Geraldine Ferraro, Queens, and the Politics of Backlash

With the furor over the recent comments from Geraldine Ferraro, I thought we’d take a trip back in time to look at her time in the House of Representatives (1979-1985). During her time in the House, Ferraro represented what was then New York’s 9th congressional district. Basically, the district was the western most part of Queens, directly across the East River from Manhattan. In thinking about her comments, I wondered if they were not just a commentary on the 2008 election, but deeply rooted in the political culture from which she emerged in the 60’s and 70’s. I’ve written quite a bit about this period of upheaval and the politics it spawned. In his mayoral race of 1965, William F. Buckley found Queens to be quite receptive to his candidacy, receiving 17% of the vote. As New York City sank into decline, and reaction to the failures of the Great Society mounted, the inhabitants of this area saw their political allegiances start to transform. Not far away in Brooklyn, conflict exploded in the wake of Mayor Lindsay’s school reforms in such neighborhoods as Ocean Hill-Brownsville. If we look at the presidential race of 1968, we see that George Wallace performed quite well in what became Ferraro’s district. While Wallace received 4.7% of the vote citywide and 5.8% in Queens, in the assembly districts making up the 9th district he received greater support. Assembly districts 30-34 gave Wallace 9.8%, 5.3%, 7.1%, 8.4% and 9.2% respectively.

Looking at the voting behavior of this constituency during the 1970’s and 80’s, one sees the emergence of a true “Reagan Democrat” district. In 1972 it gave a large margin of victory to Richard Nixon, voted for Ford in 1976, and went big for Reagan in 1980 and 1984, even with Ferraro on the ticket as Walter Mondale’s VP. Throughout this time, though, it sent Democrats to the House, but of a more culturally conservative stock. Prior to Ferraro, the 9th was represented by James Delaney and afterwards by Tom Manton. Since redistricting, it is now represented by Congressman Joseph Crowley. While Ferraro was more culturally liberal than her predecessor and successors, she did have to strike a balance between her positions on such issues as abortion with those of her ethnic, largely Catholic, constituents.

The demographics of the 9th district when Ferraro served were roughly 75% white, 15% Hispanic, 5% Asian, and only 3% African American. At the time, the Almanac of American Politics described the 9th thusly:

“It can be said with some certainty that the durable Archie Bunker lives in the 9th congressional district of New York. The aerial shot taken by TV cameramen of Archie’s neighborhood shows the kind of aging, though still neatly maintained, one and two family houses that line the streets of Jackson Heights, Astoria, Long Island City, Ridgewood, and Glendale, Queens. Moreover, Archie’s views, as modified over the years, are a fairly accurate, if stylized, portrayal of attitudes that are often, though not always, shared in this district…Most of the people here, Bunker notwithstanding, think of themselves as coming from some sort of immigrant stock. And if they were not eager to share their neighborhoods with low-income blacks in the 1960s and 1970s, they are willing, at least grudgingly, to share them with people who are doing today what their grandparents did 80 years ago.”

So, while many are speculating on whether Ferraro’s comments are part of a coordinated effort by the Clinton campaign to make Barack Obama the “black candidate” in the eyes of white, working class voters, I thought part of the explanation for her rhetoric might lie in her past as well.

Buckley and New York, 1965

Continuing our remembrance of William F. Buckley, I wanted to write more on his 1965 mayor's race. As this masterful portrait of the race in the New York Times Magazine recalls, Buckley entered the race almost on a whim. Running on the recently established line of the Conservative Party, Buckley didn't so much "campaign" in the traditional sense as use the race as an opportunity to give voice to the maturing conservative ideology that he had spent years developing. He knew he had no chance of winning and joked about the realities of the race. In retrospect, one sees that the race was rather an opening shot in the ascendancy of modern conservatism. In order for this new order to rise, the old order had to be vanquished.

This old order was, of course, a technocratic and bureaucratic liberalism that had become universally accepted by the political, academic, and journalistic classes. Social problems could be solved, society could be perfected, and government was the instrument. For Buckley, it was John Lindsay, the Republican congressman and mayoral candidate who embodied all that was wrong with this regime and who drew most of his fire. As Walter Lippmann commented at the time, Buckley was "determined to wreck the party in order to rule the wreckage."

While I haven't been able to find precinct level returns yet, the borough by borough numbers are available. Lindsay, of course, won followed closely by Democrat Abe Beam. Buckley received 13% city wide. Breaking down the numbers further, Buckley's totals were:

Queen's--17.3%
King's--12.7%
Richmond--25.2%
New York (Manhattan)--7.2%
Bronx--13.9%

So who were Buckley's voters and why are they important? In his portrait of the race, Sam Tanenhaus argues: "Though he failed to capture any single district, he finished second in parts of Queens and fared especially well among Irish and German Catholics. Once again, ethnic group interests and values--'who hates who,'--in the shorthand used by Kevin Phillips, author of 'The Emerging Republican Majority'--held true. The difference was that those aggrieved white ethnic voters now appeared to be Republicans..." In his biography of Lindsay, Vincent Cannato comes to a similar conclusion: "The twelve strong Buckley districts were in the white Catholic outer boroughs." Thus, Buckley expanded on the project begun earlier, as so ably described by Phillips, of giving voters a reason to use fear as the basis for their vote. Even though Buckley claimed to not want to divide the electorate into groups and pander to each in order to build a coalition, the result of his campaign was that just such a strategy would be viable in the future.

The importance of the race, I believe, was not so much felt in New York--although there were certainly repurcussions as Lindsay found it virtually impossible to govern a disintegrating city. What is of greater import is what this race said about the future of American politics. These Buckley voters were in fact all across the country. They lived in big cities that were in decay. They felt they were being left behind and that other groups were being given privileges--affirmative action, busing, etc. While they had at one time been the backbone of the New Deal Coalition, they would soon begin casting votes for George Wallace and comprise part of Nixon's "Silent Majority." Finally, they would provide the margin for Reagan's ascendancy. In metropolitan areas like Detroit, Cleveland, Milwaukee, Baltimore, Philadelphia, and Chicago, they were on a path toward realignment. There can be no doubt that this process was, in many ways, an ugly one. Race was used as a cleavage and latent fears and prejudices were exploited. Crime, welfare dependancy, and illegitmacy were used as metaphors for liberalism's failure. In retrospect, the tactics and language these candidates (including Buckley) often used were deplorable. However, if we want to be honest about our political history, we must reckon with them. As someone interested in why people vote the way that they do, I have to acknowledge that these reasons are not always admirable. But they must be studied.

In earlier posts on this blog, I have shown a number of examples of this, focusing on George Wallace. I wondered how a small state governor from the deep south, despite never winning the presidency, could change American politics so much. The answer, I believe, is that he gave voice to the rage and alienation of millions of Americans. At certain times in history, individuals are a perfect reflection of their times. They are the vessel in which others' aspirations, and sometimes fears, are placed. Here we have a Yale educated, patrician, son of an oil magnate drawing large numbers of votes from blue collar, lunch bucket carrying voters in Staten Island, Brooklyn, Queens, and the Bronx. Tempermentally and intellectually, Buckley was the polar opposite of Wallace. Reflecting on his death this week, I have to conclude that Buckley, like Wallace, was a crucial actor in this play. His influence on our politics over the past half century is incalculable.

Update: Here is a column by Buckley that I just found, written just prior to the 1968 election, on the subject of Wallace. The crux: votes for Wallace are votes that would otherwise go to Nixon. Thus, Buckley seems to agree that these were voters on the path to becoming Republicans, away from the Democrats. Here is a longer column from the same year, laying out his objections to Wallace at greater length.

William F. Buckley R.I.P.

William F. Buckley, the father of modern American conservatism, passed away today. The New York Times' obituary is here. While Buckley is best known for his founding of the National Review and his prolific writings that managed to unify American conservatism into a core set of ideas, what is also of great interest to us at this site is his 1965 candidacy for the mayorality of New York. The Times has a remembrance of that race here.

In the '65 race, Buckley entered the contest as the voice of what he believed to be authentic conservatism and also disenchantment. Running against liberal Republican (and eventual winner) John Lindsay and Democrat Abe Beam, Buckley tapped into the frustrations of many New Yorkers (white, ethnic, outer boroughs) with the urban decline of the city. As the failures of the war on poverty and 60's liberalism were being realized in the urban context, Buckley gave voice to those who felt left behind by this social experiment. I've always felt that Buckley's candidacy must be viewed as an important stopping off point for many urban, white ethnic Democrats who eventually ended up being "Reagan Democrats." Starting with Goldwater, through Buckley, George Wallace, and finally Reagan, you can trace this realignment of a large segment of the American electorate. While Buckley never won office, he provided the ideas and the forum for the movement.

In the next few days, John and I will attempt to unearth some data from that '65 race to highlight what was going on, though not fully appreciated, at the time.