountable to voters. Thus, they tend to approach these decisions with a bit more tact and caution.

To get a sense of the calculations that some Republican Senators might be going through, I thought I'd look at the size of the Hispanic populations in their relative states. Opposing the first Hispanic nominee to the Supreme Court leaves one open to retribution from Hispanic constituents. If it comprises a sizable component of the electorate, an energized Hispanic bloc bent on retribution could prove decisive in defeating the Senator who votes "No." Given the degree to which Hispanics moved to the Democratic ticket last fall, and given the rate of growth in the Hispanic population, a number of GOP Senators are going to spend the next few months walking a delicate tight rope.

I've created the following chart that looks at each of the 40 current GOP Senate seats. Note that because we're focusing on the electoral dimension of the confirmation vote I haven't included the retiring Senators but have listed their seats as open. I've coded, first, when that seat is up for re-election. We might expect those Senators with re-election races next year to perhaps be most fearful of the charge of being anti-Hispanic. I've next coded the percentage of their state that is Hispanic, based on numbers from the Pew Hispanic Center. Obviously, those states with a larger Hispanic vote present "No" voting Senators with a greater risk. Next I've coded the margin of victory in each Senator's last election. Those GOP senators who had extremely large margins of victories might have little to fear (especially if they come from states w/a small Hispanic population) in voting against Sotomayor compared to those who had close races. Next I identify the seven current Republican members of the Senate Judiciary Committee. These members will be in the spotlight as they lead the questioning of the nominee and cast the initial votes on her. Committee members also tend to "carry the water" for the party at large during the nomination process so we will see the emerging GOP strategy on Sotomayor implemented by this group. Finally, I've indicated how Senators in office at the time voted on Sotomayor's elevation to the U.S. Court of Appeals in 1998. It will be interesting to see whether those who supported her in 1998 now vote against her, or vice versa,--and how they justify such a vote.

A couple of interesting things to note. As I noted in the title of this post, Texas Senator John Cornyn has been conspicous in his even-handedness toward the Sotomayor nomination. One reason for this, perhaps, is the demographic reality that is modern Texas. Percentage wise, the Lone Star State has the largest Hispanic population in the country. While Cornyn was just re-elected last fall with a relatively healthy margin, any future ambitions that he may have in the state (or nation-wide) are going to be affected by his standing among Hispanic voters. The fact that he also sits on the Judiciary Committee would seem to be further evidence of why he is taking such a moderate tack at this point. Finally I'd note that Cornyn is currently the head of the Republican Senatorial Committee and thus in charge of the effort to recruit and fund GOP Senate candidates this cycle. Unlike other Senators he needs to be especially attuned to the national mood and electorate. His recent comments that the GOP needs to become a "national" party again show that he is at least aware of how much work needs to be done among certain groups (including Hispanics) of the electorate. Cornyn's colleague from Texas, Kay Bailey Hutchison, is also worth watching. While her most recent victory was double that of Cornyn's, she has perhaps a more difficult decision to make. First, Hutchison is widely expected to declare herself a candidate for the upcoming governor's race in which she will challenge incumbent GOP Governor Rick Perry in what will no doubt be a blockbuster primary fight. Thus, each decision she makes will be parsed for its electoral ramifications. Complicating this is the fact that she voted against Sotomayor in 1998. The result is some pretty complicated political jujitsu---how do you 1) win a Republican primary in which the incentive is to move right (anti-Sotomayor) yet leave yourself in a position to 2) win the general election where over 1/3 of the electorate is Hispanic???

A similar dynamic exists further west in Arizona. Here, John McCain is on the ballot next year. While he's had relatively little difficulty in his recent re-elections, the trendlines have not been favorable for the GOP in Arizona over the past few cycles. Democrats have gained 3 House seats since 2006 and many believe that it will go Democratic in the next presidential race. With 30% of the population being Hispanic, one can see why these trends have emerged. One can envision a scenario in which McCain sides with the Sotomayor pick in the end. It fits his image of an "independent" or "maverick" while also, I'd suggest, being an easy vote. He will have to explain why he changed his mind after his 1998 vote against Sotomayor, though. Because McCain doesn't sit on Judiciary, the fate of the Sotomayor nomination will probably be well known by the time it gets to the Senate floor. If it appears that Sotomayor is going to be easily confirmed, McCain can vote "Yes"without worrying that his decision will change the outcome. He maintains good standing back home while not incurring the wrath of his party--he wins on all counts. John Kyl, the other Arizona GOPer, is in a much more tricky spot. He faces the same treacherous demographics, yet 1) had a closer re-election last time; 2) sits on Judiciary (and will thus be forced to stake a position relatively early on); and 3) voted against Sotomayor in 1998.

Other Senators to watch??? I'd pick out Richard Burr from North Carolina. Electorally he's in a state that has been moving Democratic and has a Hispanic population that while not huge, can be decisive--see Nate Silver's discussion of the Hispanic vote in Obama's Tarheel State win. He's also been pulling some pretty underwhelming poll numbers for an incumbent. The fact that he's not on Judiciary and wasn't in the Senate in '98, and thus didn't vote on Sotomayor then, gives him a lot of room to maneuver now. He could vote "Yes" in the end too.

The Political Geography of the East Bronx

President Obama's nomination of Judge Sonia Sotomayor to the Supreme Court offers another opportunity to visit some interesting political geography. While there is already heated debate about how her background, ethnicity, and upbringing will affect her jurisprudence, I don't want to enter that controversy. Rather, her nomination allows us to further explore the complexity of our political and electoral landscape, in arguably the most complex city of all--New York.

Judge Sotomayor grew up in the East Bronx's Soundview neighborhood, and more specifically, the Bronxdale Houses. Later her family moved to the massive Co-Op City. While public housing is commonly associated with blight and urban decay, a more correct reading of its history in America would note that it was for many, especially in the years following World War II, a stepping stone to the middle class and home ownership. Indeed, for working class strivers like the Sotomayors and other recent immigrants, these neighborhoods were a vital point of transition between where they came from and a hopefully prosperous future. For an exhaustive, and indeed critical, history of how New York City's housing and other infrastructure developed in the post WWII period, there is no better source that Robert Caro's much lauded history of Robert Moses, The Power Broker.

The Bronx is in many ways a misunderstood or understudied part of the city. Typically associated with 1) the Yankees and 2) crime, it has historically been an extremely diverse though also divided borough (see a discussion of the East Bronx, South Bronx, and the West Bronx). To get a sense of the largest ethnic concentrations in the current Bronx, see the map below.

The neighborhood in which Sotomayor was raised is currently part of New York's 16th congressional district, represented by Rep. Jose Serrano. In many ways, this district is extremely atypical. For example, census data reports that it is the nation's poorest district, with over 40% of the population below the poverty line. The Hispanic population makes up nearly 2/3 of the total. It was also, in the last election, the country's most Democratic. Barack Obama won 95% of the vote there, giving the district a Cook PVI of D+41. CQ's Politics in America notes:

"The South Bronx, overtaken by a post-World War II influx of Hispanics to New York City, has elected men of Puerto Rican origin to the House since 1970. The 16th's strong Puerto Rican influence is complemented by African and South and Central American immigrant communities. The district's 3 percent non-Hispanic white population is the nation's lowest."

Adjoining parts of the Bronx are included in the 17th district, represented by Eliot Engel and the 7th district, represented by Joseph Crowley.

While the confirmation process will certainly allow for Judge Sotomayor to articulate how her upbringing has affected how she views the law, any discussion of her home's politics will be more than tangential. Its these tangents, though, that I tend to find the most interesting.

If you're interested in all the happenings in Bronx politics, check out the Bronx News Network.

Mississippi Turning???

Some fascinating news out of Mississippi. This week saw the election of James Young as the first African American mayor of Philadelphia, Mississippi (NYTimes coverage here). For anyone familiar with the history of race in America and the Civil Rights Movement, Philadelphia is known as the place where civil rights workers Andrew Goodman, James Chaney, and Michael Schwerner were murdered in June of 1964. Along with the Montgomery bus boycott, freedom rides, the Birmingham campaign, and the March on Selma, these deaths during Freedom Summer were a major chapter in the march toward the passage of the Civil Rights Act and Voting Rights Act of 1964 and 1965. Likewise, they've cast a long shadow that has been difficult for the city to shed. This election may help its residents turn a corner.

Later, Philadelphia was home to another event--viewed differently by competing camps--that speaks to our complicated history. Namely, Ronald Reagan kicked off his 1980 presidential campaign there at the Neshoba County Fair. By arguing strongly for "states rights," many have argued that Reagan, in coded language, was presenting himself as a more polished, refined, and less menacing version of George Wallace. This was, for critics, the personification and perfection of the "Southern Strategy." Others have offered a more benign interpretation of the Gipper's words to suggest that he was simply articulating his small government platform.

While Mississippi has the largest number of elected African American officials in the country, the bulk of these politicians come from the Delta region in the western part of the state. Back during the primaries I wrote a post about this region and how it differs from the rest of the state. Neshoba County is not in the Delta but sits in central Mississippi and has demographics that, even without its troubled history, would make the election of a black mayor more difficult. The county as a whole is 65% white and only 20% African American. Philadelphia has a larger black population with the breakdown being roughly 55% white and 40% African American. In last year's presidential race, McCain overwhelmed Obama in Neshoba County, winning 72% to 27%, 16 points better than he did statewide. Within Philadelphia itself, McCain bested Obama 59.5% to 40.5% (Results available here).

Its always dangerous to extrapolate from local races. As the coverage of Mayor Young's victory suggest, he campaigned as a reformer against a long-time incumbent and thus was certainly able to tap into voters'--black and white--dissatisfaction with the performance of city government. Nonetheless, one wonders whether the Obama campaign, despite losing badly in the state, benefitted someone like James Young. We know, for example, that black turnout in 2008 reached virtual parity with that of whites and that states with large black populations such as Alabama, Mississippi, and South Carolina saw voter turnout increase. If voters, once energized and mobilized, continue to vote over the long term then we might see something like an "Obama effect" in these other races. Its certainly too early to conclude that this is what's happening. Likewise, a four month old Obama administration isn't going to heal decades of racial tension and create national unity. Regardless of whether these campaigns are connected and regardless of whether James Young's election as mayor signifies something much larger than one candidate beating another in a small town race, one can't deny the symbolism.

**Top photo courtesy of the Neshoba Democrat

Fun With Maps--Are Democratic States More "Developed"???

This comparison may not mean much but let's consider it. I just came across a map (and companion article) of the U.S. that breaks down states based on their respective Human Development Index (HDI) measure. The HDI was created by the United Nations to gauge a country's level of development. It incorporates measures of educational attainment, life expectancy, and income to create a continuum along which a country (or now state) can be placed. As a result, one can make comparisons between countries, and do so over time, to track growth and progress. When I saw the map I immediately thought that there was something familiar about it--it resembles pretty closely the results of the 2008 election.

For example, of the 21 states that have the highest HDI (.95 and above), Barack Obama won all of them except Alaska. Of the 8 lowest scoring states--HDI of .849 and below, McCain won them all. For the 15 states in the second highest cohort (.900 to .949), Obama won 6. Of the 6 states in the middle of the continuum, Obama only won Florida. What we see is a strong correlation between a state's HDI and Obama's success there. All of his electoral votes came from states at the upper end of the continuum with the exception of Florida. McCain was only able to capture 3 electoral votes from the most developed states, aided by Sarah Palin's Alaska roots.

Mere coincidence??? Perhaps, but if we look at the recent trends we shouldn't be so surprised by this. Exit polling conducted on election day (and indeed during the primaries as well) showed that Obama and other Democrats had begun to make in-roads among those at the top of the economic ladder. We've similarly seen great movement away from the Republicans among the most highly educated. Thus, whereas traditionally it had been thought that the Republican base was among the high income/high education chunk of the electorate, this no longer seems true.

For more on this question of how class, education, and other variables are affecting voting trends, see Andrew Gelman's work.

***Update: Speaking of which, Gelman critiques and tweaks the numbers a bit here.

***Further update: After some more data critiquing, a re-scaling of the data and the following map. The electoral correlations I suggest still largely hold although Obama does better on the low, but not lowest, part of the continuum.

How Do You Stop the Bleeding If You're the GOP???

Recently released data from a new Gallup Poll is not good news for the GOP. As you see in the graphs above, every single demographic group surveyed has seen their Republican identification decline. About the only groups that have remained steady are seniors and frequent church goers.

Normally when a party is in decline, it is a result of the defection of part of its coalition. In the classic "realignment" school of thinking, new eras of party dominance are precipitated by a re-organization of the groups supporting each of the parties. What you have is a reshuffling of the deck, in other words. Depending on the size of the groups moving from one side to the other, the degree and durability of the new electoral majority can vary. Even in large realignments, though, you tend to see some parts of the minority party's coalition remain strong.

While these numbers may be temporary, the real problem with them, from the Republicans' standpoint, is that they don't offer much of a path forward. If Democratic gains were concentrated among particular groups--say the young, the un-married, those in urban areas, etc.--Republicans could create a strategy to isolate these groups from those who are still part of your coalition as well as from those whose allegiances aren't firmly defined (i.e. those traditionally seen as independents and moderates) Republicans would ideally also be able to target parts of the Democratic coalition that is shaky. By trying to define the Democrats as only representing a segment of the electorate the GOP could position themselves as a viable alternative. This is classic party politics. Whether it be Democrats reaching out to urban and minority voters with the ascendance of FDR or Reagan's courting working class whites, party majorities have their genesis when the party out of power is able to pick off the other's "low hanging fruit," especially when they are of a sizable number. However, when you are losing ground among virtually everyone, its much more difficult to stop the momentum working against you.

So what does the GOP do?? Does it simply try to hold on to those groups that, while they are running away, are doing so the slowest? Do they try something more radical? Or, perhaps most likely, do they stay in a holding pattern and hope that the Democrats overreach and fail to meet the heightened expectations of the American electorate? In other words, can you win by default?

Does the Career of David Souter Tell Us Anything About the Current State of “Conservatism” in America???

With Friday’s announcement that Justice David Souter is retiring from the Supreme Court, attention has turned to how President Obama will approach the vacancy and attempt to put his imprint on the court. In much of this discussion, the conventional wisdom has been that the balance of the court is not likely to change with the confirmation of Souter’s successor. Pegged as a member of the four justice “liberal” wing of the court, Souter has been viewed—especially among those on the left—as a reliable defender of choice, the separation of church and state, and other progressive stances . As such, he has become the justice that conservatives most love to hate. For those on the right, Souter’s decisions have been those of an apostate in light of the assurances originally made by his supporters including President George H.W. Bush.

This picture of Souter, I’d argue, is off base. Justice Souter, it seems to me, is not a “liberal” as we tend to define the term. Similarly, those who argue that his “conservatism” never materialized on the high court are misreading his approach. While I don’t want to argue that Souter’s jurisprudence is analogous to either the Democrats’ or Republicans’ ideologies, untangling his record and style might help us understand some of the troubles currently vexing the modern GOP.

Perhaps the best retrospective of Souter’s time on the court that I’ve read over the past few days is provided by the New Republic’s Gordon Silverstein. Combating the conventional wisdom, Silverstein argues that Souter has been the quintessential “judicial conservative”. He writes:

Souter's departure offers a timely reminder that when it comes to the courts, we need to be careful about our terms. Though Souter's decisions were welcomed by ideological and partisan liberals, they were judicially conservative decisions. In fact, his were among the only consistently conservative decisions the court has known for the last two decades.

The reason is that there is a difference between an ideological or movement conservative and a judicial conservative. Judicial conservatives generally have great respect for the law, and for legal decisions that have been made. This is the essence of what is called stare decisis--let the decision stand. Upholding precedent staunches the forces of change--and typically, that generates conservative results. But when the precedent you are upholding is precedent set by the Warren Court, holding back the forces of change means enforcing liberal decisions against radical demands for change from movement conservatives.

What Souter’s case illustrates more broadly, it seems, is the debate about what “conservatism” really means. This is a debate, I’d note that has been raging for the last few years on Andrew Sullivan’s blog and to which he has devoted an entire book. It is also a debate that has been necessitated by the evolution of the modern GOP. The Souter nomination is just one small chapter in this story. As traditionally understood (and defined by Sullivan among others), conservatism’s central tenet is a skepticism about the ability of man (especially via government action or the power of the state) to change or re-order the world. For these writers “conservatism” and “doubt” are analogous. Thus, conservatives have a respect for the status quo, tradition, and that which has served society well over the long term. This strain of conservatism doesn’t argue that society and culture don’t or shouldn’t change, but rather that such change should be allowed to take its natural course rather than through state led engineering. Attempts to legislate change are not only likely to fail but will also endanger our liberties and freedoms. Thus, when faced with the choice of acting and non-acting (despite the severity of the problem at hand), a conservative will in almost all cases choose non-action as the best course.

With Souter’s retirement, I’ve gone back and found many of the profiles written about him upon his nomination for the court in 1990. In addition to providing some interesting nuggets of irony—i.e. words of praise from David Keene and words of criticism from Planned Parenthood—these stories repeatedly used a term to describe Souter’s personality and judicial temperament--cautious. The Souter of 1990 was someone uncomfortable with attempts, including by the court, to disrupt the status-quo. A Newsweek piece at the time noted that “His record suggests that he sees the judiciary as an institution with limited powers.” In retrospect, then, we shouldn’t be surprised by his opinions in Planned Parenthood vs. Casey or Bush vs. Gore. In both, it can be argued that he took the conservative position—not using the court to overturn longstanding precedent or interfere with the normal workings of other institutions of government. In both cases, as well, Souter drew further ire from those on the Right.

In reflecting upon this, I went back and re-read some of former Senator Warren Rudman’s memoirs, “Combat.” Rudman has been one of Souter’s closest friends since Souter served under Rudman in the New Hampshire Attorney General’s office back in the late 1960’s. Rudman had long advocated the elevation of Souter to the high court and was aided in this effort by the fact that former NH Governor John Sununu served as White House Chief of Staff in 1990. When Souter’s nomination was announced, Rudman made it his personal mission to shepherd the nomination through the Senate. When we examine Rudman’s career and ideology we see someone who epitomized this “cautious conservatism.” In the last chapter, he writes:

If someone had told me in the 1960s that one day I would serve in a Republican Party that opposed abortion rights—which the Supreme Court had endorsed—advocated prayer in the schools, and talked about government inspired “family values,” I would have thought he was crazy.

To me the essence of conservatism is just the opposite: government should not intrude in anything as personal as the decision to have a child, it should not be championing prayer or religion, and family values should come from families and religious institutions, not from politically inspired, Washington based moralists. (p. 243)

Rudman left the Senate just as the conflict between this version of conservatism and “movement” conservatism came into stark focus. With George H.W. Bush’s intra-party challenge from Pat Buchanan in 1992 (and also recall the 1988 success of Pat Robertson), followed by the ascendancy of Newt Gingrich and a heavily southern-tinged GOP congressional majority in 1996, a pragmatic, “cautious” conservatism espoused by people like Rudman, Howard Baker, Bill Cohen, John Chafee, and John Danforth was cast aside. In its place was a more confrontational, activist, and ideological version. This metamorphosis reached its apotheosis during the Bush 43 presidency. Whether it be Terry Schiavo, the War in Iraq, or funding for faith based initiatives, the policies of the Bush Administration, though branded as “conservative,” were premised on activism, not the status quo. “Caution” is not a word one would use to define the past eight years. Electorally, one region of the country has responded most negatively to this governing philosophy—the northeast. I don’t think it’s accidental that this is the part of the country that produced David Souter (and Rudman).


To get a sense of how the GOP has suffered in the northeast, consider the following. Of the 33 Senate and Governor’s seats in the Northeast, Democrats currently hold 27 (including Senators Sanders and Lieberman). In 2008 every one of these states voted for Barack Obama as well. Looking back over the past three decades we see how much the Republicans’ fortunes have declined in this region. Even in 1976, in the aftermath of the brutal Watergate election for the GOP, Republicans held twice as many statewide seats in the Northeast as they do now. What’s happened is that the traditional “Yankee” or northeastern Republican has become virtually extinct, a point highlighted by one of the few remaining of this species, Olympia Snowe, in an op-ed to the New York Times last week. Yankee Republicans are quite different in outlook than the modern day “movement conservative.” Writing about the northeast, Kevin Phillips argued that it has been this region more than any other that has been the bastion and defender of the “establishment.” While the “establishment” or “old order” is “conservative,” it is not conservative in the “movement” sense. Rather, this conservatism is temperamental, privileging the status quo over attempts to re-order or re-make society. When Phillips penned The Emerging Republican Majority, the northeast had become the most “liberal” part of the country because at that time, “liberalism” was indeed the status quo: “ As America moved into a new political era in 1968, the Northeast once again assumed its position…as the national stronghold of the old order, which this time was an institutionalized liberalism.”

What this all shows, I think, is that while its dangerous to equate a judge’s philosophy and decisions with an underlying political ideology, its equally dangerous to assume that terms like “conservative” have a single meaning. Rather, as I think the Souter example shows, this term means different things to different people, at different times, and perhaps in different places. Whereas it certainly makes no difference to Justice Souter how more politically minded conservatives and Republicans untangle these conflicting definitions, for the GOP it seems imperative if they want to recover their footing and become, as Texas Senator John Cornyn said last week, a “national party” once again.

Some Quick Thoughts On Where the Parties Are Strong (and Weak)

I'm going to be doing a few posts over the next week or so on the regional strengths and weaknesses of the Democrats and Republicans. For a quick first post on this, above is the geographical distribution of our country's governors. To get a sense of how broad the Dems' regional strengths are, consider the following: one could walk from Canada to Mexico--beginning your destination in each of 5 different states (Maine, New Hampshire, New York, Michigan, and Montana)--and not pass through a state with a Republican governor. The longest of these routes takes you through 10 states.

For Republicans it's only possible to make this trip via one route through three states (ID-->UT-->AZ). We should note, too, that this is only possible because Arizona's Democratic Governor Janet Napolitano resigned to become Secretary of Homeland Security and was replaced by the state's Republican Lieutenant Governor. Looking at elected Republicans, this trip can't be done.

**Also note that Kathleen Sibelius, upon becoming Secretary of HHS, was succeeded by Kansas' Republican LG. Thus, we could have colored both AZ and KS blue if we based our map strictly on which party was elected to the seat.

More Info On the 2008 Electorate--Guess Who Had the Highest Turnout

Much too long without a post. Several are in the works so stay tuned. Until some longer ruminations, I'd point to this report, released yesterday, on the composition of the 2008 electorate. Produced by the Pew Research Center, it gives us more insight into last year's turnout as well as the composition and participation of different subsets of the American electorate. A couple interesting points to note:

• The composition of the American electorate is the most diverse ever. 2008's electorate saw increases in African-American, Asian, and especially Hispanic voters. The white share of the electorate was its lowest ever at 76%.
• The historical white/black turnout gap virtually disappeared in 2008. White turnout was 66.1% and black turnout was 65.2%. Obviously the Obama candidacy was a crucial component in this but this cannot be good news for future Republican candidates in the black electorate can stay energized.
• The gap between men and women overall in turnout continued. Female turnout was 65.7% while for men it was 61.5%
• The highest turnout among any group--factoring in race and gender--was African American women. Turnout for black females was 68.8%!!!
• While turnout among the young and their composition of the electorate was rather stable compared to 2004, the highest turnout rate among the young--by race--was among black voters. Black voters between the ages of 18 and 29 had a turnout rate of 58.2%.

I found these last two points to be really interesting. What we don't know, of course, is the durability of these trends and whether they will manifest themselves in elections without Obama on the ballot (say the 2010 midterms). It would seem, though, that this increased turnout among especially young and female African Americans produced some tangible outcomes. If you look at a state like North Carolina--which Obama won by a mere 14,000 votes--it seems likely that the Tarheel State would have stayed in the Republican column had we not seen this spike in turnout.

ElectionDissection.com Book Club--"Triangle"

Its been a long while since I've posted but I've been pretty engrossed in David Von Drehle's "Triangle: The Fire That Changed America." Like many great historical works, Triangle manages to weave a number of important threads together, all while centered around a common event. In this case its the March 25, 1911 fire at New York's Triangle Waist Company which resulted in the death of 146 people. Prior to 9/11 it was the largest workplace disaster in New York history. The book is masterful in that it uses this tragedy to illustrate how movements are oftentimes the result, or culmination, of unpredictable events.


This book came to my attention a few weeks back when I was at an event at the Center for American Progress celebrating the launch of their Progressive Studies program. During the Q&A session John Podesta mentioned the book, almost in passing, as being one of the best explanations of the birth of progressivism in this country. What Von Drehle (a reporter for the Washington Post) does so well is show us how modern liberalism was in many ways descended from this tragedy. There were a number of ingredients, all discussed at length, that contributed to the ascendancy of what he calls "urban liberalism" and ultimately the election of FDR and the New Deal. Among these were rapid industrialization and the mechanisation of production--in this case consumer apparel; the need for a low wage workforce to feed this demand; massive European immigration (mainly Eastern European Jewish and Italian) to provide this workforce; an urban political machine (Tammany Hall) initially standoffish to the demands of this new workforce but later converted by virtue of the number of votes to be gained; a rapidly developing labor movement; suffragist agitation; and a decidedly upper class reformist clique to provide resources and credibility to the demands of workers. The fire on March 25 managed to bring all of these forces together and lead, ultimately, to a more activist and regulatory government, working on behalf of the masses. Individuals such as Frances Perkins, Al Smith, and Robert Wagner play key roles in the aftermath of the fire to ensure that those issues raised by the tragedy did not recede into the background, but were rather translated into concrete policy.


Another interesting argument made by Von Drehle is that the resulting political regime--urban and liberal--by virtue of its policy implementation, managed to stifle the advancement of more radical political movements. We forget that while socialism never took hold in the U.S., many of the ingredients for its success were present--and in clear sight leading up to the fire. Also, the later rise of FDR and the New Deal managed to bring about the death knell of Progressivism. Like many other third parties in American history, the Progressives failed because a larger force (the Democratic Party) subsumed them.

For anyone with an interest in urban politics, immigration, the labor and suffragist movement, or the birth of the modern Democratic Party, this book is highly recommended.

Keystone Konundrum: Is Arlen Specter the New Joe Lieberman???

Its never to early to be thinking about 2010 and a bruising Senate primary in Pennsylvania has the potential of giving Democrats the magic 60 seats they need to end minority filibusters. Like in 2004, Arlen Specter finds himself challenged from his right flank by Pat Toomey, former House member of the 15th district and now president of the anti-tax, fiscally conservative think tank Club for Growth. While Specter clearly enjoys his position as the fulcrum of the current Senate—one of a small cadre of moderate Republicans who decide what legislation will go forward (Yes on stimulus; No on card check)—he has opened himself up once again to Toomey’s claim that Specter is out of step with Keystone State Republicans. While Specter might have no problem winning the general election next year, he may not get that far given current trends in the state and national GOP. If we look back to 2004 and move forward we can see some clear signs of danger for Specter.

In the 2004 contest, Specter narrowly held off Toomey, winning by just over 17,000 votes out of 1.4 million cast. I’ve built a spreadsheet of the county returns that can be viewed here. The map at left gives a visual of each candidate’s regional strengths. Specter counties are in blue; Toomey counties in red. For the most part, the primary results hewed to the conventional wisdom about Pennsylvania politics. Namely, western and central Pennsylvania tend to be more conservative than the southeastern part of the state, centered around Philadelphia. The Philly area is not only the more liberal part of the state but it is also Specter’s base going back to the beginning of his career as Philadelphia District Attorney. The one exception to this pattern is the area to the north of Philly in the Lehigh Valley. This was the area represented by Toomey during his four terms in the House so it’s not surprising that they supported him in his Senate race

More importantly, we need to look at the county by county vote in terms of overall votes. Obviously the electorate is spread out unevenly across the state so the above map only gets us so far in understanding what happened. In my data set I’ve created a variable called “County Share” which calculates the percentage of the overall vote produced by a particular county. This allows us to see the concentration of voters. One thing we find, for example, is that half of Pennsylvania’s primary vote came from just 10 counties, as shown in the map at left. As we see, nine of these are found in the southeastern and south central part of the state. Another way of stating this is that the largest concentration of voters came from Specter’s backyard. This can be further seen when looking at the “Specter Share” or “Toomey Share” variable. Here, I look at how much of each candidate’s vote came from each county. If both candidates were equally strong in each county, we’d see no difference in these numbers. The fact that we see variance confirms the fact that each candidate had different bases of support. Again, for Specter it’s the Philadelphia area that allowed him to squeak by. Montgomery County is a good example. As I wrote during last year’s primary season, Montgomery County is a large suburban county increasingly characterized by voters who are affluent, highly educated, socially liberal, yet fiscally moderate. For the pro-choice Specter, this was the place to run up the score. In 2004, he received 9.2% of his votes in Montgomery, compared to Toomey who received only 6.6% of his votes there. Specter also won significantly more of his votes in neighboring Delaware (7% vs. 5.7%), Bucks (6% vs. 4.9%), and Chester (5.1% vs. 4.2%) Counties as well as the city of Philadelphia (4.1% vs. 2.9%). Thus, without the cushion provided in this part of the state, Specter would not have survived. Also helping him fend off Toomey were endorsements by President Bush and the state’s other senator, the arch-conservative Rick Santorum.

So, going into next year’s contest might Specter simply try and repeat his 2004 performance? While in theory this might be desirable, changes over the past several years make following the old playbook precarious. If we look at more recent elections it becomes apparent that much of Specter’s base of support has been defecting from the Republican fold. It must be noted that Pennsylvania primaries are open only to registered partisans. Thus, Specter cannot rely on independents or Democratic voters to carry him to victory. Only registered Republicans will determine his fate, despite his recent attempts to get state leaders to change the primary rules. If we compare party registration figures for 2004 and 2008 we see problems for Specter. I’ve isolated those counties that provided Specter’s best performance to illustrate this point. As we can see, over the past four years Philadelphia, Montgomery, Delaware, Bucks, and Chester Counties have shed over 124,000 registered Republicans. Democrats, meanwhile, have gained over 220,000 registrants. Whether these Republican losses have become independents or Democrats is irrelevant for the primary. The important fact is that they are now out of that electorate and out of Specter’s reach unless he can get them to re-register, a daunting process in the midst of a campaign.

To get a sense of how these changes in the Philly area have been changing the tenor of the state’s politics, its useful to compare the presidential vote in 2004 and 2008 (numbers are provided in the spreadsheet). As shown in the chart at left, Barack Obama performed significantly better than John Kerry in all five of these key counties. This is especially notable in the suburbs. Thus, whereas Kerry’s statewide victory was about 144,000 votes, Obama took the state by 620,000 votes. When Pennsylvania was called so quickly on election night it was because of the sizable shift to the left taken by this region.

To get a visual sense of how 2004 and 2008 played out on the presidential stage, the two maps at left illustrate some of the shifts. We see how Obama was able to expand the Democrats' perfromance in the southeastern part of the state while he suffered losses, relative to Kerry, in the more conservative parts south of Allegheny County (Pittsburgh). He also managed to extend the blue northward into the Lehigh Valley, the part of the state formerly represented by Toomey. Finally, he captured a scattering of counties in central PA, most notably Centre County which is the home of Penn St. University.

So, as Specter contemplates how to approach his looming primary fight, he’s confronted with the fact that the part of the state that has been his base of support for the past three plus decades is in the process of a steady move to the left. Those voters who, while moderate, were willing to stay registered as Republicans have been fleeing the GOP. A more conservative Republican electorate is clearly much more advantageous to Toomey. What Specter needs to hope for is that Republican voters see the virtue in having him in his current position—namely that of a dealmaker in the Senate. Toomey, while more in line with these voters' ideology, won’t have the institutional sway that Specter does. Is an influential, yet Republican-lite Specter more useful than a more pure, but marginalized Toomey? Specter will also hope that Toomey has lost the connection to the state that he had while representing it in Congress. The years spent running an outfit like the Club for Growth have necessarily removed him from the day to day workings of the state. He may thus be hampered in his attempt to swoop back in and knock off someone who has been courting and serving constituents for years.

Another option for Specter that has been discussed would be to run as an independent. Theoretically, he could decide to do this either before or after the primary. Given how much the landscape could change over the next year, its difficult to speculate on which option, if either, would be more desirable. A big unknown so far is what the Democratic field will look like. If Specter wants advice about how to go about this, though, he doesn’t need to go far--just a few steps across the Senate floor. Just three years ago, one of his colleagues went this route—Joe Lieberman. In many ways the Democratic Party’s version of Arlen Specter, Lieberman was challenged from his flank. Defeated in the Democratic primary by Ned Lamont, Lieberman regrouped and was elected as an independent. Thus, while we don't know how Senator Specter will ultimately play the hand he's been dealt, at this point there seem to be troubling signs ahead.

What Do We Know About White People???

I’ve been meaning to do some number crunching on the role of race in the presidential election, given how much discussion and coverage it received during the campaign. While I wrote about this subject a bunch prior to the election, I haven’t done much in depth analysis in the aftermath so let’s return to the topic. For this post I want to focus pretty much exclusively on the “white vote.” We know that among African American voters, not only was Barack Obama’s vote overwhelming (about 95%) but also that there wasn’t much variance across regions or states. While some of the states with high African American populations moved into the Democratic camp this year (North Carolina, Virginia) others did not (Mississippi, Alabama, Louisiana, etc.). It is this latter group of states that was the focus of the oft cited (and discussed here) “Schaller Effect”—the tendency of southern states with large black populations to have white electorates that vote overwhelmingly Republican. Essentially, Schaller argues, the politics of these states have become so defined by the issue of race over the decades that white voters, regardless of class, education, religion, etc., tilt Republican. With an African American on the ballot this year we got a chance to test this theory like never before.

To look at how white voters cast their ballots this year, and to determine whether any underlying patterns exist, I gathered the exit poll data compiled by CNN. The resulting spreadsheet is available here. Nationwide, Obama won 43% of the white vote. When we look at the vote preference based on race, we see that Obama won a majority of the white vote in 18 states, plus the District of Columbia. The map at left highlights those states and shows a pretty clear geographic clustering in the northeast, upper Midwest, and Pacific states with the exception of Colorado--a new battleground between the parties. If the electorate was 100% white he would have received 222 electoral votes, not enough to win the presidency. Thus, we look to those states where he lost the white vote (to varying degrees), but found a large enough minority electorate (black, Latino, Asian, etc.) to overcome his poorer showing among whites. This netted him an additional 10 states (FL, IN, MD, NV, NJ, NM, NC, OH, PA, VA) and provided him the solid electoral college victory that propelled him to the presidency. While there’s probably not anything overly surprising here—Democrats have for years had to rely on a multi-racial coalition to win the White House—looking at the raw numbers is instructive.

Conversely, if we look at the McCain vote among whites, we see a strong geographical dimension to his support. Nationwide, McCain received 55% of the white vote. The map left highlights those states where his white support was the highest--over 10% above his national average. Thus, in a cluster of mostly southern states the Republican nominee got 2/3 or more of the white vote.

Another way we might approach these numbers is to go to those states with the largest black populations relative to the state as a whole. Here we get to the phenomenon described by Schaller—how does Obama do among whites in the “blackest” states?? At left is a chart showing his performance among whites in the 15 states with the most significant black electorates. Overall, he won 8 of these states. However, with the exception of Washington, DC, Obama received a majority of the white vote in only 3 (Joe Biden’s Delaware, his home state of Illinois, and New York). He received more than his national average (43%) in only one additional state—Maryland. When we look at his performance in the Deep South states we seem to see evidence of the white backlash Schaller talked about with his extremely poor showing among whites in Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Georgia, and South Carolina standing out. These states have large black populations but saw whites vote strongly Republican, a point noted in the map above as well.

What happens when we look at the inverse of these states—i.e. the “least black” ones?? Does McCain do as well as he did in the Deep South or did we see, conversely, Obama do really well? If McCain does equally well we might conclude that northern and southern whites aren’t really that different. If there is a geographical difference, maybe there is something to the hypothesis of racialized voting in the South. At left is a chart showing the 15 “least black” states in the country and Obama’s % of the white vote in each. Here his performance is much better. He won 8 of these states overall and in 7 of these 8 (with the exception of New Mexico) he not only got higher than his national average among whites, he won a majority of white voters. In fact, had some states in this group had a sizable enough minority population—Montana, the Dakotas—he may have added their electoral votes to his total as well. Clearly, it seems, there is a difference among white voters based on geography.

From this, can we conclude that white southerners voted against Obama because he was black?? Not necessarily. An alternative hypothesis is that these voters voted against Obama not because he’s black, but because he’s a Democrat. To get a better sense of what happened in November we need to go back further in time. Let’s look at 2004 when you had two white candidates on the ballot. If the results among white voters are quite similar to what we saw in 2008, our conclusions might need a bit more nuance. By looking at 2004 we can also get a sense of what changes might be taking place across the electorate and whether there is a geographic pattern. Thus, I also gathered the statewide CNN exit polls from the Bush/Kerry contest. What do we see?? Nationwide there wasn’t much difference between the support Obama and Kerry received among whites. In fact, Obama did better, getting 43% of the white vote to Kerry’s 41%.

Looking at the results state by state, we see that in all but 7 states, Obama did better among white voters than Kerry. In 8 states the performance of the two Democrats was identical. In the remaining 35 states, plus DC, Obama did better among whites than Kerry. If you look at the 18 states where Obama’s gains were the greatest (5% or more), he won 13. Four of these states voted Republican in 2004 (Indiana, Colorado, North Carolina, and Virginia). Thus, while the black and Hispanic vote was crucial in helping bring these states over to Obama’s side, we can’t ignore his increased performance among white voters as well.

Whereas Obama won 8 of the blackest states, Kerry only won 5. In these states, Kerry received below his national average among white voters (41%) in 8. Aided partially by increased support among African American voters (and also changes in turnout among whites and Republicans, plus greater support among Hispanics), Obama was able to outperform Kerry electorally. Narrowing further in on the white vote (and getting at the Schaller Effect) we see that in these states, Obama’s performance was worse than Kerry’s in four (Mississippi, Alabama, Arkansas, and Louisiana). Given that 2008 was a much better environment for Democrats than 2004 this is quite interesting. With a faltering economy, an unpopular president leaving office, and unprecedented national organization and fundraising, he did worse among some whites than did a candidate that, while white, was hardly a “good ‘ol boy.” Kerry, portrayed as elite, effete, “French,” and the epitome of northeastern liberalism outperformed Obama in much of the old Confederacy. Plus, given Bush’s cultural affinity with the South, his evangelical faith, and his political rearing in Texas, you’d have expected him to have high levels of support among southern whites. That McCain did better among some states’ white voters lends credence to Schaller’s argument, it seems.

So where does that leave us? With the low level of support Obama received among white voters in some states--relative to John Kerry and in an extremely favorable electoral environment--its hard to discount the assertion that race played some role in the vote. While some of these states have been heavily Republican, we saw Obama outperform Kerry among whites in equally Republican states in other parts of the country. We've also seen many of these states elect Democrats to other offices. The fact that white voters behaved differently in various parts of the country suggests that race is an issue that cuts across the electorate in a multitude of ways. Because race has been intertwined with politics in some places, and completely absent in others, we shouldn't make sweeping assertions about how important this cleavage is. Rather, we should approach the issue with nuance, an appreciation for historical context, and a willingness to explore multiple explanations for the outcomes we've observed. Given that we've had only one election to test our hypotheses, we should hold off on definitive statements until there's more data to parse.

Micropolitics in NYC: Don't Ignore the Trees for the Forest

For those of us who are fascinated by way ethnicity, religion, culture, race, income, and other variables affect political behavior, there's no place more compelling than New York City. Too often, I think, people gloss over the Big Apple's voting patterns because of its overwhelming Democratic tilt. In 2008, Barack Obama captured over 75% of the vote in 4 of the city's 5 boroughs (he got 47% in Staten Island). Underneath these numbers, though, are a myriad of stories. With so many voting blocs--some newly empowered, others in decline--New York politics is extremely fluid.

I recently came across this story from last summer in the NYT about the transformation in the city's electorate over the past several years. Whereas we normally think of "ethnic politics" being about the Irish, Italians, Jews, and other groups, the reality of today's Gotham is that Koreans, Russians, Pakistanis, Haitians, and dozens of other groups comprise the patchwork of voters that politicians must now cater to. The result, while perhaps more complicated for those running for office, is also empowering for these groups seeking to gain a foothold in America. As we celebrate St. Patrick's Day and Irish Americans' ascendance to our country's socio-economic and political heights, it is appropriate to appreciate how, historically, the ballot box has been a vehicle for groups' advancement. A similar story from October looks at how New York's Muslim community has experienced a political awakening.

Some of the most interesting scholarly work on New York's changing demography is being done by John Mollenkoph at the Center for Urban Research at CUNY's Graduate Center. Back in 2003, Dr. Mollenkoph co-authored this incredibly detailed study of the changes, and political implications, taking place in both New York and Los Angeles. It also provides some wonderful historical context for urban demographic change in other large cities. His findings challenge our conventional way of understanding urban politics. Whereas in past generations we saw a white/black divide and cleavage in big cities (and also Latino based in some places), the new urban landscape is much more balkanized and complex, requiring a more sophisticated approach to campaigning and governing.

To complicate things even further, we must remember that these ethnic or racial groups are not monolithic in their political behavior. Consider the maps at left, produced by the Center for Urban Research. They show the 2008 vote overall in the city as well as Barack Obama's performance vis a vis John Kerry's. While Obama did better than Kerry in most parts of the city, there are patches where McCain improved upon Bush's numbers. Given that Bush himself did relatively well in NYC--in the aftermath of 9-11--this further bump for the Republicans is quite interesting. The part of this map that immediately jumped out at me, and illustrates this need to dig deep into the micropolitics of the city, is southern Brooklyn. New York reports its election returns by Assembly district. Thus, Assembly Districts 45, 46, 47, 48, and 49 are of interest.

What caused these districts to be so different from the rest of the city in terms of its voting? One thing of note about this part of the city is that it has a large concentration of Orthodox Jews. Neighborhoods such as Midwood, Bensonhurst, and Borough Park have seen large numbers from this community settle in recent years. Likewise, Brighton Beach and Sheepshead Bay have seen an influx of Russians (many Jewish). The conservatism of the Orthodox Jewish electorate oftentimes gets overlooked given its relatively small size. Despite the discussion during the campaign season of Barack Obama's "Jewish problem," he ended up receiving 78% of the Jewish vote on election day--on par with the performance of John Kerry and Al Gore. Among Orthodox voters, however, there has always been a greater tendency to support Republican candidates given their positions on social and foreign policy issues. The Orthodox community is more likely to be pro-life, against gay marriage, and in favor of a hawkish defense and foreign policy than the Conservative and Reform movements. During the campaign the Jewish Press, which is a strong voice and based in this community, endorsed John McCain along these lines. Given this, then, we perhaps shouldn't be surprised with the voting results shown above.

While most of the data on demographic changes in the U.S. points toward a bright future for Democratic candidates--especially in regard to the Latino vote--its important to recognize that diversity entails tremendous complexity as well. Different voting blocs will bring with them different interests, agendas, and perspectives on policy. These agendas will compete with each other in an increasingly crowded environment, creating the potential for tension. While cities like New York and Los Angeles are on the front lines of this dynamic, it won't be long until its effects are felt much more broadly. Thus the need to dig deep and examine not just the forest, but the trees as well.

What the Wilderness Looks Like

For the past several posts, John and I have been spending a bit of time writing about the current state of the Conservative Movement. With the results of the past two elections showing a clear trend in the Democrats’ direction, aided not only by the failures of the Bush administration, but also by demographic and cultural shifts—see Teixeira and Judis—a lot of ink is now being spent debating how the Republicans, and conservatives more broadly, should respond. Do they move leftward and try to recapture some of the vast middle ceded to Obama (thus potentially alienating the conservative base) or do they retrench at the right flank and hope that events bring the electorate back in their direction? While many on the right argue that we are a “center-right” country by temperament, a misreading of the country’s pulse and preferences could spell disaster over the medium and long term. Hence, whether or not the right has a true leader—hence the current kerfuffle about Rush Limbaugh’s place in the conservative pantheon—they seem to be in wilderness mode.
While two election cycles don’t necessarily mean the country is on an irreversible move leftward, I thought I’d look a bit at the last time the country was moving strongly in one direction. Here, however, the move was to the right. If what is happening now is of the same magnitude and duration, Republicans are in for a long period of soul-searching and electoral defeat. My decision to look at where conservatives find themselves was spurred by today’s announcement that Al From, the founder and longtime head of the Democratic Leadership Council, is stepping down as head of the organization. The DLC was created in the midst of the Democrats’ last long period of exile. The goal of the organization, simply stated, was to make the Democrats relevant again. As liberalism reached its nadir in the 1970’s & 1980’s following the collapse of the Great Society, the “big government” solution to policy problems was thrown into disrepute. Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan were able to capitalize on the excesses of the 1960’s and America’s fear and loathing of rising crime, growing welfare dependency, and affirmative action and bring about a re-ordering of the American polity. The result?? Republicans won 5 of the 6 presidential elections between 1968 and 1988.

To get a sense of just how bad the Democrats’ period of exile was, consider the five elections between 1972 and 1988. With the exception of Jimmy Carter’s Watergate-aided win in 1976, the Republicans not only won all of these contests but won them handily. Here is the Electoral College vote in each of the contests. Overall, Republicans won 2200 electoral votes to the Democrats’ 487—82% of the total. Note how in 3 of these elections (’72, ’80, and ’84) Republicans won more electoral votes in a single contest than the Democrats won in total over all 5!!! While the Democrats managed to maintain majorities in the House and Senate (with the exception of ’81-’87) the party’s national standing was in tatters. It had no dominant spokesperson and no compelling narrative to explain how it would fix the country’s ills beyond simply rehashing liberal dogma. The question then confronting the Democrats, like the dilemma of the Republicans now, was what to do.
When the DLC was founded in 1985 the Democrats were perhaps at their lowest point nationally. In order to regain the party’s footing, the organization called for an end to the traditional “liberal” approach to policy. Rather, building on a cadre of centrist governors and members of Congress—Bill Clinton, Sam Nunn, Joe Lieberman, John Breaux, and Dave McCurdy among others—it proposed solutions that were more market based, pragmatic, and fiscally responsible. With Clinton’s election in 1992 the movement reached its ascendancy and policies such as NAFTA, welfare reform, a balanced budget, and the earned income tax credit helped reposition the Democrats as a party once again competent and identified with economic growth and prosperity.
While Bill Clinton brought the Democrats victories at the ballot box in 1992 and 1996, his centrism brought criticism from his left. Many members of Congress, still ensconced in the old liberalism (now rebranded “progressivism”) were critical of his stands on trade, welfare reform, and health care. While these intra-party squabbles were not totally responsible for the Republicans’ capture of Congress in 1994, one can argue that Clinton was more successful in dealing with the likes of Newt Gingrich and Bob Dole than he was in corralling the Democratic base. Whichever side one took in this fight for the heart of the Democratic Party, one can’t deny the fact that the debate revitalized the party and made it think hard about policy. Despite George Bush’s capture of the White House, the elections of 2000 and 2004 were fought much more closely than those of the 1970’s and ‘80’s. The Republican’s Electoral Vote margin over those two contests was a mere 40 EVs and Bush never captured 51% of the popular vote. Democrats regained their congressional losses of the mid 90’s and laid the groundwork for what we saw transpire last year.
So what can the right learn from the Democrats’ period in the wilderness?? One lesson that can be drawn is that a party needs to grapple honestly with its past excesses. Those on the left who were being honest with themselves realized that there was a reason that voters moved so definitively to the right. While events such as last weekend’s CPAC gathering isn’t going to cater to this type of reflection among today’s conservatives, other more sober venues must. What makes this introspection complicated for many on the right, though, is that they are convinced that what was repudiated in 2006 and 2008 was not conservatism, but Bush-ism. For them, Bush failed not because he was too conservative (or because conservatism more broadly was being rejected) but rather because he was too liberal. With exploding deficits and long term expansions and commitments to Medicare and other programs, “compassionate conservatism” was simply liberalism by another name. Among many congressional Republicans, the decision to now vote against spending increases—despite consistently voting for them during Bush’s reign—signals an attempt to recapture the mantle of fiscal responsibility.

Another lesson for conservatives to ponder is the need for policy debate, intra-party discussion, and diverse solutions. While not everyone on the left shared the DLC’s approach to issues, it not only helped to stop the party’s decline (perhaps it couldn’t sink any lower) but allowed it to regain a foothold in certain parts of the country where the damage of the 1970’s and 80’s was most severe—i.e. the south. Not only was the DLC a centrist organization, it was also heavily southern flavored. Whereas New Deal liberalism was strongest in the urban north, southern Democrats have always been a different breed. By giving Democrats another model, and winning elections because of it, the DLC was able to help the party begin to grow again. One can’t help but look at today’s Blue Dogs and their contribution to the Democrats’ new and expanding majority in Congress as the progeny of what Clinton and others began. If the right wants to regain not only relevancy but power, it seems obvious that they must realize that parties—should they hope to be successful nationally and over the long term—are at root coalitions. The creation and maintenance of these coalitions requires a degree of pragmatism and leadership that seems lacking on the right. It also requires a belief that many of those not currently in the coalition should be allowed under the tent. This also seems to be a point of contention among many conservatives. If the right fails to come to these realizations, they may be closer to the beginning of their time in the wilderness than to the end.