Tuesday, December 02, 2008

Georgia Sen Runoff: Could it have been "Peach-ier" for Vernon Jones than Jim Martin?

Most press previews of today’s Georgia Senate runoff focus on how the result is expected to hinge on Afro-Am turnout.  Black voters were believed to have boosted overall turnout by over 600K this year and sliced McCain’s margin over Obama by ten points as compared to Bush’s 2004 margin over John Kerry.  And conservative white Democrats are believed to have returned to the fold down ballot after going for the McCain-Palin ticket for president.  (No wonder that the GOP has sent in Sarah Palin to rally the base in this expected low turnout runoff.) 

Performance doesn’t seem to be too far off, geographically-speaking.

Here’s the map of county returns for president:

County Map

 And here’s the Senate county map

Note Mitchell County’s tie!):

 County Map

 Given this playing field, it’s difficult not to speculate how this race might be panning out if Dem nominee Jim Martin, a fmr. State rep. and failed Lt. Gov. nominee, had fallen to DeKalb Co. CEO Vernon Jones in the primary.  Jones’ bid might have been fatally wounded by ethics questions, but given his moderate – and even conservative – views on some issues and his geographic base, Jones might have been an ideal candidate.  In fact, Jones has flirted with Republicans: donating to the Georgia Republican Party and confessing to voting for George W. Bush, twice, all the while hectoring Martin for being insufficiently pro-Obama.   

Jones’ controversial temperament seems to have stunted his growth into a politician in the mold pioneered by Black Caucus Blue Dog Georgia House Democrats Sanford Bishop and David Scott, who have built up a support in white rural Georgia – the heart of Lester Maddox country! – by staking out conservative positions on issues such as gun control and positioning themselves as guardians of local and ag interests – particularly peanuts, in Bishop’s case.

Jones would differ significantly in that he would be the first politician to carve such a support base out of a booming New South county like DeKalb.  DeKalb is now majority Afro-Am, but continues to be fairly affluent even as its residents’ hues have changed.  Despite being home to the notorious giant bas-relief memorial to Confederate generals in Stone Mountain, DeKalb was a rare oasis of support for Richard Nixon, as George Wallace swept the Peach State in 1968.

While Bishop or Scott might be secretly harboring questions of how they might have been better positioned in this post-Obama runoff, Jones might be wondering - if he had crafted a more careful career – how he might have been able to cobble together an energized black Georgia electorate with just enough of a sliver of suburban Atlanta McCain voters still disaffected with the Bush Administration and Saxby Chambliss’ Congressional Republican cohorts to pull off a victory that might be just beyond the reach of the Democratic nominee, Jim Martin. 

Tuesday, November 25, 2008

County Flips, the Rural Vote, and Changes Out West



During the primary season, I came across the great site Daily Yonder which focuses on rural politics, economics, and society. The site is on outgrowth of the Center for Rural Strategies. In the aftermath of the election, Tim Murphy and Bill Bishop put together the above map that shows the counties that switched their vote between 2004 and 2008. The provide analysis here and here. While Obama's strength was certainly in the urban cores of the country, he did improve upon Kerry's performance in rural counties. Looking at the counties that flipped this year, the midwest was clearly Obama's strength. While his Illinois performance is unsurprising, the Wisconsin changes jumped out at me immediately after November 4 (see earlier post here). Also, as we know, Indiana (post here) and Iowa changed hands this year helping Obama solidify the entire region. I'm curious about the Democratic gains that took place in the string of counties running along the Minnesota/Dakotas borders. Finally, I'd note the Democrats' improved performance in the mountain west, a dynamic that has gotten a lot of play this year. A couple of points about the mountain west:

  • Beyond the pickup of Colorado and New Mexico on the presidential level, Democrats gained Senate seats in both states.
  • Democrats gained 5 seats in the House (2 in New Mexico, and 1 each in Idaho, Colorado, and Arizona). Democrats now have a majority in the House delegations of AZ, CO, and NM and split evenly with Republicans the Idaho delegation.
  • Obama actually won Salt Lake County, Utah. While Utah's electoral votes won't change hands anytime soon, this flip was nonetheless pretty interesting.
  • Note the rural county pickups in Montana. In the end, McCain ended up winning the state by only about 12,000 votes.

Friday, November 21, 2008

Godzilla for Senate 2008!!!???

Over 125 million votes were cast in this year's election. We tend to forget, in the midst of this big number, the fact that individual human beings have made choices based on their own beliefs, ideologies, and judgments. As we crunch the numbers and look for patterns, this individuality gets lost. Rarely do individual votes make much of a difference in the outcome. However, from time to time (Florida 2000) we actually get a chance to examine more closely these individual choices. Sometimes, small numbers matter. We have another case this year in the Minnesota Senate race, now in the midst of a recount. Like in the Florida 2000 case, the intent of the voter is open to interpretation when a ballot's markings are ambiguous. Minnesota Public Radio has provided some examples of what election officials are up against. Take a look and make your own determination here. My favorite disputed ballot is the one below:


This ballot comes from Beltrami County. Located in north central Minnesota, Beltrami County has a steady history of Democratic support. This year Obama won 54% to McCain's 44%. Other than going for George W. Bush in 2000, the county has voted Democratic in every election since 1976.


Apparently, however, the choices in this year's Senate matchup were unsatisfying for this particular voter. A quick internet search doesn't find much of a history of "lizard people" running for office in these parts. I haven't done research into how easy it is for third parties to get ballot access in Minnesota either.

Does this voter want Franken? Did he initially choose Franken but then cross him out and write in "Lizard People"? Does he think all of these candidates are "Lizard People"--perhaps an astute observation about the political class? Anyhow, the margin between Franken and Coleman now stands at 136 votes. I would love to watch these ballots be argued about and potentially litigated. God help the election officials. And keep an eye on Lake Superior for any disturbances.

Wednesday, November 19, 2008

Demographic and State Shifts: Temporary Change or Realignment???



Charles Franklin of Pollster.com has created the above visual showing the performance of Obama versus Kerry across a range of demographic groups. What we see as a broad shift across virtually every group in the direction of greater Democratic support. Thus, like we saw at the state and county level, the movement toward the Democrats was quite impressive. What is no doubt the more fundamental question, however, is the duration or permanence of this shift. In the academic discussion of "realignments," what is necessary for a fundamental re-orientation of the electorate is not just movement of numerous social groups from one party to the other, but the durability of this movement. Also, with every demographic group here moving more Democratic, save three, one must wonder the degree to which the economic downturn and not other factors was ultimately responsible for the magnitude of Obama's win. Should many of these groups move back to their previous levels of partisan support over the next few years then November 4th's results won't seem so dramatic. In other words, with one election we don't have enough evidence to conclude we've had a realignment. These can only be viewed in the rear view mirror. However, much of the analysis of the exit polling that's been done over the past few weeks suggests that Democrats should be very happy about the trend lines. John Judis, who wrote "The Emerging Democratic Majority" with Ruy Teixeira discusses the possibility of this enduring majority here.


The above image of the state by state change compared to 2004 was created by Andrew Gelman at Princeton.

Tuesday, November 18, 2008

Population Stability and Polarized Voting in the Deep South



The above map, via Strange Maps, overlays the 2008 election returns(Obama counties blue, McCain counties red) with 19th century data on cotton production. The resulting image is striking. We know from exit polling that the white vote in the Deep South was strongly skewed to McCain (Whites in Mississippi, Alabama, Louisiana, Georgia, South Carolina, and North Carolina gave McCain 88%, 88%, 84%, 76%, 73%, and 64% respectively) and that the black vote was even more overwhelmingly pro-Obama. Beyond that, though, what we also see quite clearly is the degree to which the African American population in the south is largely concentrated in the same areas it was over a century ago. This is something that I noticed during the primary season as well (see posts here and here).

Thus, while the Great Migration (see post here) of the early and mid 20th century saw millions of southern blacks leave the Deep South for northern cities like Chicago, Detroit, New York, Philadelphia, and elsewhere, many millions also stayed. Also, many narratives of the Great Migration note that it was not unusual for individuals or families to return to south, either because the opportunities up north were not as bountiful as they believed or because the strong ties of family, community, and familiarity beckoned them home.

On a similar note, I highlighted recent Census data on mobility a while back (see post here). One thing that you note about several of the states in this region--especially Alabama and Mississippi--is that they have seen relatively little inward and outward movement of their populations.

Over at Pollster.com, Charles Franklin does an excellent analysis of the state by state change in Obama's support among whites vis a vis Kerry's 2004 performance. He notes not only the decline in white support for the Democratic nominee in the Deep South states, but also points out the improvement Obama made in Virginia and North Carolina. Ed Kilgore over at the Democratic Strategist also comments on this dynamic.

Thursday, November 13, 2008

The Obama Bounce Down Ballott

Yesterday's Politico has a nice article on the role of the heavy pro-Obama black turnout on a number of congressional races. Among the 20 Democratic House pickups were several propelled by the black vote. Many of these gains were in districts that have been quite Republican over the past several cycles.

What we've seen in many states' redistricting processes has been an effort to take a black population (oftentimes relatively small) and subsume it within a surrounding area that is more Republican leaning, essentially diluting the power of their votes. Under normal circumstances--i.e. black turnout significantly lower than white turnout; low levels of black mobilization; no coordinated voter registration efforts--the black vote, although heavily Democratic, isn't able to sway electoral outcomes. This year, however, was not a "normal" election year. With the Republican brand in tatters, underlying economic uncertainty, and higher black turnout, mobilization, and registration, the black vote was able to tip a number of districts. To wit:



Virginia 5. Republican incumbent Virgil Goode was defeated, by less than 1000 votes, by Democratic challenger Tom Perriello in a district that includes heavily African American "southside" Virginia. The district is 24% African American. In his past four re-elections, Goode had received 59%, 64%, 63%, and 67%.


Virginia 2. Not far from Goode, Thelma Drake got bounced by 4 points by Democratic challenger Glenn Nye. Encompassing much of the Hampton Roads area, the district is 21% African American.


Connecticut 4. Here, the last House Republican from New England, Chris Shays, was finally taken down after a series of close calls. Unlike the Virginia districts cited above, the black population in this district is only 11% (Hispanic population is 13%) and largely concentrated in the city of Bridgeport. Whereas in previous years black turnout was relatively low, this year's upturn was enough to elect challenger Jim Himes.

Ohio 1. This Cincinnati centered district saw the defeat of Rep. Steve Chabot to challenger Steve Driehaus in a constituency that is 27% black.

Maryland 1. In this House race, just recently called in the past few days, Democrat Frank Kratovil defeated Andy Harris, who defeated incumbent Rep. Wayne Gilchrest in an ugly primary earlier this year. In a district that is 11% black and was once a hotbed of support for George Wallace in his '68 and '72 presidential runs, Kratovil won by roughly 2000 votes.

Alabama 2. The retirement of incumbent Republican Terry Everett created an open seat few would normally think competitive. A Republican has held this seat since 1965. However, the 30% of the district that is African American contributed to Democrat Bobby Bright's upset win. Despite the drubbing that Obama took statewide and the exit polling that showed only 20% of white Alabamans voting for the president elect, the black vote, ironically, seems responsible for Bright's ultimate triumph.

As the article notes, most importantly, the interesting dynamic to be watched will be how these new members act upon their swearing in come January. Owing their victory, largely, to a sizable minority in their district can create complications for a new member. Because these districts have been consistently Republican, these newly minted members will have targets on their backs from the get-go. Nonetheless, their relationship with this sliver of their constituency may prove to be the key to their fate in Congress. If they cast votes or push policy in line with the black electorate (as these voters will surely demand) they may find themselves out of step from the rest of their district. However, should they shun their black constituents, they may find themselves just short of the number of votes they need to secure re-election. Figuring out how to navigate this tricky dynamic will be the first order of business for these new members.

Wednesday, November 12, 2008

Obama's the Big Ten and McCain's the SEC But the Key to the Presidency Might Be the ACC

Rather than spend all of my time on the more traditional number crunching and map making, I thought I’d take a different approach to looking at last week’s election. One thing we know about American politics—and something I’ve written a lot about—is that it’s very regional. Different parts of the country tend to have different types of politics—driven by different demographics, economies, cultures, etc. Another part of American life that is heavily regional is sports. Where we live, where we go to school, and where we were raised tend to affect not only which sports we tend to be interested in (if any) but also the teams to which we’re loyal.

Both candidates this year, we’re told, are rabid sports fans. Much has been written about Obama’s love of basketball and his election day ritual of starting his day with a pick-up game. McCain, from what I’ve read, is a rabid boxing fan. So, can we merge politics and sport—in other words, how might we use the lens of sports to view the returns? As the college football season is approaching its most crucial weeks and college basketball is just gearing up (Go Marquette!!), I thought I’d see there were any parallels to the regionalism of college sports and the election returns.

College athletics is organized around a series of regionally based conferences, the six largest of which are part of the BCS (Bowl Championship Series). These six conferences are the Big East, Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC), Southeastern Conference (SEC), Big Twelve, Big Ten, and Pac Ten. The membership of each conference is as follows:

Big East: Cincinnati, Connecticut, DePaul, Georgetown, Louisville, Marquette, Notre Dame, Pittsburgh, Providence, Rutgers, Seton Hall, South Florida, St. John’s, Syracuse, Villanova, West Virginia

ACC: Boston College, Clemson, Duke, Florida State, Georgia Tech, Maryland, Miami, North Carolina, North Carolina St., Virginia, Virginia Tech, Wake Forest

SEC: Alabama, Arkansas, Auburn, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, LSU, Mississippi, Mississippi St., South Carolina, Tennessee, Vanderbilt

Big 12: Baylor, Colorado, Iowa St., Kansas, Kansas St., Missouri, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Oklahoma St., Texas, Texas A&M, Texas Tech

Big Ten: Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Michigan St., Minnesota, Northwestern, Ohio St., Penn St., Purdue, Wisconsin

Pac 10: Arizona, Arizona St., California, Oregon, Oregon St., Stanford, UCLA, USC, Washington, Washington St.

These conferences cover the entire geographical breadth of the U.S. Thus, they represent the diversity of the American voting public. What I thought would be fun to do is look at how each conference voted last Tuesday. I took each school and looked at how its state and county (in which the school resides) voted. You see some pretty interesting things. The Big Ten, for example, is the most pro-Obama conference. All 8 states in which its schools reside voted for Obama, as did all 11 counties (there are 11 schools in the Big Ten since the addition of Penn St.). The Big Ten schools occupy the industrial Midwest from Pennsylvania to Iowa, the region of the country that Obama dominated, including his pickups of Indiana and Ohio.


The most pro-McCain conference?? Not surprisingly it’s the SEC. Encompassing the deep south, McCain’s base of support, McCain won 8 of the 9 SEC states (losing only Florida). At the county level, however, Obama actually did much better. He won 7 of the 12 counties in which these schools reside (Alachua—Florida; Athens-Clarke—Georgia; Fayette—Kentucky; Oktibbeha—Mississippi St.; Richland—South Carolina; and Davidson—Vanderbilt). Thus, we may see some evidence of the youth vote (which gave Obama 2/3 of their vote) coming through for the Democrat as well as all those liberal faculty members.

The most interesting conference—and the one that got me thinking about this question in the first place—is the ACC. Since the flip of North Carolina and Virginia from the Republican to the Democratic column, many are wondering if the “solid South” is beginning to disintegrate. Given that the ACC encompasses the border area of the east coast—part northern, part southern—its voting might reflect the bipolar nature of the region and whether it is now being pulled in one direction more than the other. Indeed, 5 of the 7 ACC states went to Obama (Clemson in South Carolina and Georgia Tech in Georgia went McCain). At the county level, Obama won 11 of the 12 ACC counties (losing only Pickens County South Carolina, home to Clemson). In most of these counties, the Obama margin was quite large. Only in Montgomery County Virginia (Virginia Tech) did he get less than 55%.

To round out the remaining conferences, the Big 12 was McCain’s next strongest at the state level. This conference encompasses the central plains, another area of Republican strength. Of the seven total states McCain won 5 (losing Colorado and Iowa). Like with the SEC, however, things at the county level were more evenly matched as each candidate won 6 counties.

The Big East is the largest conference geographically (I’m using its expanded basketball membership rather than its 8 team football membership). Stretching from Rhode Island to Wisconsin (Go Marquette!!) and also having South Florida, it’s the least geographically distinct. Nonetheless, it was strongly in the Obama camp. He won 11 of the 13 Big East states (losing Kentucky and West Virginia). At the county level, though, he made a clean sweep of the 16 counties. Monongalia County West Virginia (Morgantown) gave Obama a slim win with 51% as did Hamilton County Ohio (Cincinnati) with 52% and Hillsborough County Florida (USF) with 53%.

Finally, the PAC 10 was strongly Obama and might have given him a clean sweep had it not been for Senator McCain’s presence on the balance. With the exception of Arizona, Obama won 3 of the conference’s 4 states. At the county level, he won 9 of 10, losing only Maricopa County Arizona (Arizona St.) where McCain got 55%.

So, what can we learn from this?? All in all this may not teach us much new but rather allow us to use a different lens through which to view our politics. The dominance of Obama at the county level—he won 89% of the counties surveyed (57 of 64) illustrates, it seems, not only the role of the youth vote but also something about areas that revolve around university life. Even in the Deep South, Obama did well in those areas that have universities in their midst. Beyond students, one is likely to find a populace in these cities and counties with a higher degree of education and income than in the surrounding parts. As the Democrats’ share of the vote among the high education/high income demographic continues to grow, we might begin to see more change at the state level. The concept of the “ideopolis” is key to “The Emerging Democratic Majority” thesis. What we saw last week in North Carolina and Virginia (home to 6 schools in this survey) might be a harbinger for things to come.

Tuesday, November 11, 2008

Tippecanoe and Obama Too

Perhaps the biggest surprise of last Tuesday was Indiana's move to the Democratic column. Not since LBJ's landslide 1964 victory had the Hoosier State gone blue. In looking at the returns we see that Obama was able to drastically improve upon the performance of past Democratic candidates. His vote share grew in every county versus Kerry's 2004 performance, as the map at left shows (for some coverage from the Indianapolis Star, see here). He was able to win 12 more counties than Kerry (15 total), and his performance in Marion County (Indianapolis) allowed him to generate a huge number of votes to help tilt the state. In 2004, Kerry beat Bush in Marion County by 2% (6,000 votes). This year, Obama beat McCain there by 28% (107,000 votes)!

As during the Democratic primary, Lake County was also crucial to Obama's success. Essentially a part of the Chicago metropolitan area, Lake County's Democratic share increased 6% over 2004 and gave Obama a 71,000 vote margin.

You might also look at the Indiana college population for part of this year's margin. Monroe County (Bloomington) is the home of Indiana University. In 2004, Kerry won the county by 8%. This year, Obama's margin was 32% (20,000 vote margin). Tippecanoe County (West Lafayette) in north east Indiana is home to Purdue. Whereas Bush won Tippecanoe by 20% in '04, Obama switched the county, winning it by 12% (8,000 vote margin). Finally, the University of Notre Dame resides in St. Joseph's County (South Bend). Here we saw another switch--whereas Bush won the county by 2% in '04, Obama enjoyed a 17% win (20,000 vote margin) this year.

For all the details on Indiana politics, see Howeypolitics.com.

Monday, November 10, 2008

The End of the Southern Strategy?

Appropos of my last post, today's New York Times has a long piece on the decline of the south's importance in presidential elections. Given that Obama's margins were worse than Kerry's in the region, despite the widespread economic hardships, and yet he won with such a large margin leads many to ask about the region's relevance. With North Carolina and Virginia breaking with its neighbors in the Old Confederacy, it may no longer be correct to think of the south as a monolithic force in our politics.

Thursday, November 06, 2008

The Appalachian Problem Returns


The above map has been getting a lot of attention over the past day. It shows the counties where McCain actually overperformed Bush '04. We see a very clearly defined geographical region--Appalachia, especially the southern stretch--as the source of McCain's strength. During the Democratic primary, there was much discussion of Obama's "Appalachia Problem." For a refresher, the map below illustrates how deep Clinton's support was there (the more blue, the more pro-Clinton).


In a further examination of this, Ben Smith at Politico brings forward the final map below that charts American's self-identified ancestry. The same pattern jumps out as this part of the country is dominated by people who identify their ancestry as "American." In short, this is a region in which large numbers have family ties that stretch back multiple generations--very low levels of movement in and out. Thus, unlike parts of the neighboring states of Virginia and North Carolina, which have seen a much more dynamic population flow (especially Northern Virginia and Research Triangle of N.C.), this interior is perhaps more isolated from the trends and changes that have affected some of their neighbors. Virginia and North Carolina (and seemingly Colorado out west following a similar track) may have thus crossed the threshhold necessary to vote for a Democrat for the White House.

Big Blue Badger

As I hinted yesterday, the results from Wisconsin were staggering for Obama, compared to past Democratic performance. He flipped 32 counties from '04 and won statewide by 13 points. The map at left gives you a sense of where the greatest upticks took place. As I've been saying for a long time, the key for Wisconsin Dems is not just Milwaukee and Madison, its the Mississippi River counties. You can see the big Obama performance there.

Also of interest to me was the voting in the city of Milwaukee. Obviously Obama was going to win big there--and he did with with 78%--but I was curious about the south side. The south side of Milwaukee has always been Democratic territory but it is the home of Milwaukee's white ethnic (mostly Polish and German) blue collar community--Joe the Plumber land, in short. In 1964, George Wallace actually kicked off his campaign at Serb Hall, one of the south side's venerable gathering spots and home to a wicked Friday night fish fry. Given what we saw during the primaries in Chicago (see post here) I wondered whether McCain might actually win parts of the south side. Well, now that we've got some data, it appears that Obama actually carried it. See the map below which shows this year's citywide vote in comparison to 2004. McCain may have actually won some individual precincts here but until that data becomes available, we can't be sure. I'll also be interested in some of the inner suburbs that come off the south side--Greenfield, West Allis--to how Obama performed.

Lots more Wisconsin analysis to come.

Maps courtesy of the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel.

Wednesday, November 05, 2008

The Day After

Today, mostly quick hits:

Florida. As I wrote about a few weeks back, the I-4 Corridor was indeed the key. Obama vastly outperformed Kerry, winning Pinellas (54%), Hillsborough (50.1%), and Orange (59%) Counties--the three biggest in the region.

Wisconsin. Huge Obama win--13 points. As expected big margins in Milwaukee and Dane Counties, but most impressive was the broad scope. McCain only won 13 of the state's 72 counties. In contrast, despite losing the state narrowly in '05, Bush won 45 counties. Outagamie and Brown Counties (see earlier post for more prescience) go Obama--54% each. Dems. also captured the State Assembly in Wisconsin.

The Republicans have 0 members of the House of Representatives from New England. See this to see how the region, once so solidly Republican, has been completely transformed. As I get the final House results, I'll update more fully, but increasingly the Republican House caucus is southern and rural.

Paging Dr. Schaller! Paging Dr. Schaller! Exit polls in Alabama show that 8 in 10 whites voted for McCain. In Mississippi, 88% of whites went for McCain.

Tuesday, November 04, 2008

Election Night Live Blogging!!!

John and I are here in the ElectionDissection.com election results bunker. As the results come in, we'll try and focus on things that jump out at us as interesting or important, rather than just repeat everything that's on TV or the major news sites.

Little data so far. MSNBC is reporting Obama outperforming Kerry significantly in a number of Indiana counties, especially in the northern part of the state. CBMurray

8:22 pm. Some numbers out of Florida. Obama running up big numbers in Orange County (Orlando). Narrowly won by Kerry, Obama winning big here. Part of the crucial I-4 Corridor, the key to winning the Sunshine State. CBMurray

8:29 pm. Also from Florida, Hillsborough County (Tampa). Again, Obama running ahead of Kerry. Bush won the county in 04 with about 54%. CBMurray
 
8:32 pm. A crucial Virginia county, Prince William. Obama ahead so far. CBMurray

10:49 pm. Was out for a while doing some local radio. A lot of data coming in, really overwhelming, but this thing is essentially over. Only question now is the margin.


10:56 pm.  Moderate suburban seats that pundits wrote off for the Dems are remaining competitive, even as those seats' core counties trend heavy for Obama, Dem at pres level.  Rep. Mark Kirk is holding on in Chicago's Collar Counties, as Obama clobbers McCain there. 

And - popular Fairfax Co. Exec. Gerry Connolly is stumbling across the finish line in No. Virginia.  Most pundits had written off the former GOP garrison, with its thinly-resumeed nominee who sought to hold onto moderate GOP Rep. Tom Davis' seat.  But Keith Fimian is outperforming Obama in Fairfax County.  

Obama is only pulling down 58% in a Fairfax, where many observers thought he might reach 65%.  Perhaps residual military-affinity among NoVa voters kept them loyal to the GOP one last time? JVLaB

11:30 pm.  Wautaga Watershed proves prescient! Riding larger statewide tredns, Obama takes in Wautaga Co., No. Carolina, helping pad Obama's narrow margin in the state represented by Jesse Helms as recently as 2002. 

Wednesday, October 29, 2008

Harold Washington, Barack Obama, and the Game Plan for Victory---Should We Have Seen This Coming??


A few months ago, in the midst of the primary season, I wrote a post wondering about how black turnout might affect the general election. Having done a lot of reading on Chicago politics over the past few years, I was becoming convinced that the Obama campaign was using a playbook that had proven successful in its own backyard, 25 years prior.

In 1983, Chicago elected its first African American mayor, Harold Washington. The election of Washington was an arduous two step process. First, the reformist Washington campaign had to win a bruising three way primary against incumbent Mayor Jane Byrne and Richard Daley, Jr., son of the deceased former mayor (and current mayor). With Byrne being the Democratic machine candidate and Daley the namesake of the city’s most dominant political family, Washington’s candidacy succeeded largely due to massive increases in black registration, mobilization, and turnout. For example, between the 1979 and 1983 mayoral races, registration in Chicago’s majority black wards increased 30% (as opposed to only a 4% increase in the rest of the city). The final tally gave Washington 37%, Byrne 33%, and Daley 30%. While the racial dimension of the campaign was evident in the primary, the general election brought a whole new level of rancor. Whereas the city was long dominated by the Democratic machine, giving Republicans few chances to win citywide office, Washington’s place at the top of the ticket led large swaths of Democratic voters to cross party lines and support Bernard Epton. Many of the city’s Democratic machine leaders agitated against Washington’s bid, using tactics and language that was anything but subtle in their racial overtones--Epton's campaign slogan was "Before It's Too Late." Again, Washington had to rely on black turnout and mobilization (coupled with support from high income, high education level whites). In the general, Washington narrowly won with 51.4% of the vote. Again, black turnout was huge—75%!!

Writing in the immediate aftermath of Washington’s victory, University of Maryland political scientist Ronald Walters wrote:

…the Washington campaign illustrated that a black candidacy could bring formerly politically inactive people into the electoral process and could make politics take on a relevance and urgency for those who had previously seen little connection between elections and their own lives. It also showed that participation by people who usually opt out of the system could change election outcomes (PS, Summer 1983; p. 492).

Thus, coming into this year’s election season, the Obama campaign surely realized that black turnout would be an important, although certainly not definitive, determinant of their success. While the Obama campaign’s financial juggernaut has been unprecedented and his appeal to young and upscale white voters has been crucial, one can’t ignore the degree to which the black vote has been the backbone of the campaign. Given the delegate allocation formula used by the Democrats, Obama was able to take advantage of his near universal support among black voters to ensure that Hillary Clinton was unable to gain ground quickly, despite her victories in states like Ohio and Pennsylvania. With the early date of the South Carolina primary (with its large black electorate) Obama’s campaign was given a boost heading toward the Super Tuesday blockbuster of contests. These early victories also sent a signal to black voters, as described by Walters above, that their participation could indeed determine the outcome of the race.

One consequence of Obama’s success in the primaries, which I’ve also written about, is that it placed many established African American politicians in a difficult position. Long allies of the Clintons, these members of Congress, mayors, and Democratic insiders failed to see the oncoming Obama phenomenon. In fact, several faced (and may in the future face) primary challenges as a result of their initial snubbing of Obama. For many, Hillary Clinton was the safe, and rational, pick. Here again, some parallels to Harold Washington become apparent. In his campaign against the Chicago Democratic machine, Washington broke from a number of black Chicago leaders who, by providing the machine with scores of black votes, received patronage, neighborhood power, and electoral security over the years. Writing about this tension between insurgent and establishment politicians, the Brookings Institutions’ Paul Peterson wrote:

Black political leaders nationally have many of the same difficulties that the Washington candidacy posed for black aldermen and committeemen in Chicago. If they support the problematic candidacy of an insurgent, all the past ties and connections with leading white political figures, from which many identifiable benefits flowed, would be endangered. A black candidacy that achieved only modest success could leave them politically isolated. But if they decide not to support a black insurgent who succeeds at mobilizing the black community, the close connections with white leaders would only appear to black constituents to be still another example of having “sold out.” Even as many black aldermen lost their seats to Washington’s supporters, so black mayors and congressmen who fail to support one of their own brothers for president become vulnerable to local challengers. (PS, Fall 1983; p. 716).

Sound familiar???

To add another layer, I came across an
old article from Chicago Magazine, written in January 1993. The author discusses further increases in black mobilization in Chicago, this time focused on the election of the Clinton/Gore ticket and Illinois Senator Carol Moseley-Braun, the first African-American woman ever elected to that position. The focus of the piece is Project Vote!, an organization formed to increase minority and low income voter registration. Whereas voter registration had normally been the purview of the Democratic Party machine in Chicago, Project Vote!’s efforts were conducted outside the party apparatus and were community based. For the 1992 campaign, the organization was successful in adding 150,000 black voters to the rolls. Bill Clinton’s win in Illinois and especially Moseley-Braun’s upset primary unseating of incumbent Senator Alan Dixon were aided by these new voters. Who was the Director of Project Vote!, you might wonder??? A 31 year old lawyer named Barack Obama. The article concludes with a young Obama being asked about his own political ambitions:

Obama shrugs off the possibility of running for office. “Who knows?” he says. “But probably not immediately.” He smiles. “Was that a sufficiently politic ‘maybe’? My sincere answer is, “I’ll run if I feel I can accomplish more that way than agitating from the outside. I don’t know if that’s true right now. Let’s wait and see what happens in 1993. If politicians in place now and the city and state levels respond to African-American voters’ needs, we’ll gladly work with and support them. If they don’t, we’ll work to replace them. That’s the message I want Project Vote! to have sent.”

So how might we gauge whether any of this emphasis on registration and mobilization, especially among African-Americans, is paying off??? Over the past few days we’ve started to receive some data on the early voting that is taking place across a number of states, including key battlegrounds like Florida and North Carolina (see this great site from GMU’s Michael McDonald). What seems to be taking place is tremendous, and unprecedented, black turnout. As Nate Silver at fivethirtyeight.com has pointed out, the states with the biggest increases in early voting, compared to 2004, are those with large black populations. We’re also seeing early voting spikes in counties in Ohio with large numbers of African-American voters. Thus, while we’re expecting to see higher than normal turnout among all voters nationwide, the more interesting question is what gap will exist between white and black voters. In 2004 white turnout was roughly 65% while black turnout was about 60%. What happens if black turnout not only grows (perhaps to parity with white turnout) but maybe even surpasses that of whites in some places? Should that happen, then the math starts to get really interesting, electoral votes start going red to blue, and what might normally be a close election starts to move toward landslide territory.

Thus, as we approach election day it’s hard not to think that the groundwork for the Obama campaign was put in place well before he announced his candidacy in early 2007 and before his famous address to the 2004 Democratic National Convention. Rather, much of what we’re seeing materialize has its roots in longstanding efforts begun back in Chicago. Many commentators have looked to previous elections for parallels to what we’re seeing this year—Is 2008 like 1992? 1980? 1932?

Should Obama win next Tuesday, my vote goes not for a presidential race in our past, but rather a mayoral one--1983. The fact that some of this year’s participants were either involved in or influenced by that campaign should, perhaps, have gotten a lot more attention by a lot more people.

Tuesday, October 28, 2008

Some Thoughts On the South

If you’ve been reading my posts over the course of the campaign, you know that the issue of race is something I’ve written a lot about. Well, in a week we’re going to get a lot of data that will clarify many of the questions I’ve been raising and obsessing over.

One of the big questions that has been posed is how Obama will fare in the south. Will the legacy of George Wallace be purged forever? Will black turnout be so high in some states, as to make their electoral votes attainable for the Democrats? Do white southern voters think and vote differently than white non-southern voters? Does the Bradley effect exist, and if so, does it exist everywhere or is it more regionalized?

However these questions get answered, one thing that can’t be ignored is the fact that by having a reason to ask these questions—the reality of the Obama candidacy—we have demonstrated progress. We’ll no longer have to ask ourselves “If an African American got nominated for President, would he win?” Now we’ll know. While race won’t be the only reason Obama wins or loses, it will be a variable that we can finally start to put some flesh on. As a political scientist, I can’t wait to start digging into the numbers.

In thinking about the historic nature of the Obama campaign, I came across on old Time magazine from 1971 focusing on the “New South.” Featuring the just elected Governor of Georgia Jimmy Carter, the issue looked at how the region was trying to move beyond its old, race dominated politics:

Throughout the South, there are signs that the region is abandoning the fateful uniqueness that has retarded its development and estranged its people. William Faulkner’s South—heavy with ghostly Spanish moss, penumbral myths and morbid attachment to the past—is giving way to a South that has discovered it does not need fable to shore up its pride or the past to cloud its future. Moreover, a generation after the process was largely completed in the rest of the U.S., the South is caught up in an economic expansion that is reshaping the social order. The South has become at last a region of investment, both human and economic.

Making history—not living in its vainglories and myths—is the challenge and promise of the South today. The Southern frontier closed in that awful moment when the first man came to the South in bondage, locking the Southern experience into its tragic course. Three and one-half centuries later, the thrall can be broken, the frontier reopened. The South can grown rich while there is still time to safeguard the land from despoliation. It can acquire once more the political power of the sons who helped articulate the nation’s independence. Above all, it has a chance to shed its old hatreds and show the U.S. the way to a truly integrated society.


A little too optimistic or premature?? Perhaps. But should the election returns coming out of places like Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, and other states next Tuesday show high levels of support for Obama, and produce electoral votes, we should remember that these votes were not generated in an instant or in a vacuum. Southern voters, like all voters, have grown up, lived, and been politically socialized in a historical and social context. This context evolves and develops over time. Thus, it’s appropriate to appreciate the history of this evolution.

Of course it may turn out that the southern vote will continue to be the outlier in terms of willingness to support a black candidate. Here we return to the thesis of Thomas Schaller in “Whistling Past Dixie.” In short, Schaller believes that Democrats are unable to compete in these Deep South states because of how race clouds the vote choices of white voters. An ingrained racial backlash—especially heightened with a black candidate at the top of the Democratic ticket—works to the advantage of the Republicans. While I don’t normally focus much on polls in my posts, recently released polling suggests that this explanation for southern attitudes might not be pure fiction.

Some good test cases for the role of race in these states might be found down-ballot on Tuesday. In both Georgia and Mississippi, two U.S. Senate races have become highly competitive. In Mississippi, incumbent Republican Senator Roger Wicker (appointed upon the retirement of Trent Lott) finds himself in a tough race against former governor Ronnie Musgrove. In Georgia, Saxby Chambliss is seeking a second term against Democratic challenger Jim Martin in a race that few thought would be close. What I’m interested in comparing is the difference between the votes for Musgrove/Martin and Obama. If we assume that every African American in Georgia and Mississippi who votes for Obama will also vote for Musgrove or Martin (not a perfect but, it seems, pretty reasonable assumption), then the difference between the Senate votes and the Obama vote should show us, roughly (we also need to account for the Hispanic vote) whether white voters had different evaluations of the presidential and senatorial candidates. If the Senate candidates outperform Obama, then there would seem to be reason to suspect that race was a factor.

Whatever happens on Tuesday, we’re going to be in a better position to answer some of the most vexing questions that have infused our politics going back generations. Stay tuned for the analysis.

Monday, October 20, 2008

Where They're Campaigning--A Macro Picture

In a number of posts over the past weeks, I’ve been looking at where each of the campaigns have been visiting to get a sense of their strategies and objectives. What can sometimes be missed in these daily snapshots is the larger picture or context in which the campaign takes place. Candidate visits are a part of the overall strategy of a campaign. In structuring their campaign, candidates must choose how to allocate their time, resources, and organization as well as how to frame their message and that of their opponent. With limited time, money, and organization the campaigns seek to best maximize the return on these resources within the context of a campaign’s constantly shifting position. If a candidate feels that a state is no longer in reach, they will no longer visit or air advertisements there, as witnessed by McCain’s pullout of Michigan in recent weeks. A candidate confident that a state is on their side won’t waste time with a visit—see Obama and Iowa, for example. If, however, a state seems either in danger of falling out of one’s column or potentially moving into it, a candidate will shift attention there. Here, witness the Obama campaign’s recent shift to Florida and Missouri.

Thus, by looking at where the two campaigns are spending their time, and how this has shifted over the recent weeks, we can get a sense, perhaps, of the larger direction the race is moving in. So, for example, are the campaigns spending most of their time in states won by Bush in 2004? If so, this would seem to bode well for the Obama campaign. If the Democrats are devoting resources to these states at a greater rate than states they won in 2004, they would seem confident in their ability to expand the electoral map and gain the electoral votes necessary for victory (assuming they aren’t sure they’ve already lost states they won in 2004). If McCain, likewise, is spending most of his time in the same states, this would imply a defensive stature. The Republicans can only afford minimal losses from the 2004 Bush map to win the presidency. Given the polling in some of these Bush states (Iowa, New Mexico, Virginia) McCain must find a way to win some states won by Kerry in 2004.

So, then, where are the campaigns actually spending their time? I’ve built a spreadsheet (see here) that tracks each visit by each presidential and vice presidential candidate since the end of the Republic an National Convention. These visits are tabulated by the Washington Post in their “Campaign Tracker” and updated daily. In the first column I’ve listed the date of each visit. Column 2 lists the candidate (Biden, Obama, McCain, Palin) making the visit. Column 3 is the state of the visit followed by the city in Column 4. In Column 5 I’ve noted the few visits that were fundraisers and not traditional campaign rallies or events. In the next 4 columns I’ve captured the “offensive” or “defensive” nature of each visit. This, I feel, will give a sense of the campaign’s real movement. Thus, we see Democratic visits to Bush 2004 states (offensive); Democratic visits to Kerry 2004 states (defensive); Republican visits to Kerry 2004 states (offensive); and Republican visits to Bush 2004 states (defensive). To add a visual dimension to this coding, I’ve color coded each column red (Republican) or blue (Democratic) to allow one to get a quick sense of what’s going on and to see these changes over time. I’ve also coded the visits that coincide with each debate yellow and not counted them in my tabulations as these cities were not chosen by the campaigns. I’ve also not counted a few visits that candidates made to their home state (Biden to Delaware and Palin to Alaska) because these visits do not seem part of the campaigns’ electoral strategy but were rather part of these VP nominees “roll-outs.” I’ve also not counted visits to New York as part of September 11 commemorations as official campaign stops.

In tabulating these visits, a few trends become clear. First, we see that by an overwhelming margin, the race (in terms of visits) is being conducted on Republican turf. This is very good news for the Obama campaign. 115 visits were to states won by Bush in 2004 (64 by the Obama campaign, 51 by the McCain campaign). Only 58 visits were to states won by Kerry in 2004 (26 by the Obama campaign, 32 by the McCain campaign). Put another way, the Obama campaign has spent 71% of its visits in states won by Bush while McCain has only spent 39% of its visits in states won by Kerry. Looking at this in more detail one sees, perhaps, a more dire picture for McCain. In the last ten days, the McCain campaign has only visited 3 states won by Kerry (Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, and 1 stop by Palin in Maine). Over the same time period, the Obama campaign has visited 7 states won by Bush (Florida, Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, and Virginia). Clearly, as Obama’s polling has improved over the past month, the campaign has felt emboldened to venture into a broader array of states, some of which were not thought to be winnable a few months back.


Another thing one notes is that the Obama campaign has been able to use its candidates—at least in terms of ground covered—more efficiently. One notices in the data a number of events attended by both Republican or Democratic candidates. These joint events, while probably larger in scope, are a less efficient use of the candidates’ time. Having two candidates in two places allows a campaign to accomplish more than having two candidates in one place. Here again we seem to have a Democratic advantage. Whereas the Republican ticket has had 19 joint events (thus coded as 38 visits), the Democratic ticket has had only 6.

When we look at the visits candidate by candidate, we don’t see a noticeable difference in terms of the candidates’ workloads. Obama has made 48 visits; Biden 42; McCain 42; and Palin 41. We do see some interesting trends, though, when we look at where each of these candidates has ventured. Joe Biden is probably the most interesting. He has made 43% of his visits to just two states—Ohio (13 visits) and Pennsylvania (5 visits). Thus, the “boy from Scranton” with his blue collar persona is clearly being used to try and shore up the segment of the electorate that has been most elusive to Obama throughout the campaign. Obama has made only 9 visits (19%) to those two states and concentrated his efforts on targets outside the Rust Belt like Colorado, Virginia, and Florida.

Thus, by looking at the campaign in a more “macro” sense, we can get some indication of the direction things seem to be moving. Some states that were earlier seen as competitive have seemed to solidify. Michigan, for example, hasn’t been visited by the McCain camp since September 23. It appears solidly in the Obama column. Likewise, the McCain campaign last visited Wisconsin and Minnesota on October 10. The decision by the RNC to stop airing ads in Wisconsin might signal that the Badger State is out of reach. Other states have suddenly gotten a lot more attention. Prior to October 9, Missouri had gone a month without being visited by the Obama campaign. Since the 9th, though, the Democrats have made 6 visits in a newfound sense of bullishness.

Over the remaining two weeks of the campaign, I’ll continue to monitor these visits to see if any further shifts take place. Should the polling begin to tighten in some states we’ll no doubt see the campaigns flock there. I’d also note, in closing, that the campaigns’ use of advertising will be a part of this larger strategy of resource allocation. The data for this year’s campaign advertising provided by the Wisconsin Advertising Project can be compared with these candidate visits to get a more complete picture of how the Democrats and Republicans view the current state of play. Like with visits, their recent findings suggest a battle being fought on Republican turf. The recent announcement by the Obama campaign that they had raised a staggering $150 million in September ensures that for the remainder of the contest, the Democrats will not be hindered by a lack of resources. While the laws of physics may prevent Obama and Biden from being wherever they would like to be, the opportunities available via the airwaves appear limitless.


**Update: Nate Silver takes a slightly different, but equally interesting, look at the data on candidate visits at FiveThirtyEight.com

Tuesday, October 14, 2008

Bellwether County Polling

I don't usually write much about polling--other sites do a much better job but one story today seems worth noting. Its always nice to have county level polling. Today's Politico reports on recent polling in four bellwether counties that Bush won in 2004: Hillsborough County, Florida (see discussion in previous post); Jefferson County, Colorado; Washoe County, Nevada; and Wake County, North Carolina. The Politico/InsiderAdvantage polls have Obama currently ahead in 3 of the 4.

Also, echoing a post of mine from a while back, today's Washington Post has a nice overview of the fight for Hampton Roads, the key to Virginia's 13 electoral votes.

Friday, October 10, 2008

Where the Race Will Be Won, Part 4

At the beginning of the general election season, there seemed to be little evidence that Florida would end up competitive. Whereas the 2000 election had raised the Sunshine State’s stature to that of the ultimate battleground, Bush’s relatively easy win in 2004 and polling earlier this year suggested that Republicans would hold onto the state’s 27 electoral votes. That may be changing.

One of the main reasons that Florida is a state that can be so competitive is that it contains, demographically and economically, a little bit of everything. With a population now surpassing 18 million, it is a mixture of urban and rural; white, black, and Hispanic; young and old; north and south; natives and transplants.

The distribution of these groups has given Florida politics a decidedly regional flavor. In broad terms, the northern part of the state (panhandle, Jacksonville, Pensacola) has voted consistently Republican while south Florida, with the exception of the Cuban community’s Republican affiliation, has been the hub of the state’s Democratic support (Miami-Dade, Palm Beach, Broward Counties).

The border between these two regions is Florida’s real battleground. The I-4 Corridor is viewed by many as the “Holy Grail” of Florida politics. Named for the interstate that runs from Tampa in the west to Daytona Beach in the east, the I-4 resembles a belt across the state’s midsection. Comprised of 12 counties, this region accounts for close to 30% of Florida’s population. It is also, politically, the most competitive. Much of the commentary on the state suggests that the largest concentration of Florida’s independents resides in this stretch. For a good recent article on the politics of the area, see here.

To flesh this out a bit more, let’s give some numbers. Here is the statewide vote, by county, for 2000 and 2004. Columns 1 and 2 give each county’s population and share of the statewide population, respectively. The final column gives the gain made by Bush in 2004 vs. 2000. Counties in the I-4 Corridor are highlighted. In 2000, as we know, the state was split (using the two-party vote) exactly 50/50. In 2004, Bush beat Kerry 52.5% to 47.5% for a net increase of 2.5%. Among the 12 counties of the I-4 corridor in 2000, Bush actually did better than he did statewide, garnering 51%. In 2004 he won 53.7% along the I-4, thus doing slightly better than he did statewide. His I-4 numbers in 2004 increased more than his statewide numbers compared to 2000 (+2.7% vs. +2.5%). Thus, we can attribute much of Bush’s success in repeating in Florida to his success in this part of the state.

More specifically, we can focus in on a few counties. Bush seems to have made his greatest strides is the more mid-sized counties in the region. For example, in Polk (Lakeland) and Brevard (Viera and Cape Canaveral) Counties, each home to roughly 500,000 Floridians, Bush’s numbers increased 4.4% and 3.9% respectively. In Volusia County (Daytona Beach), population 450,000, Bush’s margin increased by 3.4%. For this year’s contest, these counties would seem to be critical to Senator McCain’s efforts to hold the state.

For the Obama camp, the largest counties of the I-4 Corridor offer the greatest opportunities. The largest county in the I-4 Corridor is Hillsborough (population 1 million), which is dominated by the city of Tampa. In 2000, Bush won the County with 51.6%; in 2004 he received 53.4%. Thus, while still going for Bush, Hillsborough County’s Republican margin grew by less than the state average. Next door Pinellas (St. Petersburg) with a population of about 950,000 was won by Bush in 2004 by only 226 votes!!! Although Bush did better here than he did in 2000, this might be another opportunity for Obama to make gains. The final county in this region I would point to might be the ultimate bellwether. Orange County (Orlando) gave Kerry a slight majority in 2004 with 50.1% of the vote; it gave Gore 51% in 2000. This recent profile in National Geographic gives a fantastic overview of the diversity of the County as well as the degree to which it has exploded in growth over the past few decades.

With new polling bringing Florida back into toss-up status, both camps are spending time in the state and advertising dollars are flowing in. In the most recent report by the Wisconsin Advertising Project, the Tampa and Orlando media markets rank #5 and #7 nationally in terms of the number of ads aired. One can be sure that the recent economic downturn has contributed to the competitiveness of Florida. With a large population living off retirement savings and investments, the stock market collapse has been felt acutely. Also, the recently released unemployment figures show Florida’s unemployment rate now higher than the national average. Finally, Florida has one of the highest home foreclosure rates in the country. Thus, as we move into the final stretch of the campaign, we may be setting ourselves up for a repeat of 2000 in the Sunshine State.

Wednesday, October 08, 2008

ElectionDissection.com Book Club--Revisiting 1976

A few weeks back, while visiting Milwaukee for work, I stopped into my favorite bookstore, Renaissance Books. A towering warehouse filled with miles of shelves lined with musty books, I like stopping in a few times a year because I’m always sure to find older works of political history and biography that can’t be found easily anywhere else. Sure enough, I found a few things destined to find their way into future posts. The treasure of my visit was a copy of the 1976 Almanac of American Politics. For political junkies—especially those who study the Congress—this is our bible. I’d never seen a copy this old (1974 was the first edition) so the past several days have been spent digging into the congressional bios of members long since gone and the voting data from the post-Watergate Democratic landslide. This is high level politics nerd-dom.

What I have found particularly interesting in my reading so far is how it described the upcoming 1976 presidential election. With the benefit of hindsight, we don’t often appreciate the uncertainty that exists a year or so out from an election. However, it was far from clear who would emerge from the chaos of the Watergate era to win the White House. Michael Barone and his co-authors' description of the potential candidates is fascinating.

For example, at the time of the book’s publication in 1975, the presumptive Democratic nominee appeared to be Washington Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson:

…at this writing he is probably the leading candidate for the nomination. The impetus for the Jackson candidacy comes from those Democrats who are liberal on domestic policies and basically hawkish (though Jackson dislikes the word) on foreign policy. And his backers believe that Jackson has shown by his work in the Senate that he has mastered more subjects a President must understand than any other American legislator…Jackson has two majors problems as a presidential candidate: he is still not terribly well known, and he faces the implacable hostility of the portion of the Democratic Party that nominated George McGovern in 1972. At this writing, he is not known by almost half the American electorate; this will probably change in the course of the primaries, unless he runs unexpectedly poorly in the early contests. He certainly has the financial support necessary. He has already collected large sums, much of it from ardent supporters of Israel who appreciate his long record on Middle Eastern policy, much of it from businessmen who see him as a more congenial kind of politician than most liberal Democrats. The antiwar left is another matter. There are literally thousands of Democrats, including now some members of Congress, who got into politics primarily because of the opposition to the Vietnam War; why should they now support a man who was one of its major proponents?

Also given much discussion, but not much of a chance, was Alabama Governor (and 1968 and 1972 candidate) George Wallace. Reflecting on the Alabaman’s journey, including the 1972 attempt on his life, Barone writes:

No one doubts that he wants to run for President; it appears now that for all his primary runs and third party candidacies he has been seeking a way fro a one-time vocal segregationist to make it to the White House. Wallace has managed to raise literally millions in small contributions through direct mail, and he has enough hard core support—augmented, if anything by the respectability conferred by martyrdom—to run ahead of all other Democratic presidential possibilities in early 1975. But even more Democrats find Wallace totally unacceptable and would back anyone in the general election against him, even Gerald Ford; for all his talk of how he reflects the people’s real views, Wallace is clearly the weakest candidate the Democrats could nominate. And of course they won’t.

Also garnering attention, Arizona congressman Mo Udall:

Udall has not yet raised anything like the amount of money a presidential candidate is thought to need, and of course his name recognition is about zero. But he does have certain advantages: most notably, after the withdrawals of Edward Kennedy and Walter Mondale, there is a dearth of candidates acceptable to the liberal wing which dominated the Democratic convention in 1972 and may well again in 1976. Udall is at least acceptable to that group.

Where, you might ask, is Jimmy Carter, the eventual nominee and winner in 1976? Barone et al, less than a year before the beginning of the nomination contests, have very little to say about the former Georgia governor, and don’t seem to view his as a top tier candidate. Writing about his rise in Georgia political circles and election to the governorship in 1970, they state:

During his campaign, in which he shook tens of thousands of hands, Carter liked to describe himself as a peanut farmer from Plains, Georgia. He placed somewhat less emphasis on the fact that he had served as a top aide to Admiral Hyman Rickover in the nuclear submarine program, and that his peanut farm was not a shack-and-forty-acres affair but a well-managed, thriving business. Carter lost the Atlanta metropolitan area in both the primary and general election; but surprised some of his erstwhile supporters by coming out foresquare for integration…Now he is running for President, vowing that he will go into all the primaries; barring a major upset of George Wallace, it looks like a uphill race.

Thus, on the eve of the Democratic nominating process, it was virtually impossible to predict who would ultimately emerge victorious. It’s important, I think, to appreciate how hard it is to predict the way events, especially electoral and political, will play out. To maybe put this into a more contemporary perspective, try to go back to the recent editions of the Almanac or its competitor “Politics in America” and find anyone making a convincing argument about Barack Obama’s chances of becoming President. Momentum can develop very quickly in American politics.

As a final note, check out this snippet, written almost in passing, in the section on Arkansas in the ’76 Almanac:

Arkansas seems full of young, fairly liberal, personally attractive Democratic politicians these days—a type that simply was not around in the days before Winthrop Rockefeller (although, ironically, none is in Rockefeller’s Republican Party). There are Bumpers and Pryor, of course, and state Attorney General Jim Guy Tucker and Congressman Ray Thornton and almost successful congressional candidate Bill Clinton.

Tuesday, September 30, 2008

Wall Street Rescue--The Mother of All House Votes


Monday's House vote on the financial bailout plan was the mother of all case studies in congressional politics. I'm tempted to simply hand the roll call to the students in my Congress class as the final exam and have them explain it to me. In looking at the yeas and nays, a couple of patterns seem to emerge, many of which have been highlighted by media observers. The first, as noted by Chuck Todd, is that--as we would probably expect from House members--the fear of electoral repurcussions affected the vote of many. Those who have recently had close races, or have close races coming up in November, were likely to vote no. On the Democratic side, the examples of Nick Lampson (TX), Steve Kagen (WI), Nancy Boyda (KS), Don Cazayoux (LA), Travis Childers (MS), and Carol Shea-Porter (NH) jump out. For Republicans, Dave Reichert (WA), Robin Hayes (NC), Steve Chabot (OH), Ric Keller (FL), and Randy Kuhl (NY) are of note.

In a similar vein open seats were a good cue, especially on the Republican side. Free of electoral pressure, departing members were more likely to vote yes. Of the 29 Republicans not on the ballot this fall, 21 voted yes (with one not voting). Four of the six departing Democrats voted yes. For those leaving the House to seek another office, short term considerations seemed to compel a no vote, adding 4 to the total number of no's (2 Republican and 2 Democratic). The two nominees for New Mexico's open Senate seat, Reps. Steve Pearce (R) and Tom Udall (D) voted no; Colorado Senate candidate Rep. Mark Udall (D) voted no; as did Missouri gubernatorial candidate Rep. Kenny Hulshof (R).

Another dimension of the voting that some have discussed is the role played by the Congressional Black Caucus and Congressional Hispanic Caucus. By the numbers, of the 39 members of the CBC, 18 voted yes and 21 voted no. A story in today's Politico points to concerns among many African American members about the bill's failure to include enough foreclosure protection and how its addition might be enough to salvage the bill in the coming days. The Hispanic membership was more lined up against the bill than the CBC. Of the 21 Democratic members of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus, 14 voted no. In addition, the 3 Republican Hispanic members (not part of the CHC) voted no (Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Lincoln Diaz-Balart, Mario Diaz-Balart).

*Image courtesy of the New York Times

Where They're Campaigning--Obama Along the Mississippi


Tomorrow the Obama campaign will hit La Crosse Wisconsin (see coverage here)—his fourth visit to the Badger state since the convention. La Crosse, population 52,000, sits along the Mississippi River, and is the hub of a region that I’ve argued is crucial to Democrats’ success in Wisconsin (see post here).

La Crosse county has voted Democratic in the past five presidential elections. Kerry received 53% in 2004 here. The county has also gone Democratic in the past two gubernatorial races. At the congressional level, La Crosse is the largest city in Wisconsin’s Third Congressional District, currently represented by Democrat Ron Kind. Kind, first elected in 1996, has been comfortably re-elected in all of his campaigns with vote totals in the neighborhood of 65%. Prior to Kind’s arrival, the district had a more Republican (albeit very moderate) bent, sending Steve Gunderson to the House for eight terms.

One component of this region’s demographics that is surely attractive to the Obama team is the fact that five campuses of the University of Wisconsin system fall within the 3rd district (UW La Crosse, Eau Claire, Platteville, River Falls, and Stout), thus providing a sizable youth vote. Many suggested that this vote was crucial to the Democrats’ ability to regain control of the Wisconsin State Senate in 2006 (see post here).

Another fact of note about the area is that this district also includes Wisconsin’s fastest growing county—St. Croix. About 150 miles north of La Crosse, St. Croix County has increasingly become exurban Minneapolis/St. Paul. In fact, this whole region in many ways has a dual identity as it is pulled between the Twin Cities and Wisconsin. The Minnesota counties that sit directly across the Mississippi River from La Crosse—Houston and Winona—are very competitive. Winona County has been decided by less than 2% for the past five elections (with the Democrats winning the past 4) while Houston County has been decided by less than 2% in each of the past six elections (with Republicans winning all except ’96). Thus, the Obama campaign may be hoping for some residual benefits of this visit to accrue across the river in another swing state.

Thursday, September 25, 2008

New Census Data On Mobility--How Does It Affect Politics???

Earlier this week the Census Bureau released new data on mobility in the U.S. The data shows us the percentage of each state's population born in that state. Thus, Louisiana ranks first with 82% of its population native born. The state with the highest non-native population, not surprisingly perhaps, is Nevada with just 29% of its population born in state.

I find this type of data interesting because it raises questions about how the politics of a state might or might not change over time. One would assume that states with higher numbers of residents born out of state would have politics (voting behavior, partisan identification, etc.) more subject to flux, whereas states without much internal population change would have more stable and enduring politics. I'd note, with just a cursory examination of the rankings, that some of those states with a higher out of state born population are very much competitive this year--Nevada, Florida, Colorado, and New Hampshire.

However, one would also note that a stable population can also produce a competitive electorate. Looking at the top of the rankings, one sees Michigan, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Iowa, and Wisconsin ranked 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 7th (tie) respectively.

There's a lot to think and hypothesize about here.