Riposte to My Last Post--ElectionDissection.com Book Club

After my last post I got to wondering whether I was being a little hard on the Palmetto State. Pulling out V.O. Key when talking about the south (and race) is certainly heavy artillery, but his conclusions--while valid in 1949--may no longer hold. So we should maybe look at more recent history. To help with this, I recently came across a book that was specifically designed to be an update of Key's "Southern Politics." From the title you get a sense that the authors wanted to take another look, state by state, at what Key explored. "The Transformation of Southern Politics," written by Jack Bass and Walter DeVries shows how, in the years after Key, two party politics began to emerge across the south. Whereas Key found factionalism within the solidly Democratic south to be the traditional form of politics, we here start to see the makings of more "rational" competition between the parties.

I should note, though, that this book was written in 1976 so we don't have the opportunity to explore the full arc of southern political transformation to the point where the region is now the most Republican part of the country. Indeed, in many of the states Bass and DeVries explore, parity between the parties had yet to emerge by the mid-70's. Nonetheless, the process was under way, spurred by several events and forces. Among these was the 1949 Dixiecrat revolt, Barry Goldwater's 1964 inroads in Dixie, as well as a social transformation that saw a massive in-migration into the south from many northern states. While these forces tended to help Republicans, Democrats also saw their politics transform--and this is a process the authors focus on. With the 1965 Voting Rights Act's passage, southern politicians could no longer ignore the numerical strength of black voters. In fact, they now had the incentive to court them. Thus, the 60's and 70's saw the emergence of many Democratic politicians who were much more moderate, and indeed sometimes progressive, on the issue of race in comparison to their predecessors. Jimmy Carter is probably the best example but lesser known figures like Ernest Hollings in South Carolina, Dale Bumpers in Arkansas, and Reubin Askew in Florida saw their rise assisted by black votes. Another consequence of the Voting Rights Act's passage, along with the breakup of malapportioned state legislative districts, was the election of sizable numbers of black politicians. Thus, Key's "Southern Politics" is very much in recession by this time.


In their chapter on South Carolina titled "The Changing Politics of Color," Bass and DeVries suggest that the state's politics, along with Tennessee's, were the furthest along in developing a true two party system. The responsibility for the growth and early maturation of SC's Republicans can be most ascribed to Strom Thurmond. After first bolting the Democrats to run as a Dixiecrat in 1948, Thurmond joined the Republican ranks and was elected to the Senate. One story that I found fascinating in Rick Perlstein's "Nixonland" was the role that Thurmond played in the election of Richard Nixon in 1968. By providing affirmation of Nixon's bona fides (some would call this a wink and a nod to the "Southern Strategy"), Nixon was able to win South Carolina, not only denying it to George Wallace who swept the rest of the Deep South, but helping to cement his victory over Hubert Humphrey.

While South Carolinian, and southern politics more broadly, was changing, that's not to say that some of the characteristics Key identified had disappeared. Voting could still be very racially polarized. In his recent look at southern politics, Thomas Schaller argues that white southern voters oftentimes increase their participation in response to high levels of black voting--in other words, the fear that black voters could tilt elections leads whites to vote in reaction to them (and thus for Republicans). Bass and DeVries found a similar phenomenon in South Carolina:

A look at county data reveals, as expected, that the combination of heavy black population and a high rate of black participation greatly stimulates white political participation. Whites in all 12 of the majority black counties were registered at a higher percentage than the state average of 61.3 percent. In ten of the counties the white registration rate was more than 15 points higher than the statewide rate. As a percentage of those registered, whites in the majority black counties voted at a slightly higher rate than the state average, and blacks in those counties at a rate about equal to the state average.

Thus, there's a mixture of both fluidity and stability in the politics of the south. What we need to look at next is the subsequent chapter of southern political history--the rise of Reagan, the maturation of the Republican Party across the region, and its subsequent dominance epitomized in the 1994 congressional election. Bass and DeVries have updated the version that I have so that is probably the best place to start but I'll try and search out some more works, comprehensive in scope, to continue this process of exploration.

From Now On, Is Everything About Race???

Over the past week, especially since President Obama’s health care speech to Congress, the political debate in Washington and across the country has reached a heightened sense of craziness. Crystallized by the outburst of South Carolina congressman Joe Wilson—and the subsequent vote of disapproval in the House yesterday—the issue of race has once again been raised. Wilson’s “You lie!” comment has been interpreted in a variety of ways, with many arguing that racism lies not far beneath the surface. The most high profile advocate of this position is former President jimmy Carter. Commentary about Wilson’s motivations has been more divided.

As readers of this blog know, the role of race in American politics and society fascinates me. The Obama candidacy and now presidency have presented us with the opportunity to look, perhaps as never before, at how race defines and divides us. In theorizing about race, though, we need to be extremely careful—not because of the sensitivity of the issue and a fear of being either too overly or insufficiently “politically correct”—but because of how difficult it is to prove anything, especially when it comes to individuals’ motivations, beliefs, and biases. A case for such humility was made recently by Ta-Nehisi Coates in his blog over at The Atlantic (one of my favorites).

So having said this, I want to proceed gingerly in talking about this series of events. Nonetheless, the Wilson case brings to the fore some fascinating political/geographical history--stuff that gets us excited here. Whenever I’ve ventured to talk about race, especially in terms of its salience in the south, I turn to the great work by V.O. Key, “Southern Politics,” originally published in 1949. Key’s work was a landmark study of how the “solid south” evolved in the post-bellum south. In his introduction, Key argues

In its grand outlines the politics of the South revolves around the position of the Negro. It is at times interpreted as a politics of cotton, as a politics of free trade, as a politics of agrarian poverty, or as a politics of planter and plutocrat. Although such interpretations have a superficial validity, in the last analysis the major peculiarities of southern politics go back to the Negro. Whatever phase of the southern political process one seeks to understand, sooner or later the trail of inquiry leads to the Negro.

The main “peculiarity” Key explores is why traditional two party politics never emerged in the south after the Civil War. Whereas “rational” politics entails conflicts around economic issues—and thus divides the classes—such cleavages never took hold in the south’s politics. The reason, for Key, was because the fear of black advancement and political political power united both rich and poor whites. Even though poor whites and blacks shared many economic interests, an alliance between the two never congealed. Thus, southern politics was more factional than ideological, playing out completely within the arena of the Democratic party which, due to Jim Crow, was a totally white enterprise.

In Key’s analysis of individual southern states, he found that this type of politics was most entrenched in those areas with the largest black populations. The “blacker” a state or county, the greater incentive there was for whites to unite. Of all the southern states, South Carolina had the second largest black population, second only to Mississippi. In fact, Key entitled his chapter on the Palmetto State “The Politics of Color.” He opens this chapter by noting:

South Carolina has had a succession of spectacular race orators who almost blanket out the achievements of its abler and more temperate leaders, such as James F. Byrnes. While others shared their views, the politicians of South Carolina—and Mississippi—have put the white-supremacy case most bitterly, most uncompromisingly, most vindictively.

Does this history make Joe Wilson’s outburst racist? Who knows. Is he responsible for this history? Of course not. But history is hard to escape and it shapes people’s context and it shapes our culture. And when we’re discussing American history and especially that of the south and its politics, we can’t ignore race, even though doing so would make us more comfortable. We should also recognize that others will consider it and have their own judgments shaped by their particular experiences and histories. An interesting aspect of the Wilson brouhaha has been the role played by fellow SC congressman, and Democratic Whip, James Clyburn. Clyburn represents the neighboring district in the state and has a storied personal history as a leader of the civil rights struggle there. That he was the member driving the move to admonish Wilson should remind us how personal this issue can be.

Interestingly—and here we can find more sure footing—when one looks at Congressman Wilson’s district, one finds that his district is not one where we’d expect quite the level of demagoguery that Key described. The 2nd District finds itself, of the state’s 6, in the middle in terms of its racial composition. It is the third “blackest” with African Americans making up roughly 26% of the population. Also, it has the highest median income in the state and the highest proportion of residents with a college degree. Recent conventional wisdom has suggested that those with higher incomes and education will be the least likely to hold unenlightened views on race. In last year’s presidential race the 2nd was Obama’s third best district, giving him 45% of the vote. Furthermore, as has been noted at length over the past week, Wilson had a relatively close re-election last time, garnering only 54% of the vote. Both candidates have used the events of the past week to rake in huge sums of money for next year’s rematch. Thus, there doesn't seem to be much incentive, in a purely political sense, for Wilson to become the new incarnation of George Wallace.

So where does this leave us??? The fact that we’ve been focused on the meaning of two words over the past week—and that this meaning has been interpreted by many to have sinister racial undertones—tells us that we’ve not yet arrived at a mythical “post racial” America. Given our history and how much in is entwined into our consciousness, perhaps we never will. Where it does leave us is with a realization that these types of debates, clashes, and parsings of words are going to be with us for a while. The Obama presidency makes this unavoidable. However much we might want our political fights (in the best sense of the word) to be “just” about health care, the economy, education, and the like, they won’t be. Beneath the surface of all of these will be the unspoken, and often loudly spoken, role of race in America. We best proceed humbly.

**Top image, slave map of South Carolina, originally published in The Atlantic in 1861.

Is It Too Early To Be Thinking About 2010???

As August wraps up and the Democrats emerge from a month long, town hall meeting inspired, collective freak-out, the punditry is already asking whether the Dems are doomed come next fall. A recent Politico story samples opinion from the likes of Charlie Cook and Nate Silver, both of whom seem to be forcasting dire straits ahead.

All of this seems extremely premature to me. With 14 months to go until the voting we (if we are honest) have to acknowledge that we have no idea what the political and party dynamics will be that far down the road. While the health care debate has been (predictably) ugly, confusing, and divisive, it's also pretty much assured that something will pass. When it does, things will calm down. Perhaps this isn't the best time to be making predictions. Its also useful to put the upcoming election into some broader context.

Toward the end of the Politico story, the issue of retirements comes up. This, I'd argue, is a good place to start. Open seat races caused by an incumbents' retirements have always provided parties with their best opportunity to gain seats. The formidable incumbency advantages of name recognition, legislative record, constituency service, and fundraising might disappear, creating a much more level playing field. Should the out-party manage to field and support a credible candidate they can feasibly gain the seat. A crucial variable in their ability to do this, of course, is the underlying nature of the district itself. A Democrat retiring from a solidly liberal district isn't going to be likely to change, whatever the Republican candidate does. To look at the role that retirements play in assisting party gains, I created the following chart, focusing on the House of Representatives. Senate races have a much more individualistic dynamic that we'll explore over the coming months.

The above chart shows each party's success in gaining seats for each congressional election cycle since 1960. Column 2 indicates the total number of House retirements for that particular cycle. Column 3 provides the total number of Democratic retirements, followed by the number of those retirements lost. Column 5 provides the percentage of retirements lost. Column 6 notes the total number of Democratic losses (open seat losses plus incumbents defeated). Column 7 (based on the Republican numbers) shows how many of the Democrats' total gains for that year were the result of their capture of open seats. The remaining columns provide the same data for Republicans over this period.

So what do we see? First, both parties are quite successful in defending the seats of their retirees. Both parties lost, on average over the length of this data set, 29.5% of their open seats. Thus, if a party wants to rely on retirements to make big gains, they are going to need an extremely large number of retirements from the other side. The best example of this is 1994. I've highlighted 1994 in the chart (as with 2006) to show what happens during cycles when the party majority switches. In '94, Republicans managed to win 21 of the 28 vacancies created by Democratic retirements. These wins gave them 38% of the seats they captured that year. While they managed to unseat a very large number of incumbent Dems, these open seat wins were crucial.

A second trend that jumps out is that the Democrats have been more reliant on open seat wins to make their gains than Republicans have been. The Dems have averaged 46.5% of their gains through open seat wins as opposed to the Republicans 39%. Thus, for the Republicans in 2010, the data would seem to point to their need to knock of Democratic incumbents--at least given past trends. For them to do this, though, they'll need to target vulnerable Dems--probably those from moderate to Republican leaning districts. Hence, we've seen how the Blue Dogs have been at the center of the current hand wringing. One thing I've wondered about, as a result of how well the Democrats have done in the past two cycles, is whether the party is at its high water mark in terms of seats. In other words how many more districts, even under the most favorable circumstances, could possibly go Democratic? It's hard to think of many. Thus, any gains that the Republicans might make next year might be the result not of voter backlash against health care or Obama, but rather a natural correction in the electorate, a return to equilibrium if you will. Rather than doing so poorly now, it may be that the Democrats did too well in '06 and '08.

Looking ahead to 2010 with attention on retirements, what do we know at this point? Currently, 16 House members have announced their retirements (10 Republican and 6 Democrat). Looking at the range of this data set, one sees that even allowing for more retirement announcements in the future, 2010 doesn't seem like it will be a year with a large number of retirements--hence opportunities--for Republicans. With a new majority and now a President of their party in the White House, Democrats have an incentive to stay in office and push their policy agenda. One can also be sure that party leaders are pushing their members to stay put rather than retire or seek higher office. Thus, should some of these early prognostications materialize, they would seem to have to be driven by incumbent defeats. Not only are these difficult to produce individually, but to do so in large number and across numerous regions requires extremely unusual circumstances. While the current health care debate has certainly gotten some House Democrats scared, we shouldn't automatically assume that 2010 is going to be the equivalent of 1994 or 1966--years that saw the minority party make huge gains. A lot more would need to happen.

Free For All Guv's Race in Wisconsin

Two term Wisconsin Governor Jim Doyle (D) announced last week that he would not seek a third term, throwing wide open next year's race for the Badger State's top office (for a decent rundown see here). Doyle had been a consistent vote getter statewide, winning three terms as Attorney General and then two as Governor. Under normal circumstances, Doyle would have been virtually assured a third term (Wisconsin does not have term limits). However, with the worsening economy, Doyle's approval has cratered over the past year, with his numbers now hovering somewhere in the low 30's. With his announcement, several candidates have already announced, several more may be expected to jump in, and I'll venture that a few probably should.

Prior to this announcement, the two Republicans in the race were Milwaukee County Executive Scott Walker and former Wisconsin House member (1st District) Mark Neumann. Walker has been twice elected in Milwaukee County and was a candidate for the GOP governor's nomination last time around in 2006. However, midway through the race Walker dropped out (after some prodding by national GOP higher ups) to give then House member Mark Green (8th District) clear sailing to the party nod. Green went on to lose to Doyle handily (53%-45%) in a year Wisconsin moved solidly to the Democratic side (Green's House seat went blue to Rep. Steve Kagen). Neumann also has statewide ballot experience. After capturing the 1st District House seat in the 1994 GOP landslide, Neumann sought to take down Sen. Russ Feingold in 1998. Aided by Feingold's questionable campaign strategy (refusing national party money and abiding by the limits of the yet to pass McCain-Feingold campaign finance bill), Neumann almost scored an upset, losing by only 3 points. Both Walker and Neumann are fiscal and social conservatives. Of the two, Neumann is probably more to the extremes, especially because he hasn't been forced to govern and take pragmatic stances like Walker has as the head of Wisconsin's largest county.

On the Democratic side, things are just starting to shake out. First in the race is the current Lieutenant Governor, Barbara Lawton. While Lawton's first elected experience came with the number two spot under Doyle, she hails from a part of the state that is, in my mind, the most fascinating for Dems' chances--Green Bay and the upper Fox River Valley (see this post from last year's cycle).

The next Democrat that people are watching is 3rd District Congressman Ron Kind. The 3rd District is made up of the mostly rural western part of the state (see this older post for some background). The Blue Dog Kind has held the seat since replacing GOP moderate Steve Gunderson back in 1996. Given that the Democratic nominee will have to grapple with the state's economic downturn and no doubt have to demonstrate some fiscal bona fides, Kind is an intriguing potential candidate.

Third up, and yet to declare, is Dane County Executive Kathleen Falk. Falk has two things in her favor. First, she hails from the vote rich and most reliably Democratic part of the state--Madison. Dane County consistently has the state's highest turnout levels and, in a close primary or general, this could prove crucial. Second, she has run statewide before, losing to Doyle in the 2002 Democratic primary for governor. In a three way race, along with then Milwaukee congressman and now Mayor, Falk garnered 27% of the vote.

Which brings us to Barrett. Barrett has gotten a lot of unwanted attention, given the circumstances, over the past week, after being beaten outside the Wisconsin State Fair. Upon leaving with his family, Barrett came across a domestic disturbance and, in the process of calling the police and trying to separate the parties, ended up losing a few teeth, fracturing his hand, and requiring plastic surgery to close up some nasty cuts. Rachel Maddow profiled the episode the other day, speculating that this may gain Barrett some sympathy, and potentially votes, should he again seek the Governor's mansion. While Barrett hails from the largest city and county in the state, this may--ironically-work against him (and Walker too). Historically, Wisconsin voters have not elected their Governor from Milwaukee. One needs to go back to Civil War era elections to find the last time this happened. The big city / out state dynamic that I wrote about a while back has held quite well in Wisconsin.

One candidate that I would watch closely is 1st District Congressman Paul Ryan. While Ryan begged off the question of whether he was interested in the race, the clearly ambitious (many think he will run for the Senate soon) Ryan should, in my view, consider entering. The Republican candidate should, all things being equal, be at an advantage next year. While Ryan has risen quickly up the GOP ranks in the House--he now sits as the ranking member on the Budget Committee--his prospects of being a member of the majority party any time soon (and thus having any tangible policy influence) are dim given the size of the Democratic majority. Thus, for a wonkish, yet charismatic, politician like Ryan, the Governor's mansion would seem to be an attractive destination.

The wild card in all of this is how the Wisconsin political landscape will look 15 months from now. Should the economy improve the current GOP advantage could vaporize. While Wisconsin is always considered a classic swing state, recent elections have seen it move further to the Democratic side. A GOP presidential candidate hasn't won the state since Ronald Reagan in 1984. Democrats have won the past two governor's races and the past 7 Senate races. In the last two cycles the Democrats have captured both houses of the state legislature and have gained one U.S. House seat. Obama romped through Wisconsin, winning the state by 14 points. Thus, both parties have reason to be optimistic. The result will hopefully be (for political junkies at least) a multi-candidate Battle Royale.

A Quick Note on the Sotomayor Confirmation

Judge Sonia Sotomayor was just confirmed by the Senate, 68-31. Nine Republicans voted yes. One thing I would note is that 4 of those 9 yea votes are from retiring members (Gregg, Martinez, Bond, and Voinovich). Early on the process I speculated on how things might shake out on the Republican side (turns out I was wrong about a lot).

What seems clear is that the partisan voting trend continues on these nominations. Because of their impending retirments, these four no longer had to worry about any repurcussions stemming from supporting Sotomayor. Its hard for the leadership to whip Senators into line behind the party position when those Senators are on the way out the door. Voinovich's comments last week about the state of the Republican party and its increasing "southern-ness" seems, in retrospect, to be an insight into his thinking. Perhaps the most interesting of the Republican yeas is Lamar Alexander (R-TN) whose comments in support of Sotomayor sought to defuse the polarization of these nomination fights. Having run for President himself, Alexander may, one might speculate, be sympathetic to the critique offered by his Ohio colleague--although one can't imagine the Tennessean voicing his agreement.



***UPDATE: Nate Silver provides a rundown of the GOP vote and provides the following helpful visual on states' Hispanic population and the ultimate vote of their GOP senators.

Grampa Stayed Home

A new Census Bureau report was just released that gives a highly detailed look at turnout during last year's campaign (summary press release here and coverage here). The main takeaway is that 2008 actually saw a decrease in turnout among eligible voters (those 18 and over). The main reason for this decrease, apparently, is that older white voters decided to stay home in significant numbers.

While turnout among the young increased, it was the only age group whose numbers were up significantly compared to 2004. Largely responsible for this spike, it seems, is much higher participation by young African-American voters whose turnout increased 8% over 2004 and gave them a higher turnout rate than young whites. Overall, though, younger voters still had the lowest turnout rate. Thus, the longstanding correlation between turnout and age was maintained.

While I haven't dug through all of the date in this report yet, it seems further indication that although the 2008 election brought many new voters into the political process, it didn't produce an electorate that was radically different from what we've seen in recent contests.

Does Anyone Want to Be the Next Senator From Illinois???

There's been a rash of Hamlet-like indecision in Illinois. For next year's Senate race, a number of candidates have been mulling entering what will no doubt be an expensive, highly watched, and potentially highly competitive campaign.

Last week came word, not surprisingly, that the appointed incumbent (and Blagojevic stained) Democrat Roland Burris would not seek to retain the seat. While claiming that the cost of mounting a race would be too prohibitive, his demurral certainly also has to do with the fact that he has virtually no support among Democratic higher ups in the state, including senior Senator Richard Durbin.

Also last week came the announcement that the Democrats' top hope for the seat, Attorney General Lisa Madigan, was also saying no. While Madigan was being courted by the White House to enter the race, she was also mulling a run for Governor. In the end, she decided to seek re-election as AG. While the Senate race seemed hers to lose, perhaps fear of a Republican rebound has led her to keep her powder dry for the time being. Only 42 years old, she has many campaigns in her future.

Another potential Dem is Christopher Kennedy, son of RFK, and head of the longtime Kennedy holding, Chicago Merchandise Mart. He's also reportedly on the fence.

Fourth on our roster of potential Senators is 5th term Republican House member Mark Kirk. Over the last few days Kirk has gone back and forth, sending out signals that he was out as well as in. Key to his deliberations, apparently, is a desire to avoid a costly and divisive primary. As of today, thanks to Illinois GOP head Andy McKenna's decision not to mount his own campaign, Kirk is in.

Kirk is perhaps the most interesting of these candidates. For the GOP to make a Senate pick-up in Illinois, a moderate would seem to be a requirement. Kirk certainly fits this bill. He represents the upscale 10th district, comprising the north and northwest Chicago suburbs. In last year's presidential race, Barack Obama received 61% of the vote in the 10th. In 2004, John Kerry won the district with 52%. Despite the recent Democratic wave, Kirk managed to hold his seat with 53%. The newly published Politics in America 2010 describes the district thusly:

Suburban white-collar workers and the more working-class residents of Waukegan combine to make the 10th fiscally conservative but socially liberal, especially on abortion rights and gun control. Its proximity to Lake Michigan makes environmental issues important here. While area residents have sent a Republican to the U.S. House for decades, the area generally supports Democratic presidential candidates...

Kirk is among the most left-leaning Republicans in the GOP caucus. He's managed to parlay his moderate positions into a reliable base of support back home, allowing him to withstand the strong Democratic winds of the past few cycles. He would seem to possess the necessary ability to siphon off the votes of Democratic leaning independents in the Chicago suburbs. While these voters have been moving increasingly leftward in recent years, Kirk may be able to bring them back (perhaps only temorarily) with a message of fiscal responsibility. Should the benefits of the recently passed stimulus package remain elusive, coupled with high unemployment, Kirk may have a solid economic platform on which to mount his campaign.

There is one announced Democrat in the race, State Treasurer Alex Giannoulias. Another potential Dem entrant is 9th District House member Jan Schakowsky, whose district border's Kirk's, and who would be the most liberal candidate in the race. She has strong progressive bona fides, is part of the House Democratic leadership, and would bring fundraising potential to the campaign.

Keep an eye on Illinois as things become more straightened out over the coming weeks.

Michael Barone:Forget Deep/Old South vs New/Upper SouthIn the Age of Obama,it's "The South Atlantic" vs. "The Interior South"

Over at the Washington Examiner’s Beltway Confidential blog, the free daily’s senior Political Anaylst Michael Barone parses the House roll call vote on the Waxman-Markey climate change bill – aka “cap-and-trade.” It’s a vote worth dissecting as it’s one of the first major roll calls of the Obama Administration where partisan solidarity took a back seat - especially on the Democratic side of the aisle - to economic worries back home.

Per his methods in his authoritative biennial guide, “The Almanac of American Politics,” Barone analyzes the vote geographically, digging into partisan breakdowns in various regions to examine how the vote played out, and to handicap the bill’s prospects in the Senate. (He’s skeptical, if it’s not amended, noting Democratic Senators such as North Dakota’s Kent Conrad, who voiced, and Missouri’s Claire McCaskill, who Tweeted(!), their public skepticism of the bill’s potential burdensome economic impact on their constituents’ wallets.)

Barone still assigns regional monikers that bear a sort of charm redolent of an earlier era of political science: “The Germano-Scandinavian Midwest (IA, MN, WI).” Others are more contemporarily shrewd.

Barone updates the traditional “Deep South” vs. “Upper South” or “Old South” vs. “New South” dichotomies. In 2009, the Obama Era, Barone cleaves the coastal “South Atlantic (FL, GA, NC, SC, VA)” from the vast “Interior South,” limning a wide arc through what’s left of the Section across states of seemingly dissonant political traditions: from Appalachian West Virginia, through once decidedly “Upper South” Tennessee and Kentucky, snapping up the old Wallace/Thurmond redoubt and segregationist strongholds of Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana and Mississippi, onto western-tinged Oklahoma and Texas.

Roughly, Barone is drawing a distinction between the growing, suburbanizing states that Obama won, but George W. Bush took in 2000 (FL, VA, NC) and the rest of the South where population and incomes remains stagnant, and Democrats still struggle for traction.

Of course, these are only blunt designations. Barone’s “Interior South” includes bastions of educated Southern natives sprinkled with highly educated transplants, trend-setting metropolises like Austin, TX; Nashville, TN; and Lexington, KY that may one day overwhelm the Wacos and Memphises and Paducahs that keep those states conformably combined within the same category as West Virginia, Oklahoma and Mississippi.

And his “South Atlantic” includes South Carolina, once the most “Solid” of the “Solid South” in its Democratic partisan fervor and electoral expression of Southern Sectional defiance. (SC Dem presidential vote performance ranged from 1896-1944 spanned from 85%-98%.) But, the once-Dixiecrat Strom Thurmond impressed a durable Republican tradition when he switched parties back in the ‘60’s. The urbane Gov. Mark Sanford hails from a resort-dotted coast that’s the growing part of the state that gave an openly lesbian – if business friendly - Democratic Congressional candidate a respectable vote total in 2008. Sanford’s Coastal Carolina taste in genteel plantations and “exotic” Argentine paramours contrasts with the Up Country, South Carolina’s “Interior South,” where Mike Huckabee’s blend of social conservatism and economic populism played better.

Georgia is a sort of awkward fit in this column, too; something of a lagging indicator. Atlanta’s ‘burbs are driving demographic shifts at play in Virginia and North Carolina, but the Peach State’s Republicanism bloomed later than that of other Southern states, possibly retarded by Favorite Son Jimmy Carter’s legacy. Nevertheless, Obama scored the highest raw Dem vote total ever here, and snared the biggest share of Georgia’s popular vote since “that peanut farmer” bested Gerald Ford and Ronald Reagan.

But, Barone needed to hammer these circled squares into contiguous clusters. And, I-95 is useful as a spine that conjoins “The South Atlantic.” If trends in Tennessee and Texas continue apace, and Georgia’s and South Carolina’s still lollygag along, Barone may have to engage in his own creative Reapportionment.

But, for 2009, Barone’s updated distinction between “The South Atlantic” and “The Interior South” offers a more-than-serviceable thumbnail snapshot of an ever-changing Southern political landscape.

The "Social Issue," Crime, and Inner Cities--Are They Still Important???

Some seemingly random, but I think connected, thoughts on crime, urban life, demographic change, and politics:

I’m working my way through Richard Scammon and Ben Wattenberg’s “The Real Majority.” Written in 1970, it is in many ways a follow up to Phillips’ “The Emerging Republican Majority.” Though not nearly as exhaustive or as focused on political geography and history, it does grapple with the same turbulent time period—the late 1960’s—and tries to figure out how we seemed to move from LBJ to Nixon so quickly. Whereas Phillips had worked for the Nixon campaign, Wattenberg had worked for Johnson, and later Henry “Scoop” Jackson. Thus, their political leanings (at the time) and agenda differ a bit. Central to “The Real Majority” is the contention that the country’s rejection of LBJ was not rooted, as many have argued, in a disdain for the Vietnam War. While there was certainly opposition, the support for first Eugene McCarthy, and ultimately Nixon, was driven by what Scammon and Wattenberg call the “Social Issue.” Foremost among voters’ concerns was a combination of crime, urban unrest, racial strife, alienation, and other related issues that produced a broad uneasiness or malaise about the direction of the country. Whereas Vietnam may have been the most “important” issue for the country, it was not the “voting” issue that defined politics. In this vein, one can see how politicians like George Wallace, Ronald Reagan (first as California Governor), and even, I’d argue, William F. Buckley in his 1965 race for NYC mayor could tap into the anxiety of voters. Because elections are ultimately about putting together coalitions, the ability of candidates to capitalize on these sentiments and have them (rather than economic concerns, for example) determine voting outcomes can lead to a re-ordering of our politics.

As our country has become both 1) more suburbanized and 2) less afflicted by crime, we tend to forget how big of an issue the problem of our cities was by the late ‘60’s. With mass migration out of the central cities attention turned to other issues. I’ve always been fascinated with big cities—not only their politics, but also how they grapple with issues like crime, housing, education, and transportation. A few weeks ago, the New York Times came out with a fascinating story, and interactive map, on the incidence of murders across the five boroughs over several years. The first thing that we note is that compared to earlier years—especially during the ‘70’s and ‘80’s--the murder rate in New York City is substantially lower today. Whereas there were 2245 murders in NYC in 1990, last year saw only 521. Thus, we might imagine—using the parlance of “The Real Majority--that the “Social Issue” has receded in importance for New Yorkers, and others nation wide. One also finds, and the interactive map is amazing is allowing one to track each murder, that there are definite patterns in 1) who tends to commit murder; 2) who tends to be a victim; and 3) where these crimes take place. The combination of these variables will probably contribute to how people think about the severity of crime and the way it affects them. We see that murders in NYC tend to be concentrated in certain areas and tend to have perpetrators and victims who belong to the same race.

All of this—the rise of the “Social Issue,” issues of race and poverty, and the prevalence of crime—conditions how we view not only our cities, but our politics more broadly. Rarely, unfortunately, do we get the opportunity to take a step back and reflect upon these areas and the people who occupy them. These issues have been bouncing around in my head since I became aware of (and now obsessed with) an amazing photographer who has devoted the last 30 years to documenting inner city America. Camilo Jose Vergara currently has two exhibitions going, one in New York and one in Washington, that showcase his documentation of places (and people) we tend to overlook. While he primarily photographs inner city buildings, his work forces you to think about how our cities change (or don’t) and what those changes mean. He has created a website devoted to his work—Invincible Cities—that takes one to Harlem, Camden NJ, and Richmond CA and allows you to go street by street to see not only how these neighborhoods look today, but how they looked over several decades. His show currently in Washington, “Storefront Churces” presents his look at inner city houses of worship. A central theme to these portraits is that inner city churches have tended to spring up in places previously occupied by businesses, schools, or other, now departed, congregations. By tracking these changes one can get an understanding not only of the importance of religion to these communities but of how our urban areas have transformed themselves over time. Whereas many of the neighborhoods Vergara photographs were originally home to European immigrants, they are now virtually entirely black.

How do we put all of this together??? Ultimately (but perhaps unfortunately), politics and policy is about the issues that we are paying attention to and that we feel directly affect us. A generation ago, crime and the “problem of the cities” were among the top few issues driving our politics. Now these issues would seem to fall far down the list of Americans’ concerns. These urban areas, however, don’t disappear even if their problems get subsumed within the mix of more pressing concerns. Fortunately we have artists like Camilo Jose Vergara who force us to remember and ponder what is going on there.

Virginia Guv Primary Reminiscent of Feingold's Badger State Breakthrough

Multicandidate primaries are always tricky to predict. Turnout is usually low. Candidates have different bases of support. Each needs to decide which of their opponents they should attack and how. As a result, the final outcome is oftentimes completely out of whack compared to pre-voting polls and expectations. Such was the case with yesterday's stunner in the Virginia Democratic Governor's primary (see coverage here, here, here, and here). Prior to the vote, polling suggested an extremely tight race between Terry McCauliffe, Brian Moran, and the eventual winner Creigh Deeds. While Clinton booster and former DNC head McCauliffe was the early favorite in the race, based largely on his fundraising prowess and ties to the establishment Democratic machinery, downstate State Senator Deeds had been gaining momentum in recent days. Moran, a former state legislator from vote rich northern Virginia, was counting on a huge turnout among his suburban base to put him over the top. With three relatively evenly matched candidates one would have expected a nail biter. The result???--a Deeds landslide as he captured 50% compared to McCauliffe's 26% and Moran's 24%.

As I was reading the commentary on the race and looking at the results, something about this contest seemed awfully familiar to me. It hit me that yesterday's outcome, and the campaign leading up to it, mirrored almost exactly a campaign that I witnessed firsthand back in Wisconsin. In 1992, Democrats were looking for a nominee to challenge incumbent GOP Senator Bob Kasten. The three Democrats who emerged were 1) Joseph Checota, a wealthy Milwaukee attorney and former head of the Wisconsin Democratic party; 2) Congressman Jim Moody, a multi-term House member from Milwaukee, the state's largest vote center; and 3) Russ Feingold, a relatively unknown State Senator from Middleton, a suburb of Madison. Checota and Moody were by far the best funded and best tied to the party establishment and supporting interests. Feingold, while respected in the State Senate, was seen as the weakest of the three and least likely to win. The campaign quickly devolved into a nasty and expensive spat between the Checota and Moody. Checota was able to contribte considerable sums of his own wealth to the race and Moody was able to tap into numerous reliable sources of Democratic donors. As these two spent months attacking each other, Feingold plodded on, an afterthought to most. When the early September vote was held, Feingold scored a massive upset, capturing 70% of the primary vote, with Checota and Moody evenly splitting the remainder. See some coverage of the race here).

Fast forward to Virginia's race this year and the parallels are striking. You have a wealthy former party head (McCauliffe/Checota) with no previous elective experience, a well known legislator from the state's largest bloc of voters (Moran/Moody), and a relatively unknown, folksy, yet respected, State Senator (Deeds/Feingold). In Virginia this year, as in Wisconsin in 1992, McCauliffe and Moran spent much of the race focusing their fire on each other, especially given how much of the vote was expected to come from the place both resided--northern Virginia. Checota and Moody fought heavily over the Milwaukee area's bounty of voters in their back yards. The candidate most expected to trail far beyond the frontrunners was left to develop his own campaign, almost in isolation of the others. In doing so they were able to court a bloc of voters seemingly being ignored by those at the top. In '92, Moody and Checota were both seen as somewhat distant from Wisconsin's progressive tradition--Checota for his wealth and Moody (though sporting a generally liberal voting record) for his tenure on the Ways and Means committee. Feingold, on the other hand, came to the race with unblemished progressive bona fides. In Virginia, Moran and McCauliffe positioned themselves toward the left end of the spectrum while Deeds, hailing from the rural western part of the state, espoused a more Blue Dog-like platform.

While there are no doubt some differences between these races--most notably the fact that Deeds had run, and barely lost, a state-wide race previously whereas Feingold had no such state-wide exposure--the commonalities are worth noting for no other reason than how much the highlight the unpredictability of primaries. With each additional candidate in the race, the tactical calculus becomes much more complicated. While focusing attention on one candidate might seem obvious, such a decision may in fact present opportunities to those being ignored. When nobody is paying attention to a particular candidate, that candidate not only evades some scrutiny and bloodying, they also don't have to worry about their campaign devolving into a series of reactions and tit for tat responses. They can, in a sense, define their own candidacy, something that is no doubt how most candidates would like to appeal to voters.

When it comes to making predictions in these contests, perhaps these examples suggest that, when in doubt, pick the candidate running last. They oftentimes win.

Why is John Cornyn Being So Nice to Sonia Sotomayor???

To continue our look into the political, geographic, and demographic ramifications of the nomination of Judge Sonia Sotomayor to the Supreme Court, I thought I'd speculate a bit on how various Senate Republicans might approach the confirmation process. Over the past week the lines seem to have been drawn around the question of whether biography should affect one's view of the law. As we approach the confirmation hearings and vote, we'll move (thankfully) from the stage that we're currently in--all sorts of "legal analysts," interest group representatives, and other flaks pontificating their positions and advancing their agendas--to one in which those actually voting on her nomination (i.e. Senators) are at the forefront. Unlike the current crop of voices, Senators are actually accountable to voters. Thus, they tend to approach these decisions with a bit more tact and caution.

To get a sense of the calculations that some Republican Senators might be going through, I thought I'd look at the size of the Hispanic populations in their relative states. Opposing the first Hispanic nominee to the Supreme Court leaves one open to retribution from Hispanic constituents. If it comprises a sizable component of the electorate, an energized Hispanic bloc bent on retribution could prove decisive in defeating the Senator who votes "No." Given the degree to which Hispanics moved to the Democratic ticket last fall, and given the rate of growth in the Hispanic population, a number of GOP Senators are going to spend the next few months walking a delicate tight rope.

I've created the following chart that looks at each of the 40 current GOP Senate seats. Note that because we're focusing on the electoral dimension of the confirmation vote I haven't included the retiring Senators but have listed their seats as open. I've coded, first, when that seat is up for re-election. We might expect those Senators with re-election races next year to perhaps be most fearful of the charge of being anti-Hispanic. I've next coded the percentage of their state that is Hispanic, based on numbers from the Pew Hispanic Center. Obviously, those states with a larger Hispanic vote present "No" voting Senators with a greater risk. Next I've coded the margin of victory in each Senator's last election. Those GOP senators who had extremely large margins of victories might have little to fear (especially if they come from states w/a small Hispanic population) in voting against Sotomayor compared to those who had close races. Next I identify the seven current Republican members of the Senate Judiciary Committee. These members will be in the spotlight as they lead the questioning of the nominee and cast the initial votes on her. Committee members also tend to "carry the water" for the party at large during the nomination process so we will see the emerging GOP strategy on Sotomayor implemented by this group. Finally, I've indicated how Senators in office at the time voted on Sotomayor's elevation to the U.S. Court of Appeals in 1998. It will be interesting to see whether those who supported her in 1998 now vote against her, or vice versa,--and how they justify such a vote.

A couple of interesting things to note. As I noted in the title of this post, Texas Senator John Cornyn has been conspicous in his even-handedness toward the Sotomayor nomination. One reason for this, perhaps, is the demographic reality that is modern Texas. Percentage wise, the Lone Star State has the largest Hispanic population in the country. While Cornyn was just re-elected last fall with a relatively healthy margin, any future ambitions that he may have in the state (or nation-wide) are going to be affected by his standing among Hispanic voters. The fact that he also sits on the Judiciary Committee would seem to be further evidence of why he is taking such a moderate tack at this point. Finally I'd note that Cornyn is currently the head of the Republican Senatorial Committee and thus in charge of the effort to recruit and fund GOP Senate candidates this cycle. Unlike other Senators he needs to be especially attuned to the national mood and electorate. His recent comments that the GOP needs to become a "national" party again show that he is at least aware of how much work needs to be done among certain groups (including Hispanics) of the electorate. Cornyn's colleague from Texas, Kay Bailey Hutchison, is also worth watching. While her most recent victory was double that of Cornyn's, she has perhaps a more difficult decision to make. First, Hutchison is widely expected to declare herself a candidate for the upcoming governor's race in which she will challenge incumbent GOP Governor Rick Perry in what will no doubt be a blockbuster primary fight. Thus, each decision she makes will be parsed for its electoral ramifications. Complicating this is the fact that she voted against Sotomayor in 1998. The result is some pretty complicated political jujitsu---how do you 1) win a Republican primary in which the incentive is to move right (anti-Sotomayor) yet leave yourself in a position to 2) win the general election where over 1/3 of the electorate is Hispanic???

A similar dynamic exists further west in Arizona. Here, John McCain is on the ballot next year. While he's had relatively little difficulty in his recent re-elections, the trendlines have not been favorable for the GOP in Arizona over the past few cycles. Democrats have gained 3 House seats since 2006 and many believe that it will go Democratic in the next presidential race. With 30% of the population being Hispanic, one can see why these trends have emerged. One can envision a scenario in which McCain sides with the Sotomayor pick in the end. It fits his image of an "independent" or "maverick" while also, I'd suggest, being an easy vote. He will have to explain why he changed his mind after his 1998 vote against Sotomayor, though. Because McCain doesn't sit on Judiciary, the fate of the Sotomayor nomination will probably be well known by the time it gets to the Senate floor. If it appears that Sotomayor is going to be easily confirmed, McCain can vote "Yes"without worrying that his decision will change the outcome. He maintains good standing back home while not incurring the wrath of his party--he wins on all counts. John Kyl, the other Arizona GOPer, is in a much more tricky spot. He faces the same treacherous demographics, yet 1) had a closer re-election last time; 2) sits on Judiciary (and will thus be forced to stake a position relatively early on); and 3) voted against Sotomayor in 1998.

Other Senators to watch??? I'd pick out Richard Burr from North Carolina. Electorally he's in a state that has been moving Democratic and has a Hispanic population that while not huge, can be decisive--see Nate Silver's discussion of the Hispanic vote in Obama's Tarheel State win. He's also been pulling some pretty underwhelming poll numbers for an incumbent. The fact that he's not on Judiciary and wasn't in the Senate in '98, and thus didn't vote on Sotomayor then, gives him a lot of room to maneuver now. He could vote "Yes" in the end too.

The Political Geography of the East Bronx

President Obama's nomination of Judge Sonia Sotomayor to the Supreme Court offers another opportunity to visit some interesting political geography. While there is already heated debate about how her background, ethnicity, and upbringing will affect her jurisprudence, I don't want to enter that controversy. Rather, her nomination allows us to further explore the complexity of our political and electoral landscape, in arguably the most complex city of all--New York.

Judge Sotomayor grew up in the East Bronx's Soundview neighborhood, and more specifically, the Bronxdale Houses. Later her family moved to the massive Co-Op City. While public housing is commonly associated with blight and urban decay, a more correct reading of its history in America would note that it was for many, especially in the years following World War II, a stepping stone to the middle class and home ownership. Indeed, for working class strivers like the Sotomayors and other recent immigrants, these neighborhoods were a vital point of transition between where they came from and a hopefully prosperous future. For an exhaustive, and indeed critical, history of how New York City's housing and other infrastructure developed in the post WWII period, there is no better source that Robert Caro's much lauded history of Robert Moses, The Power Broker.

The Bronx is in many ways a misunderstood or understudied part of the city. Typically associated with 1) the Yankees and 2) crime, it has historically been an extremely diverse though also divided borough (see a discussion of the East Bronx, South Bronx, and the West Bronx). To get a sense of the largest ethnic concentrations in the current Bronx, see the map below.

The neighborhood in which Sotomayor was raised is currently part of New York's 16th congressional district, represented by Rep. Jose Serrano. In many ways, this district is extremely atypical. For example, census data reports that it is the nation's poorest district, with over 40% of the population below the poverty line. The Hispanic population makes up nearly 2/3 of the total. It was also, in the last election, the country's most Democratic. Barack Obama won 95% of the vote there, giving the district a Cook PVI of D+41. CQ's Politics in America notes:

"The South Bronx, overtaken by a post-World War II influx of Hispanics to New York City, has elected men of Puerto Rican origin to the House since 1970. The 16th's strong Puerto Rican influence is complemented by African and South and Central American immigrant communities. The district's 3 percent non-Hispanic white population is the nation's lowest."

Adjoining parts of the Bronx are included in the 17th district, represented by Eliot Engel and the 7th district, represented by Joseph Crowley.

While the confirmation process will certainly allow for Judge Sotomayor to articulate how her upbringing has affected how she views the law, any discussion of her home's politics will be more than tangential. Its these tangents, though, that I tend to find the most interesting.

If you're interested in all the happenings in Bronx politics, check out the Bronx News Network.

Mississippi Turning???

Some fascinating news out of Mississippi. This week saw the election of James Young as the first African American mayor of Philadelphia, Mississippi (NYTimes coverage here). For anyone familiar with the history of race in America and the Civil Rights Movement, Philadelphia is known as the place where civil rights workers Andrew Goodman, James Chaney, and Michael Schwerner were murdered in June of 1964. Along with the Montgomery bus boycott, freedom rides, the Birmingham campaign, and the March on Selma, these deaths during Freedom Summer were a major chapter in the march toward the passage of the Civil Rights Act and Voting Rights Act of 1964 and 1965. Likewise, they've cast a long shadow that has been difficult for the city to shed. This election may help its residents turn a corner.

Later, Philadelphia was home to another event--viewed differently by competing camps--that speaks to our complicated history. Namely, Ronald Reagan kicked off his 1980 presidential campaign there at the Neshoba County Fair. By arguing strongly for "states rights," many have argued that Reagan, in coded language, was presenting himself as a more polished, refined, and less menacing version of George Wallace. This was, for critics, the personification and perfection of the "Southern Strategy." Others have offered a more benign interpretation of the Gipper's words to suggest that he was simply articulating his small government platform.

While Mississippi has the largest number of elected African American officials in the country, the bulk of these politicians come from the Delta region in the western part of the state. Back during the primaries I wrote a post about this region and how it differs from the rest of the state. Neshoba County is not in the Delta but sits in central Mississippi and has demographics that, even without its troubled history, would make the election of a black mayor more difficult. The county as a whole is 65% white and only 20% African American. Philadelphia has a larger black population with the breakdown being roughly 55% white and 40% African American. In last year's presidential race, McCain overwhelmed Obama in Neshoba County, winning 72% to 27%, 16 points better than he did statewide. Within Philadelphia itself, McCain bested Obama 59.5% to 40.5% (Results available here).

Its always dangerous to extrapolate from local races. As the coverage of Mayor Young's victory suggest, he campaigned as a reformer against a long-time incumbent and thus was certainly able to tap into voters'--black and white--dissatisfaction with the performance of city government. Nonetheless, one wonders whether the Obama campaign, despite losing badly in the state, benefitted someone like James Young. We know, for example, that black turnout in 2008 reached virtual parity with that of whites and that states with large black populations such as Alabama, Mississippi, and South Carolina saw voter turnout increase. If voters, once energized and mobilized, continue to vote over the long term then we might see something like an "Obama effect" in these other races. Its certainly too early to conclude that this is what's happening. Likewise, a four month old Obama administration isn't going to heal decades of racial tension and create national unity. Regardless of whether these campaigns are connected and regardless of whether James Young's election as mayor signifies something much larger than one candidate beating another in a small town race, one can't deny the symbolism.

**Top photo courtesy of the Neshoba Democrat

Fun With Maps--Are Democratic States More "Developed"???

This comparison may not mean much but let's consider it. I just came across a map (and companion article) of the U.S. that breaks down states based on their respective Human Development Index (HDI) measure. The HDI was created by the United Nations to gauge a country's level of development. It incorporates measures of educational attainment, life expectancy, and income to create a continuum along which a country (or now state) can be placed. As a result, one can make comparisons between countries, and do so over time, to track growth and progress. When I saw the map I immediately thought that there was something familiar about it--it resembles pretty closely the results of the 2008 election.

For example, of the 21 states that have the highest HDI (.95 and above), Barack Obama won all of them except Alaska. Of the 8 lowest scoring states--HDI of .849 and below, McCain won them all. For the 15 states in the second highest cohort (.900 to .949), Obama won 6. Of the 6 states in the middle of the continuum, Obama only won Florida. What we see is a strong correlation between a state's HDI and Obama's success there. All of his electoral votes came from states at the upper end of the continuum with the exception of Florida. McCain was only able to capture 3 electoral votes from the most developed states, aided by Sarah Palin's Alaska roots.

Mere coincidence??? Perhaps, but if we look at the recent trends we shouldn't be so surprised by this. Exit polling conducted on election day (and indeed during the primaries as well) showed that Obama and other Democrats had begun to make in-roads among those at the top of the economic ladder. We've similarly seen great movement away from the Republicans among the most highly educated. Thus, whereas traditionally it had been thought that the Republican base was among the high income/high education chunk of the electorate, this no longer seems true.

For more on this question of how class, education, and other variables are affecting voting trends, see Andrew Gelman's work.

***Update: Speaking of which, Gelman critiques and tweaks the numbers a bit here.

***Further update: After some more data critiquing, a re-scaling of the data and the following map. The electoral correlations I suggest still largely hold although Obama does better on the low, but not lowest, part of the continuum.

How Do You Stop the Bleeding If You're the GOP???

Recently released data from a new Gallup Poll is not good news for the GOP. As you see in the graphs above, every single demographic group surveyed has seen their Republican identification decline. About the only groups that have remained steady are seniors and frequent church goers.

Normally when a party is in decline, it is a result of the defection of part of its coalition. In the classic "realignment" school of thinking, new eras of party dominance are precipitated by a re-organization of the groups supporting each of the parties. What you have is a reshuffling of the deck, in other words. Depending on the size of the groups moving from one side to the other, the degree and durability of the new electoral majority can vary. Even in large realignments, though, you tend to see some parts of the minority party's coalition remain strong.

While these numbers may be temporary, the real problem with them, from the Republicans' standpoint, is that they don't offer much of a path forward. If Democratic gains were concentrated among particular groups--say the young, the un-married, those in urban areas, etc.--Republicans could create a strategy to isolate these groups from those who are still part of your coalition as well as from those whose allegiances aren't firmly defined (i.e. those traditionally seen as independents and moderates) Republicans would ideally also be able to target parts of the Democratic coalition that is shaky. By trying to define the Democrats as only representing a segment of the electorate the GOP could position themselves as a viable alternative. This is classic party politics. Whether it be Democrats reaching out to urban and minority voters with the ascendance of FDR or Reagan's courting working class whites, party majorities have their genesis when the party out of power is able to pick off the other's "low hanging fruit," especially when they are of a sizable number. However, when you are losing ground among virtually everyone, its much more difficult to stop the momentum working against you.

So what does the GOP do?? Does it simply try to hold on to those groups that, while they are running away, are doing so the slowest? Do they try something more radical? Or, perhaps most likely, do they stay in a holding pattern and hope that the Democrats overreach and fail to meet the heightened expectations of the American electorate? In other words, can you win by default?

Does the Career of David Souter Tell Us Anything About the Current State of “Conservatism” in America???

With Friday’s announcement that Justice David Souter is retiring from the Supreme Court, attention has turned to how President Obama will approach the vacancy and attempt to put his imprint on the court. In much of this discussion, the conventional wisdom has been that the balance of the court is not likely to change with the confirmation of Souter’s successor. Pegged as a member of the four justice “liberal” wing of the court, Souter has been viewed—especially among those on the left—as a reliable defender of choice, the separation of church and state, and other progressive stances . As such, he has become the justice that conservatives most love to hate. For those on the right, Souter’s decisions have been those of an apostate in light of the assurances originally made by his supporters including President George H.W. Bush.

This picture of Souter, I’d argue, is off base. Justice Souter, it seems to me, is not a “liberal” as we tend to define the term. Similarly, those who argue that his “conservatism” never materialized on the high court are misreading his approach. While I don’t want to argue that Souter’s jurisprudence is analogous to either the Democrats’ or Republicans’ ideologies, untangling his record and style might help us understand some of the troubles currently vexing the modern GOP.

Perhaps the best retrospective of Souter’s time on the court that I’ve read over the past few days is provided by the New Republic’s Gordon Silverstein. Combating the conventional wisdom, Silverstein argues that Souter has been the quintessential “judicial conservative”. He writes:

Souter's departure offers a timely reminder that when it comes to the courts, we need to be careful about our terms. Though Souter's decisions were welcomed by ideological and partisan liberals, they were judicially conservative decisions. In fact, his were among the only consistently conservative decisions the court has known for the last two decades.

The reason is that there is a difference between an ideological or movement conservative and a judicial conservative. Judicial conservatives generally have great respect for the law, and for legal decisions that have been made. This is the essence of what is called stare decisis--let the decision stand. Upholding precedent staunches the forces of change--and typically, that generates conservative results. But when the precedent you are upholding is precedent set by the Warren Court, holding back the forces of change means enforcing liberal decisions against radical demands for change from movement conservatives.

What Souter’s case illustrates more broadly, it seems, is the debate about what “conservatism” really means. This is a debate, I’d note that has been raging for the last few years on Andrew Sullivan’s blog and to which he has devoted an entire book. It is also a debate that has been necessitated by the evolution of the modern GOP. The Souter nomination is just one small chapter in this story. As traditionally understood (and defined by Sullivan among others), conservatism’s central tenet is a skepticism about the ability of man (especially via government action or the power of the state) to change or re-order the world. For these writers “conservatism” and “doubt” are analogous. Thus, conservatives have a respect for the status quo, tradition, and that which has served society well over the long term. This strain of conservatism doesn’t argue that society and culture don’t or shouldn’t change, but rather that such change should be allowed to take its natural course rather than through state led engineering. Attempts to legislate change are not only likely to fail but will also endanger our liberties and freedoms. Thus, when faced with the choice of acting and non-acting (despite the severity of the problem at hand), a conservative will in almost all cases choose non-action as the best course.

With Souter’s retirement, I’ve gone back and found many of the profiles written about him upon his nomination for the court in 1990. In addition to providing some interesting nuggets of irony—i.e. words of praise from David Keene and words of criticism from Planned Parenthood—these stories repeatedly used a term to describe Souter’s personality and judicial temperament--cautious. The Souter of 1990 was someone uncomfortable with attempts, including by the court, to disrupt the status-quo. A Newsweek piece at the time noted that “His record suggests that he sees the judiciary as an institution with limited powers.” In retrospect, then, we shouldn’t be surprised by his opinions in Planned Parenthood vs. Casey or Bush vs. Gore. In both, it can be argued that he took the conservative position—not using the court to overturn longstanding precedent or interfere with the normal workings of other institutions of government. In both cases, as well, Souter drew further ire from those on the Right.

In reflecting upon this, I went back and re-read some of former Senator Warren Rudman’s memoirs, “Combat.” Rudman has been one of Souter’s closest friends since Souter served under Rudman in the New Hampshire Attorney General’s office back in the late 1960’s. Rudman had long advocated the elevation of Souter to the high court and was aided in this effort by the fact that former NH Governor John Sununu served as White House Chief of Staff in 1990. When Souter’s nomination was announced, Rudman made it his personal mission to shepherd the nomination through the Senate. When we examine Rudman’s career and ideology we see someone who epitomized this “cautious conservatism.” In the last chapter, he writes:

If someone had told me in the 1960s that one day I would serve in a Republican Party that opposed abortion rights—which the Supreme Court had endorsed—advocated prayer in the schools, and talked about government inspired “family values,” I would have thought he was crazy.

To me the essence of conservatism is just the opposite: government should not intrude in anything as personal as the decision to have a child, it should not be championing prayer or religion, and family values should come from families and religious institutions, not from politically inspired, Washington based moralists. (p. 243)

Rudman left the Senate just as the conflict between this version of conservatism and “movement” conservatism came into stark focus. With George H.W. Bush’s intra-party challenge from Pat Buchanan in 1992 (and also recall the 1988 success of Pat Robertson), followed by the ascendancy of Newt Gingrich and a heavily southern-tinged GOP congressional majority in 1996, a pragmatic, “cautious” conservatism espoused by people like Rudman, Howard Baker, Bill Cohen, John Chafee, and John Danforth was cast aside. In its place was a more confrontational, activist, and ideological version. This metamorphosis reached its apotheosis during the Bush 43 presidency. Whether it be Terry Schiavo, the War in Iraq, or funding for faith based initiatives, the policies of the Bush Administration, though branded as “conservative,” were premised on activism, not the status quo. “Caution” is not a word one would use to define the past eight years. Electorally, one region of the country has responded most negatively to this governing philosophy—the northeast. I don’t think it’s accidental that this is the part of the country that produced David Souter (and Rudman).


To get a sense of how the GOP has suffered in the northeast, consider the following. Of the 33 Senate and Governor’s seats in the Northeast, Democrats currently hold 27 (including Senators Sanders and Lieberman). In 2008 every one of these states voted for Barack Obama as well. Looking back over the past three decades we see how much the Republicans’ fortunes have declined in this region. Even in 1976, in the aftermath of the brutal Watergate election for the GOP, Republicans held twice as many statewide seats in the Northeast as they do now. What’s happened is that the traditional “Yankee” or northeastern Republican has become virtually extinct, a point highlighted by one of the few remaining of this species, Olympia Snowe, in an op-ed to the New York Times last week. Yankee Republicans are quite different in outlook than the modern day “movement conservative.” Writing about the northeast, Kevin Phillips argued that it has been this region more than any other that has been the bastion and defender of the “establishment.” While the “establishment” or “old order” is “conservative,” it is not conservative in the “movement” sense. Rather, this conservatism is temperamental, privileging the status quo over attempts to re-order or re-make society. When Phillips penned The Emerging Republican Majority, the northeast had become the most “liberal” part of the country because at that time, “liberalism” was indeed the status quo: “ As America moved into a new political era in 1968, the Northeast once again assumed its position…as the national stronghold of the old order, which this time was an institutionalized liberalism.”

What this all shows, I think, is that while its dangerous to equate a judge’s philosophy and decisions with an underlying political ideology, its equally dangerous to assume that terms like “conservative” have a single meaning. Rather, as I think the Souter example shows, this term means different things to different people, at different times, and perhaps in different places. Whereas it certainly makes no difference to Justice Souter how more politically minded conservatives and Republicans untangle these conflicting definitions, for the GOP it seems imperative if they want to recover their footing and become, as Texas Senator John Cornyn said last week, a “national party” once again.